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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.Over the past 20 years in the United States there has been a trend toward changing criminal 
justice policy to provide treatment as an alternative to incarceration for nonviolent drug 
offenders. Two main models have emerged that are aimed at effecting this change. One model is 
Drug Court; the other is statewide policy reformation, mandating treatment for all nonviolent 
drug offenders. The overall purposes of this study were twofold: 1. To examine the varying 
effectiveness of the Drug Court model compared to other criminal justice related models for 
treating substance abusing offenders measured in terms of participant completion rates, criminal 
recidivism and cost; and 2. To determine the impact of statewide mandated treatment policy 
reform on the operation of Drug Courts. California, with the implementation of the Substance 
Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 (SACPA), in a state with a large number of Drug 
Courts already in operation, provided a unique setting in which to examine the effects of the 
Drug Court model compared to court mandated non-Drug Court treatment models on offender 
outcomes. The research design for this study built on previous work performed by this evaluator 
in California. Detailed data on program resources (e.g., treatment services), outcomes (e.g., 
recidivism) and their costs were provided from a study
1 performed before the implementation of 
SACPA in California (1998-1999). For the current study, detailed program, outcome and cost 
data were collected (from administrative databases and paper files) on a cohort of Drug Court 
participants after SACPA implementation (those entering the program in 2002-2003) as well as 
on a cohort of SACPA participants who enrolled in the program during the same time period. All 
groups were tracked for 3 years following program entry. Results showed that the state mandated 
treatment in California (SACPA) succeeded in reaching a large number of eligible offenders and 
offered treatment for their substance use issues instead of incarceration. It has had a much greater 
impact on the total system of offenders than Drug Court that often serves only a small number of 
offenders. However, the Drug Court model showed greater success at producing higher rates of 
treatment completion and lower recidivism. Further, it did this with a significantly lower per 
person taxpayer investment. Overall, this data showed that the Drug Court model was a more 
efficient use of resources. If the resources could be provided for SACPA to incorporate practices 
of the Drug Court model that have been shown to be effective in this population (or Drug Court 
could be expanded to include a larger number of drug offenders), then this form of state 
mandated treatment could be an effective benefit resulting in large cost savings. 
                                                 
1 This study was a part of a statewide cost study of Drug Courts in California, funded by BJA and the California 
Administrative Office of the Courts. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ver the past decade in the United States there has been a trend toward changing criminal 
justice policy to provide treatment as an alternative to incarceration for nonviolent drug 
offenders. Two main models have emerged that are aimed at effecting this change. One 
model is Drug Court; the other is statewide policy reformation, mandating treatment for all 
nonviolent drug offenders. 
The overall purposes of this study were twofold: 
•  To examine the varying effectiveness of the Drug Court model compared to other 
criminal justice related models for treating substance abusing offenders measured in 
terms of participant completion rates, criminal recidivism and cost; 
•  To determine the impact of statewide mandated treatment policy reform on the operation 
of Drug Courts. 
The Drug Court model includes a higher level of supervision, particularly by the Court and 
(generally) a standardized treatment program for all the participants within a particular court 
(including phases that each participant must pass through by meeting certain goals). There is also 
regular and frequent drug testing. In contrast, most of the state-mandated program models for 
drug offenders have less criminal justice supervision (particularly less court involvement) and a 
less standardized, sometimes more individualized, treatment regimen. In addition, the non-Drug 
Court treatment model uses drug testing less frequently. For example, in California, the drug 
policy legislation provided funds for treatment and some for probation, but no funds for drug 
testing. It is of interest to practitioners and policymakers to determine the relative effectiveness 
of these two models in assisting drug offenders to complete drug treatment and in reducing the 
incidence of drug offenders returning to the criminal justice system (recidivism). 
In November 2000, 61% of California voters approved Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and 
Crime Prevention Act (SACPA). Modeled after the Arizona Drug Medicalization, Prevention 
and Control Act of 1996, the primary goal of SACPA is to provide an alternative to incarceration 
for low-level, nonviolent drug possession offenders (Prop36.org, 2004). At the time SACPA was 
implemented, California had also already broadly implemented the Drug Court model, another 
alternative to incarceration for (generally) nonviolent drug offenders. California has the largest 
number of Drug Courts (approximately 120 in operation) of any state in the union. 
The SACPA mandate included specific offender eligibility criteria required for SACPA 
programs in every county; however, each county was given the freedom to create their own 
SACPA program model and processes. While some counties attempted to implement a SACPA 
program modeled after Drug Court practices, counties were encouraged by the legislations 
proponents to create a different SACPA program model that had little criminal justice 
involvement. California is therefore a unique setting in which to examine the effects of the Drug 
Court model compared to court mandated non-Drug Court treatment models on offender 
outcomes. This setting also allows for an examination of the relative program investment and 
outcome costs as well as the effects of the introduction of court mandated non-Drug Court 
treatment models on Drug Court policies, organization, practices and costs. 
O 
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Research Design and Methods 
The research design for this study built on previous work performed by this evaluator. Detailed 
data on program resources (e.g., treatment services), outcomes (e.g., recidivism) and their costs 
were provided from a study
1 performed before the implementation of the Substance Abuse and 
Crime Prevention Act (SACPA) in California. This previous study included Drug Court 
participants from nine Drug Court sites. Two
2 of these sites, in two separate counties (the El 
Monte Drug Court in Los Angeles County and the San Joaquin County Drug Court), were 
selected for this study based on two main criteria; 1) The counties had SACPA programs that 
differed from each other and from the Drug Court model. (One was modeled somewhat like a 
Drug Court program but with less interactive court supervision and no rewards or sanctions 
while the other did not follow the Drug Court model and had no court supervision at all - both 
therefore stood as alternative approaches to the existing Drug Courts), and 2) Based on our 
experience in these sites from the statewide Drug Court study, it was known that high-quality 
data existed in a form reasonably easy to gather (e.g., administrative databases rather than just 
data in paper files). 
For this study, detailed program, outcome and cost data were collected (from administrative 
databases and paper files) on a cohort of Drug Court participants after SACPA implementation 
(those entering the program in 2002-2003) as well as on a cohort of SACPA participants who 
enrolled in the program during the same time period. The data collected included the program 
resources (e.g., treatment services, probation services) used by Drug Court and SACPA program 
participants, outcomes such as criminal justice recidivism and social services use, and the costs 
associated with the use of these resources. These same data sources were used in the previous 
Drug Court cost study. All groups were tracked for 3 years after program entry. 
Qualitative data (through interviews and document review) were collected, using a Drug Court 
typology guide developed by NPC Research and modified for use with the SACPA programs, to 
examine the changes that occurred in Drug Court organization and process due to the 
implementation of SACPA and to examine the current operations of both types of programs. 
Costs data were calculated using an approach called Transactional and Institutional Cost 
Analysis (TICA) (Crumpton, Carey, & Finigan, 2004
3). The TICA approach views an 
individual’s interaction with publicly funded agencies as a set of transactions in which the 
individual utilizes resources contributed from multiple agencies. Transactions are those points 
within a system where resources are consumed and/or change hands. Indirect (support and 
overhead) costs (as a percentage of direct costs) are added to the direct costs of each transaction 
to determine the cost per transaction. The transaction cost is multiplied by the average number of 
transactions for program participants to determine the total average cost per transaction type. 
However, to determine the relative effectiveness and the relative investment and outcome costs of 
the programs, it was necessary to control for differences between program participants. The 
                                                 
1 This study was a part of a statewide cost study of Drug Courts in California, funded by BJA and the California 
Administrative Office of the Courts. 
2 The reasons for choosing two sites for this study included the need to have at least one site to test against the other 
site to verify the consistency of the results. A second reason was the need to stay within a reasonable budget size. 
Additional sites could be added for additional funds. 
3 Crumpton, C. D., Carey, S. M., & Finigan, M. W. (2004). Enhancing Cost Analysis of Drug Courts: The 
Transactional and Institutional Cost Analysis Approach. Submitted to the National Institute of Justice, Office of 
Justice Programs, December 2004. Can be found at www.npcresearch.com 
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analyses of program outcomes including participant recidivism were adjusted to control 
statistically for differences between the groups. Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVAs) were used to 
calculate adjusted means and statistical significance for differences in re-arrests, time on probation, 
jail time served, prison time served, and new court cases. These analyses were adjusted based on 
criminal history in the 2 years prior to program start including past arrests and jail time served. 
Also included in the covariates were demographics (age, ethnicity, gender), drug of choice, and 
time in jail during the recidivism period (except when the mean of interest was time served in jail). 
Results 
The results for this study were organized around six policy questions and are summarized in the 
following text. 
POLICY QUESTION #1: HOW HAVE THE DRUG COURT AND STATEWIDE MANDATED 
TREATMENT MODELS BEEN IMPLEMENTED LOCALLY AND HOW DO THEY DIFFER? 
There are several key differences between the Drug Court model and the SACPA model. One 
obvious difference is capacity. SACPA is designed to treat all eligible offenders well beyond the 
current capacity of Drug Court programs. The ability to provide treatment to a large number of 
offenders is a large benefit of SACPA. In addition, SACPA uses a larger number of treatment 
providers than the Drug Court programs. The benefit of this is the ability to provide participants 
with treatment specific to their needs. The drawback is that it is more difficult to coordinate and 
determine the quality of the treatment with a larger number of providers and it can be difficult 
for supervision to consistently receive communications on participant progress.  
The length of stay for participants in SACPA is longer, and longer time in treatment is known to 
be associated with better outcomes. However, the treatment received in SACPA during that time 
may not be consistent, depending on whether the participant follows through on their treatment 
plan. This is in contrast to the Drug Court model where the high level of court supervision 
enforces participant attendance at treatment. 
The Drug Court model performs several activities that result in a high level of participant 
monitoring including court sessions, treatment sessions, and drug tests. In addition to learning to 
deal with their substance abuse issues in treatment, participants learn to modify their 
inappropriate behaviors from feedback provided by the Drug Court team. Appropriate behavior is 
rewarded and inappropriate behavior is sanctioned so that participants are accountable for their 
behavior either way. 
The successful completion of Drug Court, for each participant, is decided by a team that follows 
a clear list of requirements. The completion of SACPA is not standardized and is decided mainly 
from reports on treatment completion by individual treatment providers who may use very 
different criteria. Finally, the successful completion of Drug Court is called “graduation” and is 
marked by a ceremony and celebration. There is no special marking of SACPA completion aside 
from a certificate of completion. 
In summary, the Drug Court model is more personal, including a much higher level of 
supervision and participant accountability as well as including rewards and sanctions for 
behavior change while the SACPA program reaches and provides treatment to a much larger 
number of individuals making a more personal model more challenging. 
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POLICY QUESTION #2: HOW HAVE DRUG COURTS ADJUSTED (HOW HAVE DRUG COURT 
PROCESS AND POLICIES CHANGED) WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE-MANDATED NON-
DRUG COURT TREATMENT PROGRAMS?  
One of the main findings for this question was that overall there was very little to no change in 
the basic Drug Court policies and procedures. However, there were some external changes that 
may have impacted Drug Court operations and effectiveness, mostly in relation to a change in 
participant population. 
Funding for the Drug Court programs was perceived to have decreased with the passage of 
SACPA. Some staff perceived that the Drug Court program was now competing for scarce 
treatment resources with SACPA.  
With the implementation of SACPA, the continuum of criminal justice diversion programs 
expanded. The role of the Drug Court program began to shift in response. After some confusion 
as to whether participants could go back and forth between programs, increasingly, the Drug 
Court programs are viewed as the next sequential step after a client has unsuccessfully 
participated in SACPA. The Drug Court now serves as a more intensive service option for those 
who are not succeeding under the less stringent criteria of the SACPA program. The Drug Court 
has also changed at what point in the case process they exist, changing from more pre-plea to 
post-plea. 
And finally, there was a perceived change in the participant population with Drug Court 
participants becoming increasingly more addicted and more criminal by the time they enter the 
Drug Court program. This perception was confirmed by the available data on the Drug Court 
participants before and after SACPA implementation in both counties. 
POLICY QUESTION #3: WHAT IS THE SUCCESS RATE OF DRUG COURT PROGRAMS BEFORE 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE-MANDATED NON-DRUG COURT TREATMENT PROGRAMS 
COMPARED TO THE SUCCESS RATE OF DRUG COURT PROGRAMS AFTER? 
Drug Court participants at both sites received similar treatment services and court supervision 
before and after SACPA implementation, although data available at one site showed a significantly 
longer time from arrest to Drug Court entry after SACPA. It is probable that the increased time is 
due to offenders entering the Drug Courts after first spending extended time in the SACPA 
program. This means that the Drug Courts can no longer reasonably follow the third key 
component of Drug Court, that eligible offenders are identified quickly and promptly placed in the 
Drug Court program. 
Graduation rate decreased for both Drug Court sites from pre-SACPA to post-SACPA; from 
80% to 50% in El Monte and 29% to 23% in San Joaquin. Literature shows that graduation rates 
in different Drug Courts tend to vary widely (from 26% to 80%). These two Drug Court sites are 
quite typical. However, it should be noted that San Joaquin had a graduation rate that was quite 
low compared to the national average of around 50% (Cooper, 2004). In spite of this, San 
Joaquin Drug Court participants have low recidivism, regardless of whether they graduate from 
the program. This decrease in graduation rate at both sites is most likely due to the increase in 
criminality and the probable increase in addiction severity in the Drug Court population after 
SACPA implementation. 
Recidivism increased significantly for Drug Court participants after SACPA implementation. 
The increased recidivism was significant even after taking into account any differences in 
demographics, criminal history, time incarcerated and drug of choice. Because the Drug Court 
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programs showed little to no change in policies or procedures, the most likely explanation for 
this is the probable change in the Drug Court population after SACPA to a more addicted 
population at the time of entry. It is also likely that the extended time from arrest to entry into the 
Drug Court program, as well as participants’ experience with SACPA treatment, had an effect on 
how the participants perceived the Drug Court program and Drug Court treatment. Perhaps these 
participants become more jaded after experiencing and failing at treatment more than once, 
rendering the next treatment experience less effective. 
Figure A demonstrates the change in recidivism over 3 years for Drug Court participants before 
SACPA compared to Drug Court participants after SACPA. This graph (see Figure A) looks 
similar in both counties. 
Figure A. Average Number of Re-Arrests Over Time for Drug Court Participants 
Before and After SACPA Implementation 
 
 
POLICY QUESTION #4: WHAT IS THE RELATIVE SUCCESS RATE (MEASURED BY PROGRAM 
COMPLETION RATE AND RECIDIVISM) OF THE DRUG COURT PROGRAM MODEL COMPARED 
TO COURT MANDATED NON-DRUG COURT TREATMENT MODELS? 
SACPA participants in both counties spent significantly more time in the SACPA program 
than the Drug Court participants at either time period. Drug Court participants before SACPA 
show significantly lower recidivism compared to SACPA program participants and Drug Court 
program participants after SACPA implementation. While the recidivism for Drug Court 
participants after SACPA implementation was lower, it did not differ significantly from 
SACPA participants.  
These results imply that the Drug Court model is significantly more effective in getting drug 
offenders to complete treatment. In addition, the Drug Court model, before the changes in 
funding and participant population brought on by SACPA implementation, was more effective in 
lowering criminal justice recidivism than the state-mandated treatment models that do not 
include the interventions shown to be effective in the Drug Court model (such as more 
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personalized supervision, more participant accountability and an option for incarceration as a 
sanction). 
These results also imply that the Drug Court model may (understandably) be less effective with a 
more criminal, more heavily addicted population than it was with a less criminal, less addicted 
population. However, even with a more criminal population than SACPA, Drug Court performed 
at least as well, or better, than the SACPA programs in terms of criminal justice related outcomes 
in these two counties. 
Figure B demonstrates the relative recidivism of SACPA participants compared to Drug Court 
participants at both time periods. Note this is the same graph presented in Figure A, but with 
SACPA participants added to demonstrate how SACPA participant differs from that of Drug 
Court participants at both time points. The graph (see Figure B) looks quite similar in both 
study sites. 
Figure B. Drug Court and SACPA Average Number of Re-Arrests per Participant 
Over 3 Years 
 
POLICY QUESTION #5: WHAT ARE THE INVESTMENT AND OUTCOME COSTS OF DRUG 
COURTS BEFORE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATE-MANDATED NON-DRUG COURT 
TREATMENT PROGRAMS COMPARED TO AFTER IMPLEMENTATION? 
Drug Court program investment costs increased in both programs from pre-SACPA to post-
SACPA, though this was significant only in one site. Outcome costs over 3 years for El Monte 
Drug Court participants were higher for participants who entered Drug Court after SACPA 
implementation than for participants who entered before SACPA. The difference between the 
two grows over time, with post-SACPA participants showing increasingly higher costs. For San 
Joaquin County in spite of the increased number of re-arrests, the decrease in days in jail led to 
no significant difference in outcome costs for Drug Court before and after SACPA. It may be 
that the decrease in jail time is due to SACPA changes in the use of jail for drug crimes. 
Unfortunately, the lower use of jail time did not lead to less crime, as the data showed a 
significant increase in re-arrests in the same time period. 
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Putting both the investment costs and the outcome cost together, we find that in San Joaquin, 
there was no significant difference in costs for all participants from pre-SACPA to post-SACPA. 
The increase in re-arrests for Drug Court participants post-SACPA is balanced out by the 
decrease in the use of jail time. 
However, in El Monte total costs rose by 48% after SACPA implementation. The increase in 
costs in this site is due largely to the increased use of jail (or in-jail treatment) for Drug Court 
participants post-SACPA and higher recidivism (including re-arrests and prison time) for Drug 
Court participants post-SACPA. For this site, Drug Court costs to the taxpayer rose significantly 
after SACPA implementation, probably due to the increase in addiction and criminality of the 
participants. Figure C exemplifies this finding. 
 
Figure C. El Monte Drug Court Participant Total Costs: Program and Outcome Cost 
per Participant for Drug Court Pre-SACPA (T1) and Post-SACPA (T2) 
 
 
POLICY QUESTION #6: WHAT ARE THE RELATIVE INVESTMENT AND OUTCOME COSTS OF 
DRUG COURTS COMPARED TO STATE-MANDATED NON-DRUG COURT TREATMENT 
PROGRAMS? 
SACPA produced a much higher per person program investment costs than Drug Courts. This is 
largely a function of the greater amount of treatment experienced by SACPA participants. Drug 
Courts had less treatment but were more likely to lead to treatment completion. While SACPA 
participants had a higher number of re-arrests than Drug Court participants, their overall outcome 
costs were similar due to less jail time for SACPA participants. Unfortunately, this provides 
evidence that decreased jail time for SACPA participants was related to more crime. 
Overall, the total per person costs were substantially higher for SACPA participants. For a 
significantly lower investment cost, the Drug Court model produced outcomes as good as or 
better than SACPA outcomes (even after the Drug Court population became more criminal and 
more addicted than SACPA participants), resulting in lower costs over all. Although Drug Court 
participants appear to spend less time in the program, the Drug Court model is shown to be more 
efficient in treatment delivery and to produce better outcomes. Figure D provides an example of 
program investment costs from the El Monte Drug Court and SACPA programs. 
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Figure D. Total Costs per Offender for SACPA, Drug Court pre-SACPA (T1) 
and Drug Court Post-SACPA (T2) 
 
 
Limitations 
Although analyses controlled for differences between these groups on criminal history, drug of 
choice, demographics and incarceration rates, data on addiction level was not available and 
therefore could not be controlled for. This is particularly important in looking at differences for 
Drug Court after SACPA implementation because many participants in Drug Court post-SACPA 
were former SACPA participants who were unsuccessful at completing their SACPA program. It 
is likely that these offenders had higher levels of addiction by the time they entered the Drug 
Court programs at both study sites. 
Further, the ability to generalize these results is somewhat limited as this study was performed in 
only two study sites. However, given that every county has implemented SACPA differently, it 
would be difficult to generalize the results from any region to any other region. Although it may 
not be possible to generalize to every county in the state of California, there are clear lessons to 
be learned from these results in terms of the relative effectiveness of the Drug Court model (with 
practices that have been shown to be effective in other settings such as court supervision, 
rewards and sanctions and participant accountability) compared to other program models such as 
those demonstrated at these two study sites.  
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Overall Conclusions 
SACPA represents a broad based policy initiative aimed at reducing rates of incarceration and 
increasing recovery rates for low level, non-violent drug involved offenders. SACPA devotes 
considerable resources to treatment of those offenders. The policy initiative was developed 
without the use of interventions deemed effective in other researched and evaluated initiatives 
such as the Drug Court model. For example, SACPA did not use criminal justice leverage or 
sanctions found to be effective in Drug Courts. Consequently, retention in the SACPA and in 
treatment was lower than might have been anticipated. Nevertheless, on a large scale, California 
diverted many more people to treatment than the Drug Courts alone. In other words, treatment 
access was significantly increased. Further, it is likely that the total number of participants who 
entered recovery and did not recidivate exceeds the total number of Drug Court participants in 
recovery, even though the rates for Drug Court were higher. 
Therefore, the state-mandated treatment in California (SACPA) has succeeded in two important 
ways that were central to its initial logic. First, it has provided an enormous benefit in being able 
to reach nearly all eligible offenders and offer treatment for their substance use issues instead of 
incarceration. Second, it has allowed offenders to have more total treatment than Drug Court. In 
this sense, it has had a much greater impact on the total system of offenders than Drug Court that 
often serves only a small number of offenders.  
Yet, the Drug Court model has shown greater success at producing higher rates of treatment 
completion and lower recidivism. Further, it does this with a significantly lower per person 
taxpayer investment. In short, from these data it can be suggested that SACPA succeeds in 
providing more treatment but the Drug Court model produces better outcomes for less money. 
Overall, this data shows that the Drug Court model is a more efficient use of resources. 
If the resources could be provided for SACPA to incorporate practices of the Drug Court model 
that have been shown to be effective in this population, particularly when based on participant 
risk-level as described by Marlowe (2006), (or Drug Court could be expanded to include a larger 
number of drug offenders) then this form of state-mandated treatment could be an effective 
benefit resulting in large cost savings for the state of California. Other states considering 
statewide treatment reform should take into account the clear benefits demonstrated by the Drug 
Court model in this study, as well as the myriad of Drug Court studies showing positive 
outcomes for Drug Court participants. 
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I 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ver the past decade in the United States there has been a trend toward changing criminal 
justice policy to provide treatment as an alternative to incarceration for nonviolent drug 
offenders. Two main models have emerged that are aimed at effecting this change. One 
model is Drug Court; the other is statewide policy reformation, mandating treatment for all 
nonviolent drug offenders. 
The overall purposes of this study were twofold: 
  To examine the varying effectiveness of the Drug Court model compared to other 
criminal justice related models for treating substance abusing offenders measured in 
terms of participant completion rates, criminal recidivism and cost; 
  To determine the impact of statewide mandated treatment policy reform on the operation 
of Drug Courts. 
The Drug Court model includes a higher level of supervision, particularly by the Court and 
(generally) a standardized treatment program for all the participants within a particular court 
(including phases that each participant must pass through by meeting certain goals). There is also 
regular and frequent drug testing. In contrast, most of the state-mandated program models for 
drug offenders have less criminal justice supervision (particularly less court involvement) and a 
less standardized, sometimes more individualized, treatment regimen. In addition, the non-Drug 
Court treatment model uses drug testing less frequently. For example, in California, the drug 
policy legislation provided funds for treatment and some for probation, but no funds for drug 
testing. It is of interest to practitioners and policymakers to determine the relative effectiveness 
of these two models in assisting drug offenders to complete drug treatment and in reducing the 
incidence of drug offenders returning to the criminal justice system (recidivism). 
In November 2000, 61% of California voters approved Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and 
Crime Prevention Act (SACPA). Modeled after the Arizona Drug Medicalization, Prevention 
and Control Act of 1996, the primary goal of SACPA is to provide an alternative to incarceration 
for low-level, nonviolent drug possession offenders (Prop36.org, 2004). At the time SACPA was 
implemented, California had also already broadly implemented the Drug Court model, another 
alternative to incarceration for (generally) nonviolent drug offenders. California has the largest 
number of Drug Courts (approximately 120 in operation) of any state in the union. 
The SACPA mandate included specific offender eligibility criteria required for SACPA 
programs in every county; however, each county was given the freedom to create their own 
SACPA program model and processes. While some counties attempted to implement a SACPA 
program modeled after Drug Court practices, counties were encouraged by the legislations 
proponents to create a different SACPA program model that had little criminal justice 
involvement. California is therefore a unique setting in which to examine the effects of the Drug 
Court model compared to court mandated non-Drug Court treatment models on offender 
outcomes. This setting also allows for an examination of the relative program investment and 
outcome costs as well as the effects of the introduction of court mandated non-Drug Court 
treatment models on Drug Court policies, organization, practices and costs. 
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Research Design and Methods 
The research design for this study built on previous work performed by this evaluator. Detailed 
data on program resources (e.g., treatment services), outcomes (e.g., recidivism) and their costs 
were provided from a study
1 performed before the implementation of the Substance Abuse and 
Crime Prevention Act (SACPA) in California. This previous study included Drug Court 
participants from nine Drug Court sites. Two
2 of these sites, in two separate counties (the El 
Monte Drug Court in Los Angeles County and the San Joaquin County Drug Court), were 
selected for this study based on two main criteria; 1) The counties had SACPA programs that 
differed from each other and from the Drug Court model. (One was modeled somewhat like a 
Drug Court program but with less interactive court supervision and no rewards or sanctions 
while the other did not follow the Drug Court model and had no court supervision at all - both 
therefore stood as alternative approaches to the existing Drug Courts), and 2) Based on our 
experience in these sites from the statewide Drug Court study, it was known that high quality 
data existed in a form reasonably easy to gather (e.g., administrative databases rather than just 
data in paper files). 
For this study, detailed program, outcome and cost data were collected (from administrative 
databases and paper files) on a cohort of Drug Court participants after SACPA implementation 
(those entering the program in 2002-2003) as well as on a cohort of SACPA participants who 
enrolled in the program during the same time period. The data collected included the program 
resources (e.g., treatment services, probation services) used by Drug Court and SACPA program 
participants, outcomes such as criminal justice recidivism and social services use, and the costs 
associated with the use of these resources. These same data sources were used in the previous 
Drug Court cost study. All groups were tracked for 3 years after program entry. 
Qualitative data (through interviews and document review) were collected, using a Drug Court 
typology guide developed by NPC Research and modified for use with the SACPA programs, to 
examine the changes that occurred in Drug Court organization and process due to the 
implementation of SACPA and to examine the current operations of both types of programs. 
Costs data were calculated using an approach called Transactional and Institutional Cost 
Analysis (TICA) (Crumpton, Carey, & Finigan, 2004). The TICA approach views an 
individual‘s interaction with publicly funded agencies as a set of transactions in which the 
individual utilizes resources contributed from multiple agencies. Transactions are those points 
within a system where resources are consumed and/or change hands. Indirect (support and 
overhead) costs (as a percentage of direct costs) are added to the direct costs of each transaction 
to determine the cost per transaction. The transaction cost is multiplied by the average number of 
transactions for program participants to determine the total average cost per transaction type. 
However, to determine the relative effectiveness and the relative investment and outcome costs of 
the programs, it was necessary to control for differences between program participants. The 
analyses of program outcomes including participant recidivism were adjusted to control 
statistically for differences between the groups. Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVAs) were used to 
calculate adjusted means and statistical significance for differences in re-arrests, time on probation, 
                                                 
1 This study was a part of a statewide cost study of Drug Courts in California, funded by BJA and the California 
Administrative Office of the Courts. 
2 The reasons for choosing two sites for this study included the need to have at least one site to test against the other 
site to verify the consistency of the results. A second reason was the need to stay within a reasonable budget size. 
Additional sites could be added for additional funds. 
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jail time served, prison time served, and new court cases. These analyses were adjusted based on 
criminal history in the 2 years prior to program start including past arrests and jail time served. 
Also included in the covariates were demographics (age, ethnicity, gender), drug of choice, and 
time in jail during the recidivism period (except when the mean of interest was time served in jail). 
Results 
The results for this study were organized around six policy questions and are summarized in the 
following text. 
POLICY QUESTION #1: HOW HAVE THE DRUG COURT AND STATEWIDE MANDATED 
TREATMENT MODELS BEEN IMPLEMENTED LOCALLY AND HOW DO THEY DIFFER? 
There are several key differences between the Drug Court model and the SACPA model. One 
obvious difference is capacity. SACPA is designed to treat all eligible offenders well beyond the 
current capacity of Drug Court programs. The ability to provide treatment to a large number of 
offenders is a large benefit of SACPA. In addition, SACPA uses a larger number of treatment 
providers than the Drug Court programs. The benefit of this is the ability to provide participants 
with treatment specific to their needs. The drawback is that it is more difficult to coordinate and 
determine the quality of the treatment with a larger number of providers and it can be difficult 
for supervision to consistently receive communications on participant progress.  
The length of stay for participants in SACPA is longer, and longer time in treatment is known to 
be associated with better outcomes. However, the treatment received in SACPA during that time 
may not be consistent, depending on whether the participant follows through on their treatment 
plan. This is in contrast to the Drug Court model where the high level of court supervision 
enforces participant attendance at treatment. 
The Drug Court model performs several activities that result in a high level of participant 
monitoring including court sessions, treatment sessions, and drug tests. In addition to learning to 
deal with their substance abuse issues in treatment, participants learn to modify their 
inappropriate behaviors from feedback provided by the Drug Court team. Appropriate behavior is 
rewarded and inappropriate behavior is sanctioned so that participants are accountable for their 
behavior either way. 
The successful completion of Drug Court, for each participant, is decided by a team that follows 
a clear list of requirements. The completion of SACPA is not standardized and is decided mainly 
from reports on treatment completion by individual treatment providers who may use very 
different criteria. Finally, the successful completion of Drug Court is called ―graduation‖ and is 
marked by a ceremony and celebration. There is no special marking of SACPA completion aside 
from a certificate of completion. 
In summary, the Drug Court model is more personal, including a much higher level of 
supervision and participant accountability as well as including rewards and sanctions for 
behavior change while the SACPA program reaches and provides treatment to a much larger 
number of individuals making a more personal model more challenging. 
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POLICY QUESTION #2: HOW HAVE DRUG COURTS ADJUSTED (HOW HAVE DRUG COURT 
PROCESS AND POLICIES CHANGED) WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE-MANDATED NON-
DRUG COURT TREATMENT PROGRAMS?  
One of the main findings for this question was that overall there was very little to no change in 
the basic Drug Court policies and procedures. However, there were some external changes that 
may have impacted Drug Court operations and effectiveness, mostly in relation to a change in 
participant population. 
Funding for the Drug Court programs was perceived to have decreased with the passage of 
SACPA. Some staff perceived that the Drug Court program was now competing for scarce 
treatment resources with SACPA.  
With the implementation of SACPA, the continuum of criminal justice diversion programs 
expanded. The role of the Drug Court program began to shift in response. After some confusion 
as to whether participants could go back and forth between programs, increasingly, the Drug 
Court programs are viewed as the next sequential step after a client has unsuccessfully 
participated in SACPA. The Drug Court now serves as a more intensive service option for those 
who are not succeeding under the less stringent criteria of the SACPA program. The Drug Court 
has also changed at what point in the case process they exist, changing from more pre-plea to 
post-plea. 
And finally, there was a perceived change in the participant population with Drug Court 
participants becoming increasingly more addicted and more criminal by the time they enter the 
Drug Court program. This perception was confirmed by the available data on the Drug Court 
participants before and after SACPA implementation in both counties. 
POLICY QUESTION #3: WHAT IS THE SUCCESS RATE OF DRUG COURT PROGRAMS BEFORE 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE-MANDATED NON-DRUG COURT TREATMENT PROGRAMS 
COMPARED TO THE SUCCESS RATE OF DRUG COURT PROGRAMS AFTER? 
Drug Court participants at both sites received similar treatment services and court supervision 
before and after SACPA implementation, although data available at one site showed a significantly 
longer time from arrest to Drug Court entry after SACPA. It is probable that the increased time is 
due to offenders entering the Drug Courts after first spending extended time in the SACPA 
program. This means that the Drug Courts can no longer reasonably follow the third key 
component of Drug Court, that eligible offenders are identified quickly and promptly placed in the 
Drug Court program. 
Graduation rate decreased for both Drug Court sites from pre-SACPA to post-SACPA; from 
80% to 50% in El Monte and 29% to 23% in San Joaquin. Literature shows that graduation rates 
in different Drug Courts tend to vary widely (from 26% to 80%). These two Drug Court sites are 
quite typical. However, it should be noted that San Joaquin had a graduation rate that was quite 
low compared to the national average of around 50% (Cooper, 2004). In spite of this, San 
Joaquin Drug Court participants have low recidivism, regardless of whether they graduate from 
the program. This decrease in graduation rate at both sites is most likely due to the increase in 
criminality and the probable increase in addiction severity in the Drug Court population after 
SACPA implementation. 
Recidivism increased significantly for Drug Court participants after SACPA implementation. 
The increased recidivism was significant even after taking into account any differences in 
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demographics, criminal history, time incarcerated and drug of choice. Because the Drug Court 
programs showed little to no change in policies or procedures, the most likely explanation for 
this is the probable change in the Drug Court population after SACPA to a more addicted 
population at the time of entry. It is also likely that the extended time from arrest to entry into the 
Drug Court program, as well as participants‘ experience with SACPA treatment, had an effect on 
how the participants perceived the Drug Court program and Drug Court treatment. Perhaps these 
participants become more jaded after experiencing and failing at treatment more than once, 
rendering the next treatment experience less effective. 
Figure A demonstrates the change in recidivism over 3 years for Drug Court participants before 
SACPA compared to Drug Court participants after SACPA. This graph (see Figure A) looks 
similar in both counties. 
Figure A. Average Number of Re-Arrests Over Time for Drug Court Participants 
Before and After SACPA Implementation 
 
 
POLICY QUESTION #4: WHAT IS THE RELATIVE SUCCESS RATE (MEASURED BY PROGRAM 
COMPLETION RATE AND RECIDIVISM) OF THE DRUG COURT PROGRAM MODEL COMPARED 
TO COURT MANDATED NON-DRUG COURT TREATMENT MODELS? 
SACPA participants in both counties spent significantly more time in the SACPA program than 
the Drug Court participants at either time period. Drug Court participants before SACPA show 
significantly lower recidivism compared to SACPA program participants and Drug Court 
program participants after SACPA implementation. While the recidivism for Drug Court 
participants after SACPA implementation was lower, it did not differ significantly from SACPA 
participants.  
These results imply that the Drug Court model is significantly more effective in getting drug 
offenders to complete treatment. In addition, the Drug Court model, before the changes in 
funding and participant population brought on by SACPA implementation, was more effective in 
lowering criminal justice recidivism than the state-mandated treatment models that do not 
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include the interventions shown to be effective in the Drug Court model (such as more 
personalized supervision, more participant accountability and an option for incarceration as a 
sanction). 
These results also imply that the Drug Court model may (understandably) be less effective with a 
more criminal, more heavily addicted population than it was with a less criminal, less addicted 
population. However, even with a more criminal population than SACPA, Drug Court performed 
at least as well, or better, than the SACPA programs in terms of criminal justice related outcomes 
in these two counties. 
Figure B demonstrates the relative recidivism of SACPA participants compared to Drug Court 
participants at both time periods. Note this is the same graph presented in Figure A, but with 
SACPA participants added to demonstrate how SACPA participant differs from that of Drug 
Court participants at both time points. The graph (see Figure B) looks quite similar in both study 
sites. 
Figure B. Drug Court and SACPA Average Number of Re-Arrests per Participant 
Over 3 Years 
 
POLICY QUESTION #5: WHAT ARE THE INVESTMENT AND OUTCOME COSTS OF DRUG 
COURTS BEFORE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATE-MANDATED NON-DRUG COURT 
TREATMENT PROGRAMS COMPARED TO AFTER IMPLEMENTATION? 
Drug Court program investment costs increased in both programs from pre-SACPA to post-
SACPA, though this was significant only in one site. Outcome costs over 3 years for El Monte 
Drug Court participants were higher for participants who entered Drug Court after SACPA 
implementation than for participants who entered before SACPA. The difference between the 
two grows over time, with post-SACPA participants showing increasingly higher costs. For San 
Joaquin County in spite of the increased number of re-arrests, the decrease in days in jail led to 
no significant difference in outcome costs for Drug Court before and after SACPA. It may be 
that the decrease in jail time is due to SACPA changes in the use of jail for drug crimes. 
Unfortunately, the lower use of jail time did not lead to less crime, as the data showed a 
significant increase in re-arrests in the same time period. 
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Putting both the investment costs and the outcome cost together, we find that in San Joaquin, 
there was no significant difference in costs for all participants from pre-SACPA to post-SACPA. 
The increase in re-arrests for Drug Court participants post-SACPA is balanced out by the 
decrease in the use of jail time. 
However, in El Monte total costs rose by 48% after SACPA implementation. The increase in 
costs in this site is due largely to the increased use of jail (or in-jail treatment) for Drug Court 
participants post-SACPA and higher recidivism (including re-arrests and prison time) for Drug 
Court participants post-SACPA. For this site, Drug Court costs to the taxpayer rose significantly 
after SACPA implementation, probably due to the increase in addiction and criminality of the 
participants. Figure C exemplifies this finding. 
 
Figure C. El Monte Drug Court Participant Total Costs: Program and Outcome Cost 
per Participant for Drug Court Pre-SACPA (T1) and Post-SACPA (T2) 
 
 
POLICY QUESTION #6: WHAT ARE THE RELATIVE INVESTMENT AND OUTCOME COSTS OF 
DRUG COURTS COMPARED TO STATE-MANDATED NON-DRUG COURT TREATMENT 
PROGRAMS? 
SACPA produced a much higher per person program investment costs than Drug Courts. This is 
largely a function of the greater amount of treatment experienced by SACPA participants. Drug 
Courts had less treatment but were more likely to lead to treatment completion. While SACPA 
participants had a higher number of re-arrests than Drug Court participants, their overall outcome 
costs were similar due to less jail time for SACPA participants. Unfortunately, this provides 
evidence that decreased jail time for SACPA participants was related to more crime. 
Overall, the total per person costs were substantially higher for SACPA participants. For a 
significantly lower investment cost, the Drug Court model produced outcomes as good as or 
better than SACPA outcomes (even after the Drug Court population became more criminal and 
more addicted than SACPA participants), resulting in lower costs over all. Although Drug Court 
participants appear to spend less time in the program, the Drug Court model is shown to be more 
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efficient in treatment delivery and to produce better outcomes. Figure D provides an example of 
program investment costs from the El Monte Drug Court and SACPA programs. 
 
Figure D. Total Costs per Offender for SACPA, Drug Court pre-SACPA (T1) 
and Drug Court Post-SACPA (T2) 
 
 
Limitations 
Although analyses controlled for differences between these groups on criminal history, drug of 
choice, demographics and incarceration rates, data on addiction level was not available and 
therefore could not be controlled for. This is particularly important in looking at differences for 
Drug Court after SACPA implementation because many participants in Drug Court post-SACPA 
were former SACPA participants who were unsuccessful at completing their SACPA program. It 
is likely that these offenders had higher levels of addiction by the time they entered the Drug 
Court programs at both study sites. 
Further, the ability to generalize these results is somewhat limited as this study was performed in 
only two study sites. However, given that every county has implemented SACPA differently, it 
would be difficult to generalize the results from any region to any other region. Although it may 
not be possible to generalize to every county in the state of California, there are clear lessons to 
be learned from these results in terms of the relative effectiveness of the Drug Court model (with 
practices that have been shown to be effective in other settings such as court supervision, 
rewards and sanctions and participant accountability) compared to other program models such as 
those demonstrated at these two study sites.   
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Overall Conclusions 
SACPA represents a broad based policy initiative aimed at reducing rates of incarceration and 
increasing recovery rates for low level, non-violent drug involved offenders. SACPA devotes 
considerable resources to treatment of those offenders. The policy initiative was developed 
without the use of interventions deemed effective in other researched and evaluated initiatives 
such as the Drug Court model. For example, SACPA did not use criminal justice leverage or 
sanctions found to be effective in Drug Courts. Consequently, retention in the SACPA and in 
treatment was lower than might have been anticipated. Nevertheless, on a large scale, California 
diverted many more people to treatment than the Drug Courts alone. In other words, treatment 
access was significantly increased. Further, it is likely that the total number of participants who 
entered recovery and did not recidivate exceeds the total number of Drug Court participants in 
recovery, even though the rates for Drug Court were higher. 
Therefore, the state-mandated treatment in California (SACPA) has succeeded in two important 
ways that were central to its initial logic. First, it has provided an enormous benefit in being able 
to reach nearly all eligible offenders and offer treatment for their substance use issues instead of 
incarceration. Second, it has allowed offenders to have more total treatment than Drug Court. In 
this sense, it has had a much greater impact on the total system of offenders than Drug Court that 
often serves only a small number of offenders.  
Yet, the Drug Court model has shown greater success at producing higher rates of treatment 
completion and lower recidivism. Further, it does this with a significantly lower per person 
taxpayer investment. In short, from these data it can be suggested that SACPA succeeds in 
providing more treatment but the Drug Court model produces better outcomes for less money. 
Overall, this data shows that the Drug Court model is a more efficient use of resources. 
If the resources could be provided for SACPA to incorporate practices of the Drug Court model 
that have been shown to be effective in this population, particularly when based on participant 
risk-level as described by Marlowe (2006), (or Drug Court could be expanded to include a larger 
number of drug offenders) then this form of state-mandated treatment could be an effective 
benefit resulting in large cost savings for the state of California. Other states considering 
statewide treatment reform should take into account the clear benefits demonstrated by the Drug 
Court model in this study, as well as the myriad of Drug Court studies showing positive 
outcomes for Drug Court participants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Project Overview and Background 
Over the past decade in the United States there has been a trend toward changing criminal justice 
policy to provide treatment as an alternative to incarceration for nonviolent drug offenders. Two 
main models have emerged that are aimed at effecting this change. One model is Drug Court; the 
other is statewide policy reformation, mandating treatment for all nonviolent drug offenders. 
The overall purposes of this study are twofold: 
  To examine the varying effectiveness of the two models for treating substance abusing 
offenders measured in terms of participant completion rates, criminal recidivism and 
cost/benefit; 
   To determine the impact of statewide mandated treatment policy reform on the operation 
of Drug Courts. 
Specifically, the policy questions this research is designed to answer are: 
1.  How do the implementation and operations of the Drug Courts and the statewide 
mandated treatment models differ? 
2.  How have Drug Courts adjusted (how have Drug Court process and policies changed) 
with the implementation of state-mandated non-Drug Court treatment programs?  
3.  What is the success rate (measured by program completion and recidivism) of Drug 
Court programs before the implementation of state-mandated non-Drug Court treatment 
programs compared to after? 
4.  What is the relative success rate (measured by program completion rate and recidivism) 
of the Drug Court program model compared to court mandated non-Drug Court treatment 
models? 
5.  What are the investment and outcome costs of Drug Courts before the implementation of 
the state-mandated non-Drug Court treatment programs compared to after 
implementation?  
6.  What are the relative investment and outcome costs of Drug Courts compared to state-
mandated non-Drug Court treatment programs? 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
There is a well-researched link between substance abuse and criminal behavior. Approximately 
68 percent of new arrestees test positive on a urine screen for one or more illicit drugs (National 
Institute of Justice, 1996). Summary statistics gathered in 1996 from the Department of Justice 
suggest that nationally 36% of adult offenders were under the influence of alcohol at the time of 
their offense (Greenfeld, 1998). Data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) 
program research indicates that two-thirds of convicted jail inmates were actively involved with 
drugs prior to their admission to jail (National Institute of Justice, 2000; Wilson, 2000). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that treating substance abuse leads to a reduction in criminal 
behavior. For individuals receiving substance abuse treatment, The National Treatment 
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Improvement Evaluation Study (NTIES, 1997) found significant declines in criminal activity 
between the 12 months prior to treatment and the 12 months subsequent to treatment. Those 
declines included: 
  Self-reported incidence of selling drugs by 78 percent 
  Shoplifting by almost 82 percent 
  Supporting oneself largely through illegal activity by more than 48 percent 
  Arrests for any crime by 64 percent 
Gerstein, Harwood, Fountain, Suter, & Malloy (1994) found positive effects of drug and alcohol 
treatment on self-reported subsequent criminal activity in a statewide sample. In a study using 
administrative data, comparing those who completed treatment with a comparison group of those 
eligible but not receiving treatment in the State of Oregon, Finigan (1996) also found significant 
reduction in police-report arrests for those who completed treatment. 
DRUG COURTS AS A RESPONSE TO THIS PROBLEM 
In the past nearly 20 years, one of the strongest movements in the United States focused on 
reducing substance abuse among the criminal justice population has been the spread of Drug 
Courts across the country. The first Drug Court was implemented in Florida in1989. As of March 
2008, there were 1,853 adult and juvenile drug courts active in all 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam (BJA, 2008).  
The prevalence of offenders with substance abuse issues in the criminal justice system was the 
primary impetus for the formulation of Drug Courts specifically designed to handle offenders 
who committed crimes while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The purpose of Drug 
Courts is to guide offenders identified as drug-addicted into treatment that will reduce drug 
dependence and improve the quality of life for them and their families. In the typical Drug Court 
program, participants are closely supervised by a judge who is supported by a team of agency 
representatives who operate outside their traditional advocacy/adversarial roles. This team 
includes addiction treatment providers, district attorneys, public defenders, law enforcement 
officers and parole and probation officers (Goldkamp, Robinson, & White, 2002).  
Since the first Drug Court began operation in Miami in 1989, this model of linking the resources 
of the criminal system and substance treatment programs has become firmly established 
nationwide. The combined systems approach used in Drug Courts has the potential to provide 
greater efficiency as well as heightened accountability for the offender. On the other hand, it 
creates complexity in understanding both the costs of the program and the avoided costs that may 
accrue from the impact of the program. 
Belenko (1998, 2001) provides a summary review of Drug Court research. He suggests that the 
research findings are consistent with the following:  
1.  Drug Courts are successful in engaging and retaining offenders in treatment, 
2.  Drug Courts provide more comprehensive supervision of offenders,  
3.  Drug use is reduced for offenders who participate in Drug Court,  
4.  Criminal recidivism is reduced for offenders,  
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5.  Drug Courts can generate cost savings,  
6.  Drug Courts can successfully bridge the gap between multiple publicly funded systems.  
Multiple studies have shown a decrease in recidivism for drug court participants (e.g., Carey & 
Finigan, 2003; Gottfredson, Majaka, & Kearly, 2003; Carey, 2004; Government Accounting 
Office, 2005; Finigan, Carey & Cox, 2007). In a meta-analysis of Drug Court impact studies, 
Wilson, Ojmarrh and MacKenzie (2002) found that 34 of 40 evaluations using matched 
comparison groups of individuals who did not participate in Drug Court reported lower rates of 
crime among Drug Court participants. The pooled results also showed significantly lower 
amounts of recidivism. 
Recent research has also reported that Drug Court programs have been cost beneficial in local 
criminal justice systems (Finigan, Carey, & Cox, 2007; Carey, Finigan, Waller, Lucas, & 
Crumpton, 2005; Shaffer, Bechtel, & Latessa, 2005; Crumpton, Brekhus, Weller, & Finigan, 
2004; Carey & Finigan, 2003; Fomby & Rangaprasad, 2002). Limited research has also shown 
that Drug Courts may be cost beneficial in impacting other publicly supported services: child 
welfare; physical health care; mental health care; and, employment security (Carey, Finigan, 
Weller, Schnacker, & Crumpton, 2003; Crumpton, Worcel, & Finigan, 2003). 
STATEWIDE POLICY REFORM (STATE-MANDATED TREATMENT) AS A RESPONSE TO THIS 
PROBLEM 
In 1996, Arizona became the first state to implement a sweeping drug policy reform when voters 
approved an initiative (the Drug Medicalization, Prevention and Control Act) that mandated 
treatment instead of incarceration for nonviolent drug offenders arrested for drug possession 
charges. Since that time many states have instituted similar drug policy reforms including 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Texas, District of Columbia, and California 
(Drug Policy Alliance, 2004). 
The primary goal of many of these state-mandated policy reforms is to provide an alternative to 
incarceration for low-level, nonviolent drug possession offenders (Prop36.org, 2004). Although, 
intuitively, the Drug Court model fits the description of programs that provide treatment instead of 
incarceration, many of these state-mandated treatment programs do not use the Drug Court model, 
but instead use a treatment model that is more removed from the criminal justice system with less 
court involvement and few, if any, drug tests. For those programs, the treatment professionals take 
a central role of responsibility for the success of the client, rather than the courts. 
The Drug Court model includes a high level of supervision, particularly by the Court and 
(generally) a standardized treatment program for all the participants within a particular court 
(including phases that each participant must pass through by meeting certain goals). There is also 
regular and frequent drug testing. In contrast, most of the state-mandated program models for 
drug offenders have less criminal justice supervision (particularly less court involvement) and a 
less standardized, generally more individualized, treatment regimen. In addition, the non-Drug 
Court treatment model uses drug testing less frequently. For example, in California, the drug 
policy legislation provided funds for treatment and some for probation, but no funds for drug 
testing. It is of interest to practitioners and policymakers to determine the relative effectiveness 
of these two models in assisting drug offenders to complete drug treatment and in reducing the 
incidence of drug offenders returning to the criminal justice system (recidivism). 
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OVERVIEW: STATE-MANDATED TREATMENT AND DRUG COURTS IN CALIFORNIA 
In November 2000, 61% of California voters approved Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and 
Crime Prevention Act (SACPA). Modeled after the Arizona Drug Medicalization, Prevention 
and Control Act of 1996, the primary goal of SACPA is to provide an alternative to incarceration 
for low-level, nonviolent drug possession offenders (Prop36.org, 2004). At the time SACPA was 
implemented, California had also already broadly implemented the Drug Court model, another 
alternative to incarceration for (generally) nonviolent drug offenders. California has the largest 
number of Drug Courts (approximately 120 in operation) of any state in the union. The passage 
of Proposition 36 led to concerns to those within the Drug Court community. In particular, there 
were concerns that although SACPA was a state mandate, the amount of funds provided was not 
enough to pay for treatment and supervision at the level that the Drug Court community felt was 
necessary for the programs to be effective. In addition, there was concern that SACPA programs 
would replace Drug Courts (because they served the same or similar population) but would not 
provide same amount of participant (or practitioner) accountability, which is believed to be one 
of the most effective practices of Drug Courts. 
SACPA is a statewide mandate, and as such, eligibility requirements are identical in all 58 
California counties: conviction of a nonviolent drug offense or being under the influence of a 
controlled substance (Longshore et al., 2003). SACPA guarantees treatment to all eligible 
offenders, including first time offenders (Prop 36.org, 2004).  
One of the principal arguments for Proposition 36 centered on the cost of incarceration versus 
treatment. As of the end of September 2000, there were 162,533 inmates in the California prison 
system, 28% of which were incarcerated for drug offenses (Hser et al., 2003). The state‘s budget 
analysis for 2001-2002 estimated that it costs $25,607 per year to imprison each California 
inmate (Uelmen, Abrahamson, Appel, Cox, & Taylor, 2002). In contrast, the average cost for a 
treatment cycle is $4,500 (Males, Macallair, & Jamison, 2002). The state of California allocated 
$60 million in start-up funds for the 2000-2001 fiscal year, with an additional $120 million each 
year until 2005 (Uelmen et al., 2002). One evaluation demonstrated that the initial investment in 
SACPA may have saved California at least $275 million during the first year following the July 
1, 2001 implementation of Proposition 36 (Longshore et al., 2003). This number is based on the 
roughly 37,000 people who enrolled in treatment over incarceration.  
New admissions to prison for drug possession have reportedly declined by 32% in the 5 years 
from 1999-2004 in California, while the overall prison incarceration rate declined by 4% (Ehlers 
& Ziedenburg, 2006). Ehlers and Ziedenburg estimate that, over a 5-year period, Prop 36 
resulted in 14,000 fewer new prison admissions totaling a savings of $350 million dollars—and 
this includes the cost of substance abuse treatment. Similarly, they calculated 45,000 fewer jail 
admissions for a savings of $62 million.  
Other states have also reported savings due to the implementation of statewide mandated 
treatment for nonviolent drug offenders. Arizona reported a savings of $6 million in the second 
year of the Drug Medicalization, Prevention and Control Act and Kansas reported saving 
$21,000 for each offender not sent to prison due to the legislation on treatment rather than 
incarceration passed in November 2003 (Drug Policy Alliance, 2004). 
While it appears that California‘s SACPA and other state legislation has been cost-effective on 
the front-end of the criminal justice pipeline (Longshore et al., 2003), what is less known is how 
SACPA affects the outcomes of individuals and the associated costs to the state systems. Early 
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data from the SACPA cost study found that the ―typical‖ offender—one at the median level in 
the cost distribution—had no convictions at 30 months after entry into the program (Longshore, 
Hawken, Urada, & Anglin, 2006). Furthermore, in counties that used ―Drug Court‖ procedures, 
assessment and treatment show rates were higher (Longshore, et al., 2006).  
Opponents warned of increasing crime rates with the institution of Prop 36 legislation. Although 
early results from Orange County found that crime rates rose in some cities since the inception of 
SACPA, and that these rises may be due, in part, to SACPA (Orange County Grand Jury, 2003), 
the rate of violent crimes in California actually dropped 11.2% between 2000 and 2004 (Ehlers 
& Ziedenburg, 2006). 
On the other hand, there appears to be a small proportion of Prop 36 eligible defendants (1.6%) 
that have so many arrests that they cost the state over 10 times more than the average SACPA 
defendant (Longshore et al., 2006). Researchers at University of California in Los Angeles 
(UCLA) concluded that the Drug Court approach might be more effective for these more 
addicted and often more criminally-inclined people (Longshore et al., 2006).  
Initial evaluations focused on the treatment modalities and implementation processes of SACPA. 
In general, research has shown that treatment admission has been on the rise since the 
implementation of Proposition 36, with many offenders receiving their first treatment sessions 
(Hser et al., 2003). Over 80% of people who participated in SACPA were placed in outpatient 
drug-free programs, typically lasting around 30 days (Longshore et al., 2003). In a comparison 
with non-SACPA patients in five California counties, almost 20% more SACPA clients were 
treated in outpatient programs (Hser et al., 2003). 
Treatment completion rates reported for SACPA programs vary across California counties, 
ranging from 13% to 100% in 2001-2002, with about half of the counties having completion 
rates of 40% or more. The treatment completion figure for non-SACPA persons entering 
treatment from the criminal justice system in 2001-2002 was 36% (Ehlers & Ziedenburg, 2006; 
17). Pre-SACPA Drug Court data show about 4,000 clients entering treatment per year, while in 
2003-2004, 37,000 clients began SACPA-initiated treatment. The smaller number of Drug Court 
clients is due to the fact that Drug Courts were not available in all counties and the eligibility 
requirements for Drug Courts tend to be tighter (Drug Policy Alliance, 2006: 10). On the other 
hand, Drug Court treatment completion rates in the 46 California counties with Drug Courts 
were fairly high at 55% for adult felons—even after the inception of SACPA (DADP, 2005). 
Drug Court data also show other positive outcomes such as 80% of formerly homeless becoming 
housed, 96% negative results for the average 36 drug tests per client performed, 94% of babies 
born while mothers were involved with Drug Court were drug-free at birth, etc.  
Generally, evaluations have found that there may not be enough treatment options to meet the 
diverse needs of the SACPA patients, particularly for those with dual diagnoses (mental health 
and drug problems) (Klein, Miller, Noble & Speiglman, 2004; Carey, Finigan, Weller, 
Schnacker, & Crumpton, 2003; Hser et al., 2003; Longshore et al., 2003; Uelman et al., 2002). 
However, many counties have increased or added to their treatment modalities, particularly in 
the area of outpatient treatment (Carey, Finigan, & Schnacker, 2003; Longshore et al., 2003). 
The Drug Policy Alliance reported that the average percentage of SACPA funds budgeted for 
drug treatment and services by the 58 counties was 79.1% (Uelman et al., 2003). 
Perhaps the key difference between Drug Court and SACPA is accountability and, in particular, 
the use of behavior modification techniques by an authority figure, (swift responses to participant 
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behavior). Drug Courts involve frequent and close monitoring of the client by a team of 
treatment and corrections officials. Judges have the discretion to sanction the client immediately 
after a relapse or other non-compliant behavior. It is the belief of many involved with Drug 
Courts that it is precisely this involvement that helps offenders stick with the demands of the 
Drug Court program. Although some counties attempt to run their SACPA programs following a 
Drug Court model, immediate sanctions and the threat of incarceration are not as plausible in 
SACPA (Longshore et al., 2003). In national context, it appears that California‘s SACPA is 
missing most of the important accountability mechanisms that other states have enacted in 
similar legislation—accountability mechanisms that are generally found in Drug Court 
programs.
3 Therefore, perhaps the most important difference about specific SACPA legislation 
in California is that it lets treatment facilities make decisions about a client‘s treatment progress, 
as well as the reward or sanctions for failure to comply. Similarly, only California and Arizona 
specifically prohibit the court from using incarceration as a penalty for continued drug 
possession or use (VanderWaal et al., 2006), which may result in a higher use of prison later 
(Riley et al., 2005). 
In an attempt to remedy what is perceived as the faulty accountability mechanisms in SACPA, 
the California legislature passed a law in 2006 (SB 803/1137) giving judges the option to jail 
first-time drug possession violators for two days and second-time violators for five days. It 
would also allow judges to jail clients who continue to re-offend or not meet obligations of 
parole for up to 30 days. Under this law, judges could even throw clients out of the SACPA 
program altogether. Opponents subsequently sued Governor Schwarzenegger and the State of 
California and, in September 2007, they won an injunction to stop the law increasing judicial 
sanctions. A final court date to settle the lawsuit has yet to be determined (Leonard & Garvey, 
2007). 
All 58 counties in California must provide treatment through Proposition 36, but not all 
California counties have Drug Courts. Proposition 36 is completely funded by public sources. 
Drug Courts are funded from a variety of sources, public and private. The Drug Court 
Partnership program (2003-2004) provided $7.8 million for adult Drug Courts throughout 
California and an additional $9.1 million was allocated to juvenile and adult programs by other 
sources. In contrast, Proposition 36 allocated $120 million for the same time period.  
In light of the suspension of the reforms, the current Governor's Budget reduces 2007-08 
Proposition 36 funding by $60 million and utilizes this funding to provide an increase to funding 
for Offender Treatment Programs (OTP). OTP contains many of the Proposition 36 reforms sought 
by the Administration, increasing funding for the OTP will allow the state to implement these and 
other reforms that they believe will lead to improved program performance and client outcomes.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
The link between substance abuse and criminal behavior has led to a great deal of national 
attention on models designed to reduce criminal recidivism by addressing the substance abuse 
problems of offenders. As discussed above, two models have gained significant national 
                                                 
3 VanderWaal et al. (2006: 638) caution those suspicious of legislated diversion programs such as Prop 36 by noting 
that many states have accountability mechanisms in place that are comparable to those that have been effective for 
Drug Courts. 
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attention. Of the two models Drug Courts have received the most national attention and research. 
Research has supported the idea that Drug Courts can be effective in reducing criminal 
recidivism and providing cost savings to taxpayers. Yet the research has been unable to 
determine whether the effects of Drug Court largely accrue from the provision of treatment to the 
client or to the intense judicial oversight and team staffing of cases that accompanies Drug Court. 
This is an important issue because the intense judicial involvement and intense team efforts that 
characterize Drug Courts can be expensive for local courts to implement. The non-Drug Court 
SACPA model is a potentially less costly approach since, although it requires treatment 
resources (as do Drug Courts) and some probation resources, depending on how it is 
implemented, it can require less court time per participant and can be implemented relatively 
easily for large populations of offenders.  
This research is designed both to test out the relative effectiveness and cost advantages of the 
Drug Court and non-Drug Court treatment models and to examine how Drug Court programs 
have adjusted in response to the implementation of other offender treatment models. Since 
California provides an opportunity to examine both models operating at the same time within the 
same state, it is uniquely suited to this research. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
he SACPA mandate included specific offender eligibility criteria required for SACPA 
programs in every county; however, each county was given the freedom to create their 
own SACPA program model and processes. While some counties attempted to 
implement a SACPA program modeled after Drug Court practices, counties were encouraged by 
the legislation‘s proponents to create a different SACPA program model that had little criminal 
justice or judicial involvement. California is therefore a unique setting in which to examine the 
effects of the Drug Court model compared to court mandated non-Drug Court treatment models 
on offender outcomes (such as program completion rates and recidivism). This setting also 
allows for an examination of the relative program investment and outcome costs as well as the 
effects of the introduction of court mandated non-Drug Court treatment models on Drug Court 
policies, organization, practices and costs. 
The fundamental reasoning of a cost approach to substance abuse treatment is that untreated 
substance abuse is very costly to taxpayers who must, in one way or another, fund the 
consequences of negative social behaviors resulting from substance abuse. Substance abuse leads 
to ancillary negative social behaviors that have cost consequences to many publicly funded 
systems, including the criminal justice system. In November 2000, 61% of California voters 
approved Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act (SACPA). The primary 
goal of SACPA is to provide an alternative to incarceration for low-level, nonviolent drug 
possession offenders (Prop36.org, 2004). 
The research design for this study builds on previous work performed by this evaluator (NPC 
Research) on Drug Courts in California. NPC Research and the California Administrative Office 
of the Courts (AOC) performed a cost-benefit evaluation of Drug Courts statewide using samples 
of Drug Court participants from prior to the implementation of SACPA
4. The statewide study, 
funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the AOC, completed Phase II of a three-phase 
study and has process, outcome and cost data on Drug Court samples prior to SACPA 
implementation from nine Drug Court sites in California. Two
5 of these sites, in two separate 
counties, were selected for this study based on two main criteria; 1) The counties had SACPA 
programs that differed from each other and from the Drug Court model. One was modeled 
somewhat like a Drug Court program but with far less direct court supervision and the other did 
not follow the Drug Court model and had no court supervision at all (both therefore stood as 
alternative approaches to the existing Drug Courts),
6 and 2) Based on our experience in these sites 
from the statewide Drug Court study, the researchers knew that high quality data existed in a form 
reasonably easy to gather (e.g., administrative databases rather than just data in paper files). 
For this study, detailed program, outcome and cost data were collected on a cohort of Drug Court 
participants after SACPA implementation (those entering the program in 2002-2003) as well as 
                                                 
4 One of the purposes of the statewide study is to examine longer term costs and benefits. Therefore it was necessary 
to choose an historical sample, prior to the implementation of SACPA that would have several years of outcome 
data available. This study is still ongoing and more recent samples of Drug Court participants are being collected). 
5 The reasons for choosing two sites for this study included the need to have at least one site to test against the other 
site to verify the consistency of the results. A second reason was the need to stay within a reasonable budget size. 
Additional sites could be added for additional funds. 
6 It was discovered, after more detailed analysis of the sites, that one of these sites had two alternative approaches to 
the SACPA program, one with very little criminal justice supervision at all, and the other modeled exactly like a 
Drug Court but without jail as a sanction. This is discussed in the results. 
T 
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on a sample of SACPA participants from the same time period. The data collected included the 
program resources (e.g., treatment services, probation services) used by Drug Court and SACPA 
program participants, outcomes such as criminal justice recidivism and social services use, and 
the costs associated with the use of these resources. These same data sources were used in Phase 
II of the statewide Drug Court cost study. 
Qualitative data (through interviews and document review) were collected, using a Drug Court 
typology guide developed by NPC Research and modified for use with the SACPA programs, to 
examine the changes that occurred in Drug Court organization and process due to the 
implementation of SACPA and to examine the current operations of both types of programs (See 
guide in Appendix A). This information provided an understanding of current SACPA and Drug 
Court programs as well as how SACPA has led to changes in Drug Courts and what these 
changes look like. The information was also used to help explain the outcome and cost results 
obtained in this research. 
Investment costs (costs associated with program implementation) and outcome costs (costs 
associated with criminal recidivism, subsequent treatment episodes and social service use) for 
SACPA participants were compared to those for Drug Court participants both before and after the 
implementation of SACPA. Further, the investment and outcome costs for Drug Court participants 
after SACPA will be compared to the results for Drug Courts prior to SACPA implementation. 
Research and Policy Questions 
As described above, this research is designed to answer the following key policy questions: 
1.  How do the implementation and operations of the Drug Court and the statewide 
mandated treatment models differ? 
2.  How have Drug Courts adjusted (how have Drug Court process and policies changed) 
with the implementation of state-mandated non-Drug Court treatment programs?  
3.  What is the success rate (measured by program completion and recidivism) of Drug 
Court programs before the implementation of state-mandated non-Drug Court treatment 
programs compared to the success rate of Drug Court programs after implementation? 
4.  What is the relative success rate (measured by program completion rate and recidivism) of 
the Drug Court program model compared to court mandated non-Drug Court treatment 
models? 
5.  What are the investment and outcome costs of Drug Courts before the implementation of 
the state-mandated non-Drug Court treatment programs compared to after 
implementation?  
6.  What are the relative investment and outcome costs of Drug Courts compared to state-
mandated non-Drug Court treatment programs? 
These policy questions clearly have a national context. Across the nation, criminal justice 
systems have become increasingly involved in mandating or encouraging treatment. These two 
important models, Drug Courts (with high court/criminal justice supervision) and state-mandated 
treatment using a non-Drug Court model (with less criminal justice involvement, overseen by 
treatment providers), have emerged as having the most potential to address the problem of 
providing (and enforcing) treatment for substance abusing offenders. 
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METHODS 
Program Process Analysis Methodology 
SITE VISITS 
The evaluation team traveled to the selected Drug Court and SACPA sites to meet with key 
personnel involved in these programs. The first site visit occurred in May 2005, and the final site 
visit concluded in December 2006. Key personnel are those who are knowledgeable about Drug 
Court/SACPA processes or clients, and those knowledgeable about the database(s) and cost-
related information at these agencies. Site visits generally involve judges, program coordinators 
or administrators, public defenders, district attorneys, probation officers, personnel from the 
police department, treatment providers, and other court staff. The site visits also provided an 
opportunity to observe court sessions and staff meetings. These observations gave the evaluation 
team first-hand knowledge of the structure, procedures, and routines of the programs. 
One of the main benefits of these visits was the chance to make face-to-face contact with those 
individuals who would be providing us with potentially sensitive information. These visits also 
provided the evaluation team with the opportunity to explain the purpose of the evaluation and 
elicit input from the agencies involved. The contacts developed during these visits helped 
increase the comfort level of those involved in the evaluation and enabled future contacts and 
requests to go more quickly and smoothly. 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
Key informant interviews were a critical component to understanding the program operations 
and the flow of clients through the various agencies. Stakeholders were interviewed individually 
during site visits and over the telephone. The interviews usually lasted between 30 minutes to an 
hour. 
Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview guide developed by NPC Research. 
Originally developed to evaluate Drug Court operations, questions on the guide were modified to 
collect information relevant to the SACPA programs (see Appendix A). Stakeholders were asked 
separate questions regarding their involvement in Drug Court or SACPA. In many cases, the 
same program staff were involved in both programs. The number of interviews performed per 
study site is detailed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Key Informant Interviews by Study Site 
Location 
98-99 Program 
Descriptions 
02-03 Program 
Descriptions 
San Joaquin  12  17 
El Monte  11  15 
Total  23  32 
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The topics for this typology interview guide were chosen from three main sources: the evaluation 
team‘s extensive experience with criminal justice diversion programs, the American University 
Drug Court Survey, and a paper by Longshore et al. (2001), describing a conceptual framework 
for Drug Courts. The typology interview covers a large number of areas including: eligibility 
guidelines; program processes (e.g., phases, treatment providers, urinalyses, fee structure, 
rewards/sanctions); program completion; aftercare; termination; program staff and roles; and 
program demographics and other statistics. 
Many of the questions in the interview guide were asked both during site visits and through 
multiple phone calls with interviewees. This served three purposes: 1. It allowed us to spread the 
interview questions out over time, minimizing the length of the interview at any one point in 
time; 2. It provided us an opportunity to connect with key players throughout the duration of the 
project, maximizing our opportunities to obtain information; and 3. It allowed us to keep track of 
any changes that occur in program process from the beginning of the project to the end.   
DOCUMENT REVIEW 
The evaluation team obtained documents from the programs that helped the research team 
understand the programs‘ history, operations, and practices. These documents included written 
program descriptions, quarterly and annual reports, previous evaluations of the programs, and 
many documents used regularly by program staff such as intake forms, referral to treatment 
forms, etc. 
ADMINISTRATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
NPC Research staff also examined all available administrative databases. While these databases 
were used primarily for the outcome and cost analyses, they also provided valuable data for the 
program process descriptions. These databases provided the evaluation team with information on 
the types of clients served by the programs; the length of time between arrest or sentencing and 
program entry, the types of treatment, the frequency of drug testing; and the frequency of client 
court appearances. 
Outcome Analysis Methodology 
DATA COLLECTION 
The data necessary for the outcomes and costs were gathered from available administrative 
databases and from paper files where necessary and available. NPC staff members have 
experience extracting and merging data from multiple data sources. The research team developed 
an Access database that served as a central repository of all data for each study participant. This 
relational database allowed for linkages between an individual‘s criminal activity data, treatment 
data, and other program activity data. Once all data were gathered on the study participants the 
data were compiled and cleaned and then moved into SPSS 14.0 for statistical analyses.  
DATA SOURCES 
NPC collaborated with several state and local government agencies in California for the purpose 
of tracking the study participants through a complex system of court, criminal justice and 
substance abuse treatment services. A summary of the relevant data sources from each 
collaborating agency is detailed in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Data Elements and Data Sources for Drug Court and SACPA  
Participants in Each County 
Data  El Monte/Los Angeles  San Joaquin 
Demographics 
Name 
Date of birth 
Race 
Gender 
Drug of Choice 
CII # 
SACPA # 
 
DA and court paper files 
 
County Drug Court management 
information system (DCMIS) 
 
Court records 
 
SACPA database (SMART Card 
system) 
 
Drug Court database 
Drug Court or SACPA Case 
Related Data 
Case number of the offense 
that led to Drug Court 
Drug Court case number 
Entry date 
Exit date 
Status at exit (grad./term., 
etc.) 
 
 
County Drug Court management 
information system (DCMIS) 
 
SACPA program database 
(TCPX) 
 
 
Drug Court Database (Phases) 
 
SACPA program database 
(SMART Card) 
Court hearing dates (or 
number of hearings) 
County Drug Court management 
information system (DCMIS) 
 
SACPA program database 
(TCPX) 
Drug Court Database (Phases) 
 
SACPA program database 
(SMART Card) 
Jail days sanctioned (Drug 
Court only) 
County Drug Court management 
information system (DCMIS) 
County Criminal Justice database 
(CJIS) 
Drug Court Treatment Data 
Dates or number of group 
sessions 
Dates or number of individual 
sessions 
Dates or number of days in 
residential  
Other DC service dates and 
types 
 
County Drug Court management 
information system (DCMIS) 
 
Drug Court Database (Phases) 
 
County treatment database 
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Data  El Monte/Los Angeles  San Joaquin 
Drug Test Data 
Number of UA 
Number of other drug tests 
 
County Drug Court Management 
Information System (DCMIS) 
SACPA program database 
(TCPX) 
 
Drug Court Database (Phases) 
 
SACPA program database 
(SMART Card) 
SACPA Treatment Data 
Dates or number of group 
sessions or episodes 
Dates or number of individual 
sessions or episodes 
Dates or number of urinalysis 
tests 
Dates or number of days in 
residential  
Other SACPA service dates 
and types 
 
SACPA program database 
(TCPX) 
 
SACPA program database 
(SMART Card) 
 
 
Arrest Data 
Dates of arrest 
Charge codes 
Dispositions 
Sentences 
 
California Law Enforcement 
Telecommunication System 
(CLETS) Statewide Database 
 
California Law Enforcement 
Telecommunication System 
(CLETS) Statewide Database 
New Court Cases Data 
Case #s 
Case dates  
Charges 
Sentences (prison) 
 
CCHRS (Sheriff database)  
 
County court database 
 
County Criminal Justice database 
(CJIS) 
 
Jail Data 
Jail dates in and out 
 
CCHRS (Sheriff database) 
 
County Criminal Justice database 
(CJIS) 
Prison Data 
Prison Sentences 
 
California Law Enforcement 
Telecommunication System 
(CLETS) 
 
California Law Enforcement 
Telecommunication System 
(CLETS) 
Probation Data 
Probation start date 
Probation end date 
 
CCHRS (Sheriff database) 
 
County Criminal Justice database 
(CJIS) 
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SAMPLE SELECTION 
Drug Court Samples 
The Drug Court cohorts consisted of: 
Drug Court Time 1 (T1): The Pre-SACPA Drug Court participants include all those who entered 
the Drug Court program July 1998 through June 1999. (The SACPA programs were 
implemented in July 2001.) The Drug Court cohorts pre-SACPA were provided from the 
statewide Drug Court cost study and included 202 participants in San Joaquin and 127 
participants in El Monte. 
Drug Court Time 2 (T2): The Post-SACPA Drug Court participants included all those who 
entered the Drug Court program in July 2002 through June 2003. These samples were pulled 
from the Drug Court databases in San Joaquin and Los Angeles (El Monte) counties. This time 
period provide us with 128 participants in San Joaquin and 147 participants in El Monte who 
experienced the Drug Court program after any changes in eligibility and Drug Court process due 
to SACPA as well as allowing for outcome data for 3 years post program entry. 
SACPA Samples.  
The SACPA samples in San Joaquin and El Monte/LA consisted of all SACPA participants who 
were first time enrollees in SACPA programs between July 2002 and June 2003. (This did not 
include participants who were already enrolled and were still active during this time period.) 
This provided us with 395 participants in San Joaquin and 313 participants in El Monte who 
experienced a reasonably well-established SACPA program (avoiding the early implementation 
period) while still allowing 3 years of outcomes post-program entry. As a part of SACPA 
implementation, these counties created new databases, or adjusted old databases to flag SACPA 
participants (see data sources, above). The samples of SACPA participants from the time period 
of interest were pulled from these databases.  
The Drug Court and SACPA participant samples are described in more detail in the results 
section of this report. 
Cost Analysis Methodology 
TRANSACTION AND INSTITUTIONAL COST ANALYSIS 
NPC Research has performed several cost studies in the criminal justice setting (e.g., Carey et 
al., 2005; Carey, Marchand, & Waller, 2005; Carey & Finigan, 2003; Crumpton, Carey, Weller, 
& Finigan, 2003;Crumpton, Worcel & Finigan, 2003; Finigan, Carey & Cox, 2007) using an 
approach called Transactional and Institutional Cost Analysis (TICA). The TICA approach views 
an individual‘s interaction with publicly funded agencies as a set of transactions in which the 
individual utilizes resources contributed from multiple agencies. Transactions are those points 
within a system where resources are consumed and/or change hands. In the case of Drug Courts, 
when a Drug Court participant appears in court or has a drug test, resources such as judge time, 
public defender time, court facilities, and urine cups are used. Court appearances and drug tests 
are transactions. In addition, the TICA approach recognizes that these transactions take place 
within multiple organizations and institutions that work together to create the program of 
interest. These organizations and institutions contribute to the cost of each transaction that occurs 
for program participants. TICA is an intuitively appropriate approach to conducting costs 
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assessment in an environment such as a Drug Court, which involves complex interactions among 
multiple taxpayer-funded organizations. 
COST TO THE TAXPAYER 
In order to maximize the study‘s benefit to policymakers, a ―cost-to-taxpayer‖ approach was 
used for this evaluation. This focus helped define which cost data should be collected (costs and 
avoided costs involving public funds) and which cost data should be omitted from the analyses 
(e.g., costs to the individual participating in the program). In this approach, any criminal justice 
related cost incurred by the Drug Court or comparison group participant that directly impacts a 
citizen (either through tax-related expenditures or the results of being a victim of a crime 
perpetrated by a substance abuser) is used in the calculations. 
OPPORTUNITY RESOURCES 
NPC‘s cost approach looks at publicly funded costs as ―opportunity resources.‖ The concept of 
opportunity cost from the economic literature suggests that system resources are available to be 
used in other contexts if they are not spent on a particular transaction. The term opportunity 
resource describes these resources that are now available for different use. For example, if 
substance abuse treatment reduces the number of times that a client is subsequently incarcerated, 
the local Sheriff may see no change in his or her budget, but an opportunity resource will be 
available to the Sheriff in the form of a jail bed that can now be filled by another person.  
COST DATA COLLECTION 
The TICA methodology is based upon six distinct steps. Table 3 lists each of these steps and the 
tasks involved. Step 1 was performed during the site visits, through analysis of court, Drug Court 
and SACPA documents, and through interviews with key informants. Steps 2 and 3 were 
performed through observation during the site visits and by analyzing the information gathered 
in Step 1. Step 4 was performed through extensive interviewing of key informants, direct 
observation during the site visits, and by collecting administrative data from the agencies 
involved in Drug Court and SACPA. Step 5 was performed through interviews with Drug Court, 
Prop 36 and other agency staff, and with agency finance officers. Cost data were also collected 
from budgets either found online or provided from agency staff. Step 6 involved calculating the 
cost of each transaction and multiplying this cost by the number of transactions. All the 
transactional costs for each individual were added to determine the overall cost per individual. 
This was reported as an average investment cost per participant for the program (Drug Court or 
SACPA), and average outcome/impact costs due to re-arrests, jail time and other recidivism 
costs per participant. In addition, due to the nature of the TICA approach, it was also possible to 
calculate the costs for Drug Court and SACPA for each agency. 
The specific transactions used in this cost evaluation were somewhat limited due to budget 
constraints and the availability of data (see the limitations section of this report). The costs to the 
criminal justice system outside of Drug Court or SACPA program costs (i.e., recidivism costs) 
consist of those due to new arrests, new court cases, jail bookings, jail, probation and prison time 
served, and victimizations (including person/violent and property crimes). Program costs consist 
of all program transactions including assessments, court sessions (or a court case if there are no 
SACPA specific court sessions), case management, drug tests, outpatient group and individual 
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treatment sessions, and residential treatment. Jail sanctions are included for Drug Court program 
participants. 
Table 3. Steps in TICA Methodology 
  Description  Tasks 
Step 1  Determine flow/process (i.e., how 
clients move through the system) 
Site visits/direct observations of program practice 
Interviews with key informants (agency and 
program staff) using program typology guide (See 
Appendix A) 
Step 2  Identify the transactions that occur 
within this flow (i.e., where clients 
interact with the system) 
Analysis of process information gained in Step 1 
Step 3  Identify the agencies involved in each 
transaction (e.g., court, treatment, 
police) 
Analysis of process information gained in Step 1 
Direct observation of program transactions 
Step 4  Determine the resources used by each 
agency for each transaction (e.g., 
amount of judge time per 
transaction, amount of attorney time 
per transaction, # of transactions) 
Interviews with program key informants using 
program typology (See Appendix A ) 
Direct observation of program transactions 
Administrative data collection of # of transactions 
(e.g., # of court appearance, # of treatment 
sessions, # of drug tests) See Table 2. 
Step 5  Determine the cost of the resources 
used by each agency for each 
transaction  
Interviews with budget and finance officers 
Document review of agency budgets and other 
financial paperwork 
Step 6  Calculate cost results (e.g., cost per 
transaction, total cost of the program 
per participant) 
Indirect (support and overhead) costs (as a 
percentage of direct costs) are added to the direct 
costs of each transaction to determine the cost per 
transaction. 
The transaction cost is multiplied by the average 
number of transactions for program participants to 
determine the total average cost per transaction 
type. 
These total average costs per transaction type are 
added to determine the program and outcome 
costs. (These calculations are described in more 
detail below.) 
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Data Analyses 
ANALYSES OF PROGRAM DIFFERENCES AND RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS 
The Drug Courts in San Joaquin and El Monte have very similar eligibility criteria to SACPA 
programs. For the most part, these counties give similar offenders the option of the two programs 
and most offenders choose to try the SACPA program first because there is less criminal justice 
involvement and they require a lesser time commitment. In many cases, those who do not 
successfully complete the SACPA treatment programs are referred to Drug Court. These 
circumstances have the potential of resulting in Drug Court programs with offenders who have 
more serious drug use issues and more serious criminal issues, in short, the program population 
may not be comparable. However, one of the purposes of this study is to examine how Drug 
Courts have changed with the implementation of SACPA, in particular changes in the participant 
population. In addition, these changes in Drug Court population allowed us to examine how 
differences in population characteristics influence the effectiveness of the Drug Court programs. 
Differences in participant population are also important descriptors of each of the SACPA and 
Drug Court programs and allow us to determine whether certain program processes are more 
effective for some types of participants than other types.  
Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs) and chi-squares were used to determine any significant 
differences between the Drug Court cohorts before and after the advent of SACPA and to look 
for differences between the Drug Court cohorts and SACPA cohorts.  
However, to determine the relative effectiveness and the relative investment and outcome costs of 
the programs, it was necessary to control for differences between program participants. The 
analyses of program outcomes including participant recidivism were adjusted to control 
statistically for differences between the groups. Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVAs) were used to 
calculate adjusted means and statistical significance for differences in re-arrests, time on probation, 
jail time served, prison time served, and new court cases. These analyses were adjusted based on 
criminal history in the 2 years prior to program start including past arrests and jail time served. 
Also included in the covariates were demographics (age, ethnicity, gender), drug of choice, and 
time in jail during the recidivism period (except when the mean of interest was time served in jail). 
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COST ANALYSES 
Cost information was entered into Excel for unit cost calculations. The unit costs were then 
entered into SPSS for total cost calculation and other analyses. The costs calculated for this study 
include: 1. Cost per transaction; 2. Investment costs for Drug Court and SACPA program 
transactions; 3. Outcome costs for Drug Court and SACPA participant outcomes; and 4. Relative 
cost differences between the programs and subsequent outcomes. All costs were calculated in, or 
adjusted to, 2006-2007 fiscal year dollars. 
Cost Per Transaction 
The costs incurred by each agency in terms of direct costs (staff time and materials) and indirect 
costs (support costs and overhead calculated as a percentage of the direct costs) involved in a 
transactional cost area were combined to create a cost for each agency for each transaction. The 
costs for each agency were then added together to achieve a total cost per transaction. (For 
example, a court appearance involves the use of resources from several agencies including the 
Court, the Public Defender, the District Attorney, the treatment provider, and the Sheriff (bailiff). 
The costs for the resources used by each agency for each court appearance were added together 
to determine the cost of a single court appearance.)  
Investment Costs for Drug Court and SACPA Program Processes 
Investment costs include all transactions directly related to participation in the program. The 
investment transactions include (as applicable to the specific program) program related court 
appearances, outpatient and residential treatment, drug tests, probation contacts, and jail sanction 
time. The taxpayer investment costs for the Drug Court and SACPA program process were 
calculated by adding the costs for the investment transactions for each offender to achieve the 
total investment cost per offender. The investment costs were averaged across all participants 
within a specific program in order to present the average investment cost per offender for each 
program. 
Costs for Drug Court and SACPA Program Outcomes 
Outcome costs are those costs due to transactions that occur after program entry but are not 
related to the program. Outcomes include re-arrests, new court cases, jail bookings, jail time 
served, probation time served, victimization costs, and prison time served. Outcome costs were 
calculated in the same manner as the investment costs described above. The costs per offender 
for all outcome transactions will be summed to determine the total outcome costs per offender 
and then averaged to present the average cost of outcomes per participant for each program.  
Investment and Outcome Cost Comparison 
Once the average costs per participant for the Drug Court process, the SACPA process, and the 
outcome costs are calculated, relative costs can be determined by taking the difference between 
the Drug Court samples prior and post SACPA and between the Drug Court samples and 
SACPA sample. The difference was computed in three ways: 1. The difference in investment 
costs; 2. The difference in outcome costs; and 3. The difference in total costs. The difference in 
total costs is truly the ―bottom line‖ for the cost to the system.
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RESULTS 
he results of this study are presented in order of the policy questions listed previously in 
this report. In some cases, the same results may be repeated in more than one section 
(i.e., in the section for policy questions #3 and #4 and questions #5 and #6). This is for 
two purposes: 1. To simplify the presentation of results within each section (rather than 
attempting to combine the answers to two questions into one section) and 2. So that the reader 
may turn to any section and understand the materials without reference to previous sections. 
Policy Question #1: How Have the Drug Court and Statewide 
Mandated Treatment Models Been Implemented and How Do the 
Programs Differ? 
The answer to Policy Question #1 requires an understanding of the national Drug Court model 
shared by Drug Courts in California and also an understanding of the specific mandates shared 
by SACPA programs in the state. Therefore, the answer to this question begins with a summary 
description of the Drug Court model and SACPA program mandates. This is followed by a 
description of the study sites and how these programs have been implemented on the local level 
in San Joaquin and El Monte (LA). Two sets of tables are provided next, detailing the qualitative 
differences between the Drug Court and SACPA programs at each site and the quantitative 
differences in the population between the programs at each site. Then a final section is provided 
summarizing the main differences between the Drug Court and SACPA programs.  
The results for this question are organized as follows: 
1A. Drug Court and SACPA Program Overview 
1B.  Study Site Overview 
1C.  San Joaquin County Drug Court and SACPA Programs  
1D.  El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Programs  
1E.  Differences in Drug Court and SACPA Models 
1F.  Differences in Program Population 
1G.  Summary of Differences between SACPA and Drug Court Programs in Both Counties 
1A. DRUG COURT AND SACPA PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
Drug Court Guidelines 
The first Drug Court was implemented in Florida in 1989. For several years, that Drug Court 
provided a model for other jurisdictions nationwide that wanted to create a similar program. In 
1994, the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP), a not-for-profit 
organization, was founded to ―reduce the negative social impact of substance abuse, crime and 
recidivism by promoting and advocating for the establishment, growth and funding of Drug 
Courts; providing for the collection and dissemination of information; and providing training, 
technical assistance and mutual support to association members‖ (NADCP Web site, 2007). In 
1997, a group of Drug Court professionals and evaluators created the ―Ten Key Components of 
Drug Courts‖ (NADCP, 1997) as a description of the basic activities and processes that define a 
program as being a Drug Court. These key components are: 
T 
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1.  Drug Courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice system case 
processing. 
2.  Using a non-adversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel promote public safety 
while protecting participants‘ due process rights. 
3.  Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the Drug Court program. 
4.  Drug Courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, and other related treatment 
and rehabilitation services. 
5.  Abstinence is monitored by frequent alcohol and other drug testing. 
6.  A coordinated strategy governs Drug Court responses to participants‘ compliance. 
7.  Ongoing judicial interaction with each Drug Court participant is essential. 
8.  Monitoring and evaluation measure the achievement of program goals and gauge 
effectiveness. 
9.  Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective Drug Court planning, 
implementation and operations. 
10. Forging partnerships among Drug Courts, public agencies, and community-based 
organizations generates local support and enhances Drug Court effectiveness. 
These key components are basic guidelines. They are not strict requirements and are not 
explicitly defined. They therefore can be put into practice in a variety of ways. In general, Drug 
Court programs develop a team of representatives from a variety of agencies including the court, 
law enforcement, public defense and treatment who work together to assist program participants 
in ending their drug use and becoming contributing members of society. The offense and defense 
attorney work collaboratively for the good of the participant and society. The Drug Court model 
is intended for nonviolent offenders with a drug related charge. The model works from the idea 
of ―teachable moments‖ for offenders and therefore one goal is to move the eligible offender 
from the arrest into treatment as quickly as possible. Drug Court programs provide a range of 
treatment along with other structured activities (such as life skills classes and parenting classes). 
These services are often offered in a continuum of ―phases‖ starting participants in more 
intensive treatment and lowering the intensity and structured requirements with each successive 
phase with the intention that by the end of the program, participants are able to maintain the 
structure on their own. During the course of the program, participants are tested for drug use 
frequently both as a way of monitoring participants‘ progress and as a therapeutic tool for 
participants to deter drug use. The collaborating agencies generally work as a team in responding 
to participants‘ compliance and non-compliance with program rules and behavioral modification 
techniques are used to encourage participants to learn appropriate behavior. Rewards are given to 
participants who are doing well and following program rules. Rewards may include applause and 
verbal praise from the judge in the courtroom or tangible rewards such as candy, movie tickets or 
key chains. Sanctions (or punishments) are given when participants do not comply with program 
rules (do not attend required meetings or treatment sessions, or have a positive drug test). 
Sanctions can range from verbal reprimands to writing essays to increased treatment sessions to 
days in jail. Judges are a member of the Drug Court team and are generally responsible for 
monitoring participant progress. There are regular court sessions when Drug Court participants 
appear before the judge and their progress in treatment is discussed. Court sessions are often 
where rewards or sanctions are dispensed. Built into the key components is regular monitoring 
and evaluation of whether the program is meeting its goals. The results of this monitoring allow 
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programs to adjust their protocols and policies in order to become more effective. Drug Court 
staff are expected to be trained in the Drug Court model including behavior modification 
techniques in order to implement their role in the program successfully. Finally, Drug Court 
programs encourage collaboration with the community. Drug Court participants continue to live 
in the community as they work on their drug abuse issues in the program and must continue to 
live in the community when they have left the program. Connections with the community are 
beneficial to Drug Court programs in many ways including providing an increasingly large range 
of services available to participants during and after program participation such as employment 
and employment training, housing, health care and community service. 
California is one of the national leaders in the Drug Court movement. The first Drug Court in 
California was implemented in Alameda County in 1991, one of the earliest Drug Courts in the 
nation. By 2005, California had 158 operating Drug Courts (including adult and juvenile courts). 
California has also been at the forefront of Drug Court evaluation, starting a statewide cost 
evaluation of Drug Court in 1999 that is still ongoing today (see Carey et al., 2005). 
State-Mandated Treatment for Drug Offenders in California 
The goal of Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act (SACPA) of 2000, 
as stated in the initiative‘s text, is ―to divert from incarceration into community-based substance 
abuse programs nonviolent defendants, probationers and parolees charged with simple drug 
possession or drug use offenses.‖ Other goals, according to the Alcohol and Drug Programs 
(ADP) web site, are to ―Preserve jail and prison cells for serious and violent offenders; enhance 
public safety by reducing drug-related crime; and improve public health by reducing drug abuse 
through proven and effective treatment strategies,‖ (ADP, 2007). 
The statewide SACPA statute strictly defines eligibility criteria, with no possibility of exception, 
unless disqualifying charges are dropped. SACPA targets nonviolent offenders who have a 
history of substance abuse and are primarily charged with misdemeanor or felony possession, 
excluding selling charges. Everyone who is eligible must be offered SACPA in lieu of 
incarceration and SACPA programs may not jail SACPA participants. There is no limit on prior 
convictions except for serious or violent felonies unless at least 5 years has passed since the time 
of the conviction.  
Offenders must participate in SACPA post-plea. SACPA is offered to participants on every 
SACPA eligible case. So, a single participant may (and often does) have multiple active SACPA 
cases. SACPA participants have three chances to successfully complete the SACPA program on 
each case. It is difficult to determine (from speaking with program staff) what constitutes one 
chance as the guidelines are not specific. Generally, if participants never arrive at treatment or do 
not complete treatment at the treatment agency where they are referred then they have used one 
chance. Also, if they are arrested on a new case (which may or may not be SACPA eligible), 
then they have used one chance (though this can vary from county to county). There are also 
other possible ways to use a chance including continued drug use but the two prior examples are 
the most straightforward. If a second case is eligible for SACPA then participants are on their 
second chance on their first SACPA eligible case and are on their first chance on their second 
SACPA eligible case. Once all three chances are used for a particular case and a participant has 
not successfully completed treatment or has not successfully completed the other SACPA 
program requirements, they are no longer eligible for SACPA on that case and may receive a 
sentence that includes probation, jail or prison time.  
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Drug testing is not included as a part of SACPA (and was not included as a part of the original 
proposition). However, there were many representatives from the court, law enforcement and 
treatment systems who believed that drug testing was an important component of treatment. A 
new bill (separate from SACPA) was introduced and was passed by the state to provide funds for 
drug testing for SACPA clients. 
Other than these guidelines, each county in California was required to create their own plan for 
implementing SACPA; therefore, the SACPA program in each county is different from other 
counties. In the next section the SACPA program in the two counties that participated in this 
research (as well as the Drug Court programs) will be described. 
1B. STUDY SITE OVERVIEW 
Two California counties participated in this research. The two counties were quite different as 
were the Drug Court and SACPA programs they developed.  
San Joaquin is a county in the Central Valley of California, east of the San Francisco Bay area. 
Named after the San Joaquin River, the county was one of the first in the state, created in 1850 at 
the time statehood was granted. The population is approximately 620,000, with roughly 58% 
listed as White, 7% as Black/ African American, 11% Asian, with 31% listed as Hispanic/ Latino 
of any race. The per capita income is $17,365, with a high poverty rate (17.7%) (U.S. Census 
estimates, 2006).  
Los Angeles County is the largest county in California with a population of 9,948,081. Los 
Angeles County has over 60 different Drug Courts and SACPA programs. From within Los 
Angeles we chose a single Drug Court and SACPA program site in El Monte, California. El 
Monte is the ninth largest city in Los Angeles County. Based on 2006 census estimates, El 
Monte has a population of roughly 130,000, the majority of which is Hispanic (82%) with 
significant numbers of Asians (13%) and Anglo Whites (4%) and a smaller number of African 
American and other ethnic groups. The per capita income is $10,316. Poverty rates are high 
(26%), particularly for Hispanics (22%), and African Americans (26%). Unemployment rates are 
also high, at 6.9% (U.S. Census estimates, 2006). 
1C. SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY DRUG COURT AND SACPA PROGRAMS  
San Joaquin Drug Court 
The original San Joaquin Adult Drug Court was implemented in July 1995. According to Drug 
Court staff, the goal of the San Joaquin Drug Court is ―to provide substance abuse treatment and 
other services in order to return participants to the community as productive and responsible 
members of society.‖ The program (before SACPA) targeted nonviolent offenders who had a 
history of substance abuse and were primarily charged with misdemeanor or felony possession or 
being under the influence. The program now targets felony offenders only and is called the 
Felony Drug Court. Offenders charged with the sale of drugs (except in small amounts), 
possession for the sale of drugs, or violent offenses are excluded. The program is post-plea. The 
Felony Drug Court program is offered as a part of the plea on the eligible case and the offender 
is referred to the Drug Court Office in the same court building the day of the plea. The Drug 
Court allows participants to remain a free member of society while working on their substance 
use problems. Any jail time that would have been imposed at the time of sentencing is suspended 
while participants are in Drug Court as long as they maintain satisfactory progress, although jail 
can be used as a sanction when participants are not compliant with program requirements. 
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A team of representatives from several collaborating agencies supports the Drug Court program 
and serves on a steering committee that decides program policy and process. These agencies 
include the Court, the District Attorney‘s Office, Public Defender‘s Office, the Office of 
Substance Abuse, Probation and other law enforcement agencies such as the Sheriff and Police. 
The Office of Substance Abuse, a county agency, provides primary management and 
coordination of treatment and rehabilitation services, and conducts the initial client assessment 
and intake. Other treatment providers include both county and private agencies. Treatment 
provided includes group and individual drug treatment sessions, residential treatment, relapse 
prevention and acupuncture. Other services available by referral include literacy programs, job 
preparation classes, mental health services and GED classes. 
The San Joaquin Felony Drug Court has four phases. Each phase has specific requirements for 
the program participants which, in the first two phases, include weekly Drug Court appearances 
before the Drug Court judge, drug tests one to two times per week, group substance abuse 
treatment four times per week, other treatment sessions as determined by the assessment given at 
program entry and self-help groups four times per week. Most of these requirements become less 
frequent as the program participant moves to later phases. The Office of Substance Abuse case 
managers prepare weekly progress reports that list information on drug test results, client 
attendance and participation at treatment sessions, whether the client has a sponsor, safe living 
environment and employment and/or school status. This progress is discussed with program 
participants at court appearances.  
One of the key components of the Drug Court model followed by San Joaquin (as in other Drug 
Courts) is the use of rewards and sanctions. Participants who are doing well and following 
program requirements are rewarded with applause during court sessions. Rewards may also 
include tangible gifts such as pens and key chains. Participants who are not following 
requirements (who miss treatment sessions or who have positive drug tests) are sanctioned. 
Sanctions range from a verbal reprimand to more frequent treatment sessions, self-help groups 
and drug tests to sanctioned time in jail. 
In order to graduate from Drug Court participants must participate in the program at least 12 
months, must fulfill all program phase requirements, must stay clean (negative drug tests) for 
120 consecutive days and be crime free. Graduation is a ceremony held once per year at the Bob 
Hope Theatre. The Mayor, Board of Supervisors and other politicians often attend, along with 
clients‘ families and arresting officers. Upon successful completion of the Drug Court program, 
clients may have their charges dismissed; the arrest upon which the judgment was deferred is 
stayed; felony offenses remain on record, but show as expunged. 
With the advent of SACPA, San Joaquin created a new version of the Drug Court program 
specifically for SACPA participants called Drug Court II. This program is mainly for SACPA 
participants who have been unsuccessful at completing the less intensive SACPA program 
described below. The main difference between Felony Drug Court and Drug Court II is that jail 
cannot be used as a sanction for SACPA participants. Otherwise, the requirements for program 
participation are the same as those described for Felony Drug Court. Participants of the Felony 
Drug Court program are those who have failed Drug Court II and have used up all their chances 
for SACPA participation and/or are those who do not qualify for SACPA because they have 
burglary charges or sales of small amount of drugs and are likely to get prison sentences if they 
cannot complete the Drug Court program. This implies that the population of offenders in both 
Drug Court programs is different than those in (non-Drug Court II) SACPA in that most of the 
participants have already experienced the SACPA program and are entering the Drug Court 
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programs after months or years of unsuccessful treatment and most likely have a more extensive 
criminal history. This implication is discussed further in the presentation of the data on the 
population of participants for each program. 
San Joaquin SACPA Program 
The SACPA program was officially implemented in all California counties in July 2001. Other 
than the specific guidelines described above, all California counties were required to develop 
their own plan for implementing the SACPA program locally. In San Joaquin, the SACPA 
program is offered to the defendant at arraignment, the earliest possible time. A client may 
accept SACPA at any time from arraignment to trial, although most accept it earlier, usually at 
the preliminary hearing. If a defendant opts for a jury trial, time from arrest to program entry 
may be as much as 6 months. Once defendants accept and are granted SACPA they can 
immediately proceed downstairs to the SACPA office in the basement of the courthouse to begin 
intake. The San Joaquin SACPA program requires that the client be referred to the treatment 
provider by the probation office within 7 days from court entry, and must report to the treatment 
provider within 14 days, however, this process usually takes less time. If the participant arrives at 
the treatment provider, the provider must prepare a treatment plan within 30 days of referral. 
There is no specific capacity for the SACPA program as they are required to take all eligible 
offenders. There are approximately 800 SACPA participants per year, though a large proportion 
of these are not new enrollments but former SACPA participants who are re-enrolling due to new 
cases.  
Similar to the Drug Court program described above, the SACPA program allows participants to 
remain free members of society while working on their substance use problems. Upon successful 
completion of SACPA, the participant may petition the court to dismiss charges. The case is then 
dismissed entirely and the charge is vacated.  
The San Joaquin SACPA program consists of four levels of intensity. (These levels are not the 
same as the phases described for the Drug Court program.) The levels of intensity refer to the 
intensity and frequency of the treatment received by the participants, which is determined by the 
level of need found at the time of the assessment. Level 1 is the lowest intensity treatment and 
consists of outpatient treatment a minimum of twice per week as well as self-help groups, while 
Level 4 is the highest intensity treatment and consists of either residential treatment or daily 
intensive outpatient treatment, also with self-help groups. A new participant can be referred to 
any level of treatment although they are rarely referred to Level 4 after their first assessment. 
Each time participants fail one of their chances they are re-assessed and may be assigned to a 
different level of treatment based on the new assessment. Treatment on any level involves a 
period of at least 2-3 months of multiple weekly treatment sessions, followed by ―aftercare‖ of 
one or two sessions each month until one year is completed. 
There are approximately fourteen treatment providers in San Joaquin that take SACPA 
participants. Treatment services available to SACPA participants include group and individual 
drug treatment sessions, residential treatment, relapse prevention and coping skills classes as 
well as acupuncture. Treatment providers are also responsible for performing drug tests at least 
once per month. Other services are also available by referral such as Tai Chi, employment 
training, GED and parenting skills classes. Treatment providers send one-page quarterly progress 
reports to Probation. Probation is the law enforcement arm of SACPA. Probation is involved 
with the initial referral to get client into treatment and serves as case managers for SACPA 
participants, although there are no regular meetings with participants from the reports provided 
by treatment and the SACPA database, called the SMART card system. (Participants are given 
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cards that they can swipe each time they attend treatment or other required meetings.) Probation 
monitors cases to ensure the clients are following the Court‘s directions and obeying the 
conditions of probation as well as making referrals, filing reports for courts for violations or 
abnormalities, testifying in court for violations and making recommendations regarding client 
disposition. There is also a SACPA coordinator who works for the Office of Substance Abuse. 
This position is responsible for coordinating initial intake, generally directing the program, and 
making sure all involved agencies are ―on the same page.‖ There are no regular court sessions 
for SACPA participants. Court appearances only occur in response to participants‘ violations of 
probation. 
If the client fails treatment (does not attend and is discharged from the treatment program), they 
are referred back to the Probation Department and a violation is filed. If the Court deems the 
client is appropriate for treatment, they are re-referred to the Intake Unit. Should the client fail 
treatment a second time, the Court will refer them to the Drug Court II program. In this program, 
they are given a Case Manager and monitoring is significantly increased. During this process, if 
the client is determined to be dangerous to the community or refuses to participate in a treatment 
program, the probation officer will recommend to the Court that he/she be dismissed from the 
Proposition 36 program and a jail sentence be imposed. 
In order to successfully complete the SACPA program, participants must participate in the 
program for a minimum of one year, must complete the prescribed course of treatment and pay 
all fees and restitution. Upon completion of the program participants receive a certificate of 
successful completion and can go back to court to request that the case be dismissed and that 
they be taken off probation. Case dismissal and end of probation are not automatic, however, and 
are up to the court‘s discretion. 
1D. EL MONTE DRUG COURT AND SACPA PROGRAMS  
El Monte Drug Court 
Implemented in July 1994, El Monte Drug Court was one of the earliest Drug Courts in 
California. It was the second Drug Court in Los Angeles County and the third in the state. The 
goals of the El Monte Drug Court are to reduce drug use and recidivism among clients; to 
provide court-supervised treatment to clients and to integrate drug treatment with other 
rehabilitation services in order to promote long-term recovery and reduce social costs. The 
program can currently accommodate 160 individuals, with, currently, approximately 130-150 
clients enrolled at any single point in time. The capacity of the court decreased from 180 after the 
implementation of SACPA. The enrollment decreased to as low as 60 participants soon after 
SACPA started but has slowly increased as more offenders were unsuccessful in SACPA and 
turned to the Drug Court program as an alternative to incarceration. 
The El Monte Drug Court targets nonviolent offenders with drug charges or under the influence 
charges, including both felony and misdemeanor cases. To be eligible for Drug Court, the 
defendant must have no prior serious or violent felony convictions, no strike convictions; and 
have no sales/trafficking convictions. Potential participants are referred to Drug Court after they 
are identified at arraignment or from other court referrals. Originally, El Monte‘s Drug Court 
program was entirely pre-plea. After SACPA was implemented, Drug Court became both pre- 
and post-plea, with a tendency towards post-plea clients. Offenders are often taken immediately 
from court to the Drug Court program office. Assessments may be done the same day as court. A 
client in custody could be in the program within 48-72 hours of arrest. Clients on bond, bail, or 
sign-out may have a month or more before program entry. 
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As in the typical Drug Court model, the program allows participants to remain a free member of 
society while working on their substance use problems. Any jail time that would have been 
imposed at the time of sentencing is suspended while the participant is in Drug Court as long as 
they maintain satisfactory progress. The El Monte Drug Court program consists of three phases, 
(the first of which includes a 2-week trial period), and an alumni program. The first phase is the 
most intensive with 3 to 5 group treatment sessions per week, five drug tests per week, a 
minimum of one individual treatment session per week and court sessions once every 2 weeks. 
The phases get successively less intensive with Phase 3 requiring fewer group sessions and drug 
tests (two per week, respectively) and one court session per month. There is a single treatment 
agency that provides Drug Court services. Services include outpatient counseling and intensive 
therapy, relapse prevention, health education, family sessions, dual diagnosis treatment, mental 
health facilities, and one-on-one treatment with an individual counselor. Participants also have 
access to other recovery programs such as anger management, parenting and GED classes.  
There is a team of representatives from several collaborating agencies that work together to assist 
participants in their recovery. The Drug Court team consists of the judge, Drug Court 
coordinator, assistant Drug Court coordinator, judicial assistant, treatment agency director, 
deputy district attorney, deputy public defender, alternate public defender, and probation officer. 
The Drug Court team meets once or twice a week in the courtroom to go over participant 
progress reports. There is also a Drug Court steering committee that meets monthly to discuss 
Drug Court policy, any changes in staffing and upcoming graduation and fundraisers. The 
steering committee consists of the entire Drug Court team as well as further representatives from 
several agencies including the assistant director for the treatment agency and representatives 
from law enforcement. 
The treatment provider gives written and verbal progress reports to court before each Drug Court 
appearance. These reports include information on client attendance, types of sessions attended, 
12- step meetings attended, drug tests, and a narrated section for additional comments. 
As in San Joaquin, one of the key components of the Drug Court model followed by El Monte 
(as in other Drug Courts) is the use of rewards and sanctions. Participants who are doing well 
and following program requirements are rewarded with applause and verbal praise during court 
sessions. Rewards may also include tangible gifts such as candy and movie tickets. Participants 
who are not following requirements (who miss treatment sessions or who have positive drug 
tests) are sanctioned. Sanctions range from writing essays or letters to more frequent treatment 
sessions and self-help groups to sanctioned time in jail with and without treatment. 
In order to graduate (successfully complete) the Drug Court program, participants must complete 
all program requirements, must have no positive drug tests for 6 months, and must be employed 
or in school full time. Upon completion of the program, clients may have their charges 
dismissed; the arrest upon which the judgment was deferred is considered to have never 
occurred. If clients entered through probation, they receive early termination of probation and the 
case is expunged. 
After the advent of SACPA, SACPA participants who did not successfully complete their 
programs began being accepted to the Drug Court. However, the Drug Court is not a component 
of SACPA. Participants who enter the program must give up any remaining rights they have to 
SACPA funded treatment. 
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El Monte SACPA Program 
As described in the text for San Joaquin County, SACPA has specific and strict statewide 
eligibility criteria as well as forbidding jail for those offenders willing to attempt treatment. Drug 
testing is not included in the SACPA statute and the funding for drug tests is provided by a 
separate legislation.  
On Nov 15, 2000, the Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination Committee (CCJCC) 
established the Proposition 36 Implementation Task Force, which was comprised of 
approximately 60 members including treatment providers, county and city criminal justice 
agencies, judicial officers, public defender‘s office, district attorney‘s office, and county 
departments such as health services, probation, mental health, social services, sheriff, 
corrections/parole, Department of Health, Alcohol and Drug Programs Administration (ADPA) 
and various drug treatment provider groups. The Los Angeles Board of Supervisors designated 
the Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination Committee SACPA Implementation Task Force 
as the advisory group responsible for the development of policies and procedures for the 
implementation of Proposition 36. ADPA was designated as the lead agency. It was decided by 
the Task Force and various subcommittees that it would be best to staff SACPA with personnel 
with Drug Court experience, and use Drug Court principles in SACPA cases. The El Monte 
SACPA program officially began operations with the rest of the state in July 2001, although it 
also ran a short pilot test of the program in the months before official implementation. 
In El Monte, the main staff for the SACPA program is also the team for Drug Court. Many of the 
staff members have worked together in the Drug Court since its implementation in 1994 and 
continue to work together in the SACPA program. The same judge, or commissioner, supervises 
both the Drug Court program and the SACPA program. 
The program allows participants to remain a free member of society while working on their 
substance use problems. As required by the SACPA statute, participants enter the program post-
plea. Eligible offenders are offered the SACPA program when they appear in court. In general, 
the time from referral and through the assessment process can take about 5 days. (However, it 
often takes longer when participants do not make or show up for their assessment appointment.) 
When offenders who agree to participate in SACPA in court, they are referred to a special center 
for an assessment to determine their treatment needs. Assessments in LA are performed by 
Community Assessment Service Centers (CASCs). The CASC determines the treatment plan and 
treatment level for each participant, which must then be approved by the SACPA program 
commissioner. There are three levels of treatment available to El Monte SACPA clients. As in 
San Joaquin, these are not the same thing as the Drug Court phases. Participants can be referred 
at entry to any level of treatment depending on their treatment needs and probation risk level. 
Level 1 is the lowest intensity treatment. It is expected to last about 18 weeks and requires 3 
hours of treatment per week and one drug test per week. A participant may be assigned to the 
next level of treatment if they miss three drug tests, three meetings or three treatment sessions in 
a 30-day period. Level 3 is the most intensive and lasts approximately 40 weeks. Level 3 is 
residential and/or intensive outpatient with 9 hours of treatment required per week and two drug 
tests per week for the first 8 weeks.  
There are approximately 100 treatment providers available to El Monte SACPA clients. The 
CASC determines which treatment provider a participant attends based on their treatment needs 
and the geographic area in which they live. Treatment includes group and individual treatment 
sessions as provided by the specific treatment provider. Treatment providers also conduct drug 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.  Drug Courts and State Mandated Drug Treatment Programs: Outcomes, Costs, and Consequences   
30    March 2008 
tests. Any ancillary services (such as parenting classes or anger management) are based on the 
existence of these services at the particular treatment agency the participant attends. 
SACPA participants must report their progress to their probation officer monthly and attend 
court sessions quarterly. The participants‘ monthly reports are performed through kiosks that are 
available at large number of convenient locations throughout Los Angeles. These kiosks 
recognize participants by their handprints. Once participants have logged in to the kiosk they are 
required to read and answer a series of questions about their progress in treatment and other 
questions relevant to their SACPA participation. They can also receive messages and reply to 
messages from their probation officer and pay fees at the kiosk. SACPA participants attend court 
sessions once every quarter. The treatment providers and probation officers, as well as the court, 
enter all information into a single database called TCPX. The court receives reports on 
participant progress from TCPX. 
Although the same staff overlap between Drug Court and SACPA, there is no SACPA 
coordinator, no team and no team meetings. There are also no rewards or sanctions.  
Participants are allowed three drug related violations before they are terminated from the 
SACPA program. This includes positive drug tests, missed tests or missed counseling sessions, 
being discharged from (failing to complete) the treatment program and new drug-related arrests. 
Clients may be terminated if they are a physical danger to others. The text of Proposition 36 
notes that treatment staff may notify probation that a client is un-amenable to treatment, which 
may lead probation being revoked and failure out of the program unless the client can prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that there is a drug treatment program available that the client is 
amenable to. Otherwise, the client may be incarcerated as they would pre-SACPA legislation.  
Requirements for successful completion from the El Monte SACPA program include having no 
positive drug tests for 30 days prior to completion; payment of all fees, attending all treatment 
requirements according to the appropriate treatment level and attend 6 months of aftercare. Upon 
successful completion of SACPA, the client may petition the court to dismiss charges. The case 
is then dismissed entirely and the charge is vacated. 
1E. DIFFERENCES IN DRUG COURT AND SACPA MODELS 
There are several key differences in structure and operations between the two program types in 
both sites. These differences are summarized in a table for each site. 
San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA Process Differences 
A review of the program descriptions and the interviews with program staff for the San Joaquin 
Drug Court and SACPA programs revealed some significant differences in program components. 
For the purposes of this analysis, the SACPA program, not including the Drug Court II 
component, is compared to the San Joaquin Drug Court model. A summary of the differences is 
provided in Table 4. Additional quantitative data is also examined. 
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Table 4. Programmatic Differences Between SACPA and Drug Court in San Joaquin 
Program Component  Drug Court  SACPA 
Capacity & Enrollment  The felony Drug Court currently has 
80 clients while Drug Court II has 
150 clients. 
There is no capacity limit on 
enrollment in SACPA. There have 
been up to 1,800 active participants 
at any one time. The program must 
expand to meet demand. By statute, 
the program must be available for all 
eligible clients. 
Treatment Provider 
Network 
Drug Court relies on two main 
agencies for treatment services. 
Clients are occasionally referred out 
to multiple county and private 
treatment agencies for specialized 
services. 
SACPA clients are referred among 14 
treatment providers in the county. 
Treatment is organized into 4 main 
intensity levels ranging from 
outpatient to residential services. 
Length of 
Program/Length Of Time 
In Treatment 
The Drug Court program requires a 
minimum of 12 months to complete, 
although participants can stay longer 
as long as they are attending 
treatment and complying with other 
program rules. Treatment continues 
throughout the length of the program 
for all participants. 
The actual time spent in the program 
by those who complete, as measured 
from administrative data, averages 
just over one year (390 days). 
The SACPA program also requires a 
minimum of one year to complete 
although treatment for participants 
can be covered up to 18 months (but 
no longer). The required length of 
time in treatment can vary from 3 to 
6 months depending on treatment 
level. If the treatment is completed 
successfully, then there is “continuing 
care” for the remainder of the year 
that varies in intensity depending on 
the treatment provider but is 
generally minimal meetings around 
once per month. 
The actual time spent in the program 
by those who complete, as measured 
from administrative data, averages 
just under 18 months (522 days). 
Aftercare (after program 
completion) 
There is an alumni group to lend 
continued support after treatment 
completion.  
SACPA clients do not receive 
aftercare unless they were referred to 
a Drug Court program as part of their 
treatment. 
Use of Rewards  The Drug Court determines rewards 
for positive client behavior based on 
an established point system. Rewards 
can be tangible (such as small gifts) or 
intangible (such as praise or 
courtroom applause). 
There is no established reward 
system for SACPA clients. 
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Program Component  Drug Court  SACPA 
Use of Sanctions  A series of graduated sanctions is used 
to respond to non-compliance with 
program rules. The judge, in 
consultation with the case managers, 
imposes sanctions in court. Sanctions 
may include increased drug testing, 
residential treatment, community 
service, journaling, and/or jail time. 
The SACPA statute allows for the use 
of some sanctions. Sanctions occur in 
response to failure to attend 
treatment or other probation 
violations and generally involve 
increasing the client’s treatment 
level. In some instances, probation 
may be modified or revoked.   
Supervision of Participants  In the first phase of the program 
participants appear weekly before the 
judge in a court session that is open to 
the public. Court appearances are 
required once every 2 weeks in Phase 
2 and once every 3 weeks in Phase 3. 
The judge receives weekly progress 
reports from treatment providers. 
Clients do not return to court once 
they have been referred to SACPA 
unless there is a problem, such as a 
probation violation. Probation does 
intake when the participant is 
referred from the court and refers 
participants to treatment. 
Participants are monitored through 
treatment reports provided to 
Probation. Probation officers do most 
of the client monitoring through 
these reports and through the 
SMART card database. There are no 
required meetings with probation 
unless there is a problem. 
Drug Testing  Drug testing is both random and for 
cause. Initially testing occurs three 
times per week and then is reduced to 
twice per week. 
Treatment providers are expected to 
conduct random drug testing a 
minimum of once per month. 
Client Fees  Drug Court clients do not pay 
program fees though they may be 
required to pay any court fees or 
restitution. 
If the client earns $900 per month or 
more, there is a sliding fee scale that 
begins at $75/month. 
Program Oversight  There is a Drug Court team 
(including the judge, the Drug Court 
coordinator, case managers from the 
Office of Substance Abuse, and 
representatives from the main 
treatment agency) that manages client 
progress. The team meets weekly to 
discuss individual participant 
progress.  
There is also a Drug Court Oversight 
Committee that meets bi-monthly to 
discuss program policy and 
accomplishments.  
There is a SACPA Oversight 
Committee that meets bi-monthly to 
discuss program policy and 
accomplishments.  
There is no team that oversees 
individual participant progress. 
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Program Component  Drug Court  SACPA 
Requirements for 
Completion 
A highly structured program in which 
participants must complete all 
requirements and successfully pass 
through four treatment phases to 
graduate. Each phase has mandatory 
treatment and court session 
requirements, drug tests and 12-step 
meetings. Participants must have no 
positive drug tests for 120 
consecutive days to graduate. 
SACPA participants do not “graduate” 
from the program. Requirements for 
successful completion of the 
programs include completion of 
treatment and successful completion 
of continuing care for a total of at 
least one year, as determined by the 
individual treatment provider. Once 
all fees are paid, participants officially 
receive a certificate of successful 
completion. 
Recognition Program 
Completion 
Clients participate in a graduation 
ceremony held in the courtroom. 
Families and guests are invited to 
attend. Graduates receive a small gift 
and a certificate. 
Clients receive a certificate of 
completion. 
 
There are several key differences between the San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA models. One 
obvious difference is capacity. SACPA is designed to treat all eligible offenders (can handle 
several hundred participants simultaneously), considerably more than the current capacity of the 
Drug Court programs (around 200 participants combined). The ability to provide treatment to a 
large number of offenders is a large benefit of SACPA. In addition, SACPA uses a larger number 
of treatment providers than the Drug Court programs. The benefit of this is the ability to provide 
participants with the treatment specific for the needs. The drawback is that it is more difficult to 
coordinate and determine the quality of the treatment with a larger number of providers and it 
can be difficult for supervision to consistently receive communications on participant progress.  
The length of stay for participants in SACPA is longer, and longer time in treatment is known to be 
associated with better outcomes. However, the treatment received in SACPA during that time may 
not be consistent, depending on whether the participant follows through on their treatment plan. 
Time in the SACPA program does not equal time in treatment. This is in contrast to the Drug 
Court model where the high level of court supervision enforces participant attendance at treatment 
and therefore, time in the Drug Court program corresponds closely with time in treatment. 
The San Joaquin Drug Court model performs several activities that result in a high level of 
participant monitoring including court sessions, treatment sessions, and drug tests. In addition to 
learning to deal with their substance abuse issues in treatment, participants learn to modify their 
inappropriate behaviors from feedback provided by the Drug Court team. Appropriate behavior 
is rewarded and inappropriate behavior is sanctioned so that participants are accountable for their 
behavior either way. 
The successful completion of Drug Court for each participant is decided by a team following a clear 
list of requirements while the completion of SACPA is decided mainly from reports on treatment 
completion by individual treatment providers that have different criteria. Finally, the successful 
completion of Drug Court is called ―graduation‖ and is marked by a ceremony and celebration. 
There is no special marking of SACPA completion aside from a certificate of completion. 
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In summary, the Drug Court model is more personal, including a much higher level of 
supervision and participant accountability while the SACPA program reaches and provides 
treatment to a much larger number of individuals making a more personal model more difficult. 
El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Process Differences 
Table 5 highlights some of the key differences in the operation of the El Monte Drug Court 
compared to the EL Monte SACPA program. 
Table 5. Programmatic Differences Between SACPA and Drug Court in El Monte 
Program Component  El Monte Drug Court  El Monte SACPA 
Capacity & Enrollment  The El Monte Drug Court has a 
capacity of approximately 160 
participants (down from 180 pre-
SACPA). 
There is no capacity limit on enrollment 
in SACPA. In Los Angeles County there 
are up to 5,000 active participants at any 
one time. In El Monte, over 400 were 
referred in 2002-2003 and 313 entered 
the program. The program must expand 
to meet demand. By statute, the 
program must be available for all eligible 
clients. 
Treatment Provider 
Network 
Drug Court has one agency that 
performs intake, drug tests and 
primary services (group and 
individual drug treatment sessions). 
This agency refers out to 
approximately ten additional 
agencies (though others are used 
occasionally) for more specialized 
treatment services including 
residential care. 
El Monte SACPA participants are 
referred to a Community Assessment 
Service Centers (CASC), which does the 
assessment and chooses a treatment 
provider out of several hundred based on 
the location of the participants’ home. 
Length of 
Program/Length of time 
in treatment 
The El Monte Drug Court program 
requires a minimum of 12 months 
to complete, although participants 
can stay longer as long as they are 
attending treatment and complying 
with other program rules. 
Treatment continues throughout 
the length of the program for all 
participants. 
The actual time spent in the 
program by those who complete, as 
measured from administrative data, 
averages just over 14 months (436 
days). 
The SACPA program also requires a 
minimum of approximately one year to 
complete depending on the treatment 
level. The required length of time in 
treatment can vary from 18 weeks (4 
months) to 40 weeks (9 months) 
depending on the intensity level. 
Completion of treatment is followed by 
6 months of “continuing care” which 
requires documented meetings at self-
help groups and at least one meeting 
with the treatment provider to verify 
participation. 
The actual time spent in the program by 
those who complete, as measured from 
administrative data, averages to just less 
than 23 months (696 days). 
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Program Component  El Monte Drug Court  El Monte SACPA 
Aftercare (After program 
completion) 
There is an alumni group to lend 
continued support after treatment 
completion. Participants in Phase 3 
are required to attend alumni group 
meetings. 
SACPA clients do not receive aftercare 
unless they were referred to a Drug 
Court program as part of their 
treatment. 
Use of Rewards  The Drug Court team determines 
rewards for positive client behavior 
including compliance with program 
rules. Rewards can be tangible 
(such as candy or other small gifts) 
or intangible (such as praise, hugs 
or courtroom applause). 
There are no rewards for SACPA clients. 
Use of Sanctions  A series of graduated sanctions is 
used to respond to non-compliance 
with program rules. The judge, in 
consultation with the team, 
imposes sanctions in court. 
Sanctions may include, increased 
drug testing, writing essays or 
letters, residential treatment, 
community service, and/or time in 
jail. 
There are no sanctions for SACPA 
participants. Although, if clients fail to 
complete treatment or commit other 
probation violations their treatment 
level may increase or they may be 
terminated from the program if they 
have used their third (and last) chance in 
SACPA. 
Supervision of Participants  In the first phase of the program 
participants appear once every 2 
weeks before the commissioner in a 
court session that is open to the 
public. Court appearances are 
required once every 3 weeks in 
Phase 2 and once every per month 
in Phase 3. The judge receives 
written and verbal progress reports 
from treatment providers on 
individual participants before each 
court session. 
Tone of Drug Court sessions are 
friendlier, more relaxed, and less 
adversarial than SACPA. 
Participants appear before the SACPA 
commissioner monthly at the beginning 
of the program then move to quarterly 
when they get “stabilized,” unless they 
have a probation violation or other 
problem in which case they will come to 
court sooner. Participants must report 
to Probation monthly through kiosks 
where they login with their handprint 
and answer questions on the screen. The 
probation officer is automatically 
notified if a participant does not perform 
their monthly check-in or does not 
appear for a drug test. Probation officers 
can leave messages for participants on 
the kiosk and participants can reply or 
leave their own messages to their 
probation officer on the kiosk. There are 
no required meetings with probation 
except to come in for drug testing on a 
random basis at the discretion of the 
probation officer, at least once every 3 
months.  
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Program Component  El Monte Drug Court  El Monte SACPA 
Drug Testing  Drug testing is both random and for 
cause. Initially testing occurs five 
times per week and then is reduced 
to twice per week in the last phase. 
Treatment providers are expected to 
conduct random drug testing at least 
once or twice per week. If a participant 
does not appear for a drug test, 
treatment is expected to inform 
Probation.  
Probation is required to perform 
random drug tests at least once every 3 
months, but they may do it more often 
(up to once per month). 
Client Fees  Drug Court participants pay up to 
$400 to the treatment provider, 
according to their ability to pay. 
El Monte SACPA participants may be 
asked to pay a $200 SACPA fee, a 
probation fee (from $250 to $650) and a 
lab fee for drug test averaging about $50. 
However, this is based on the 
participants’ ability to pay and these fees 
may be waived at the Commissioner’s 
discretion. 
Program Oversight  There is a Drug Court team 
(including the judge, the Drug 
Court coordinator, a district 
attorney, a public defender, the 
treatment agency director and a 
judicial assistant) that works 
together to manage participant 
progress. The team meets one to 
two times weekly to discuss 
individual participant progress.  
There is also a Drug Court 
Oversight Committee (including 
the Drug Court team and more 
representatives from treatment as 
well as from law enforcement) that 
meets every 6 weeks to discuss 
program policy, staffing changes 
and upcoming graduations.  
Although the main staff for SACPA is the 
same as the staff on the Drug Court 
team, they do not oversee individual 
participant progress as a team. There are 
no team meetings. 
 
Two judges oversee a “Proposition 36 
oversight committee” which meets 
quarterly for this region to talk about 
any SACPA related issues and policies. 
This committee includes treatment 
providers, probation, attorneys and 
judicial officers.  
Requirements for 
Completion 
A highly structured program in 
which participants must complete 
all requirements and successfully 
pass through three treatment phases 
to graduate. Each phase has 
mandatory treatment and court 
session requirements, drug tests 
and 12-step meetings. Participants 
must have no positive drug tests for 
SACPA participants do not “graduate” 
from the program. Requirements for 
successful completion of the program 
include completion of treatment, 
successful completion of 6 months of 
“continuing care” and compliance with 
any other conditions of probation. 
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Program Component  El Monte Drug Court  El Monte SACPA 
6 months, must be employed or in 
school full-time, have a sober living 
environment and demonstrate an 
ability to support themselves in 
order to graduate. 
Recognition Program 
Completion 
Clients participate in a graduation 
ceremony three to four times per 
year. Families and guests are 
invited to attend. Graduates receive 
a certificate of completion, lunch 
and a picture with the Drug Court 
team, and small gift such as t-shirts 
and key chains. 
There is no official ceremony of SACPA 
completion. Once participants complete 
the program the SACPA charge is set 
aside and the participant can petition the 
court to dismiss the indictment. 
Interestingly, of 3,118 clients who 
successfully completed in FY2003-2004, 
only 1,759 petitioned to have cases 
dismissed. 
 
The key differences between the Drug Court model and the SACPA model in El Monte are 
almost identical to the differences in San Joaquin, in spite of each county developing their own 
SACPA plan. A clear difference is capacity. SACPA is designed to treat all eligible offenders 
(can handle several hundred participants simultaneously), considerably more than the current 
capacity of the Drug Court program (currently operating at about 120 participants). The ability to 
provide treatment to a large number of offenders is a major benefit of SACPA. In addition, 
SACPA uses a larger number of treatment providers than the Drug Court programs. The benefit 
of this is the ability to provide participants with the treatment specific for the needs. The 
drawback is that it is more difficult to coordinate and determine the quality of the treatment with 
a larger number of providers and it can be difficult for the court to receive consistent 
communications on participant progress.  
The length of stay in the program for participants in SACPA is longer, and longer time in 
treatment is known to be associated with better outcomes. However, the treatment received in 
SACPA during that time may not be consistent, depending on whether the participant follows 
through on their treatment plan. Further, SACPA participants may still be in the program but not 
be attending treatment for varying lengths of time. (There is an average number of three separate 
treatment episodes per SACPA participant.) Therefore, time in the program for SACPA 
participants does not equal time in treatment. This is in contrast to Drug Court where time in the 
program does generally correspond closely with time in treatment. In the Drug Court model the 
high level of court supervision enforces participant attendance at treatment throughout the length 
of the program. 
The El Monte Drug Court model performs several activities that result in a high level of 
participant monitoring including court sessions, treatment sessions, and drug tests at a much 
higher frequency than SACPA. In addition to learning to deal with their substance abuse issues 
in treatment, participants learn to modify their inappropriate behaviors from feedback (including 
rewards and sanctions) provided promptly at the time of the behavior by the Drug Court team. 
Appropriate behavior is rewarded and inappropriate behavior is sanctioned so that participants 
are accountable for their behavior either way. Although, both Drug Court and SACPA 
participants attend court sessions, because of the larger number of participants, SACPA sessions 
are performed more quickly and formally for each participant, while in Drug Court the session is 
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more informal and personal for each participant. SACPA participants check in with their 
probation officer through kiosks rather than in person. 
The successful completion of Drug Court for each participant is decided by a team following a 
clear list of requirements and includes 6 consecutive months of ―clean‖ drug tests and a having a 
job or being in school full time. The completion of SACPA is decided mainly from reports on 
treatment completion by each individual treatment providers and then by the satisfaction of any 
other specific conditions of probation. Finally, the successful completion of Drug Court is called 
―graduation‖ and is marked by a ceremony and celebration. There is no special marking of 
SACPA completion aside from a certificate of completion. 
In summary, like San Joaquin, the Drug Court model in El Monte is more personal, with a team 
of representatives from collaborating agencies focusing on the progress of each participant 
individually, including a much higher level of supervision and participant accountability. In 
contrast, the SACPA program reaches and provides treatment to a much larger number of 
individuals, and keeps those participants in treatment longer. However, the large number of 
SACPA participants makes a more personal model more difficult to accomplish. 
1F. DIFFERENCES IN PROGRAM POPULATION 
The organization of the criminal justice system around the SACPA and Drug Court programs, so 
that participants of SACPA who do not successfully complete the program are then sent to Drug 
Court leads to significant differences between the populations of the two programs in both sites. 
Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were performed to determine if any differences between 
program participant characteristics were statistically significant. 
San Joaquin Differences in Participant Population 
Table 6 provides the participant characteristics, including demographics and criminal history for 
the San Joaquin SACPA program (not including Drug Court II) and the Drug Court program 
before and after the implementation of SACPA. The Drug Court program at Time 2 (T2), after 
the implementation of SACPA, includes both Felony Drug Court and Drug Court II participants. 
(The differences in the participants from Felony Drug Court and Drug Court II participants will 
be described further under Policy Question #3.) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.     Results 
 
39 
Table 6. San Joaquin Drug Courts and SACPA Participant Characteristics 
 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
Pre-SACPA 
(T1) (98-99) 
N=202 
San Joaquin 
SACPA 
N=395 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
Post-SACPA 
(T2) (02-03) 
N=128 
Significant 
Difference 
Between 
Drug Court 
and SACPA? 
P < .01 
Age  36  36  36  No 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
 
61% 
39% 
 
72% 
28% 
 
70% 
30% 
 
No 
Race/Ethnicity 
White 
Hispanic/Latino 
African American 
 
43% 
24% 
31% 
 
48% 
26% 
21% 
 
39% 
21% 
23% 
 
No 
Drug of Choice 
Meth 
Cocaine* 
Heroin 
Marijuana* 
Alcohol* 
 
25% 
29% 
22% 
14% 
29% 
 
34% 
12% 
25% 
23% 
12% 
 
28% 
21% 
23% 
16% 
21% 
 
Yes 
(For Cocaine, 
Marijuana and 
Alcohol at both time 
periods) 
Average # of arrests in 2 years 
prior to program entry*  3.1  3.3  4.5 
Yes 
(For Drug Court T2) 
Average # of arrests with 
person charges in 2 years prior  .27  .35  .48  No 
Average # of arrests with 
property charges in 2 years 
prior 
NA  .48  .97  No 
Average # of arrests with drug 
charges in 2 years prior  2.3  2.1  3.0 
Yes 
(For Drug Court T2) 
Average # of arrests with 
felony charges in 2 years prior  1.6  1.9  2.9 
Yes 
(For Drug Court T2) 
Average # prior convictions in 
2 years prior  2.0  1.7  2.0  No 
Average # of days in jail in 2 
years prior  51  35  55  Yes 
Average # of days in Prison in 
2 years prior  NA  7  14  Yes 
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While most of the demographics measured (age, gender, ethnicity) were not significantly 
different between the Drug Court and SACPA groups, drug of choice was significantly different. 
The use of methamphetamine was fairly similar but Drug Court had higher numbers of cocaine 
users while SACPA had higher numbers of marijuana users. Drug Court participants after 
SACPA implementation had a more extensive criminal history (greater numbers of total prior 
arrests and arrests with specific charges including drug and felony charges) and spent more time 
incarcerated (both jail and prison) before entering the program. Drug Court participants before 
SACPA had similar or slightly more extensive criminal histories before starting the Drug Court 
program. These results will be discussed further in the summary for this section. 
El Monte Differences in Participant Population 
Table 7 provides the participant characteristics, including demographics and criminal history for 
the El Monte SACPA and Drug Court programs before and after the implementation of SACPA.  
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Table 7. El Monte Drug Courts and SACPA Participant Characteristics 
 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
Pre-SACPA 
(T1) (98-99) 
N = 127 
El Monte 
SACPA 
(02-03) 
N = 313 
El Monte  
Drug Court 
Post-SACPA 
(T2) (02-03) 
N = 147 
Significant 
Difference 
between 
Drug Court 
and SACPA? 
P < .01 
Age  32  33  32  No 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
 
75% 
25% 
 
84% 
16% 
 
73% 
27% 
 
No 
Race/Ethnicity 
White 
Hispanic/Latino 
African American 
 
28% 
68% 
2% 
 
18% 
75% 
1% 
 
19% 
75% 
1% 
 
Yes 
(Drug Court T1) 
Drug of Choice 
Meth 
Cocaine 
Heroin 
Marijuana 
Alcohol 
 
33% 
49% 
6% 
2% 
8% 
 
63% 
15% 
12% 
4% 
5% 
 
55% 
19% 
11% 
4% 
20% 
 
Yes 
(Meth and 
cocaine at T1; 
alcohol at T2) 
Average # of arrests in 2 years 
prior to program entry  2.2  2.9  3.1  Yes 
Average # of arrests with person 
charges in 2 years prior  .02  .12  .04  Yes 
Average # of arrests with property 
charges in 2 years prior  NA  .30  .50  No 
Average # of arrests with drug 
charges in 2 years prior  1.7  2.1  2.5  Yes 
Average # of arrests with felony 
charges in 2 years prior  1.4  1.7  2.0  No 
Average # convictions in 2 years 
prior  .79  .77  .62  Yes 
Average # of days in jail in 2 years 
prior  33  45  69  Yes 
Average # of days in Prison in 2 
years prior    22  35  No 
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There are several differences in the population of the El Monte Drug Court before SACPA 
compared to the SACPA program and Drug Court program after SACPA. The Drug Court and 
SACPA programs in 2002-2003 had higher numbers of Hispanic participants and fewer whites 
than the Drug Court program pre-SACPA, although this may be a function of an increase in the 
population of Latino individuals in the in the County as a whole. Drug of choice was also 
significantly different with Drug Court in 2002-2003 and SACPA participants using dramatically 
more methamphetamine and less cocaine than Drug Court participants pre-SACPA. Drug Court 
participants after SACPA implementation had a more extensive criminal history (greater 
numbers of total prior arrests and arrests with specific charges including drug and felony 
charges) and spent more time incarcerated (both jail and prison) before entering the program than 
SACPA participants and Drug Court participants before SACPA. Drug Court participants before 
SACPA had similar or slightly less extensive criminal histories than SACPA before starting the 
program. Strangely, although the SACPA program does not allow participants with violent 
histories within 5 years of program entry, SACPA participants had more arrests with person 
charges than the Drug Court program at either time period. However, this difference may just be 
an artifact of the extremely small number of this type of arrests. These results will be discussed 
further in the summary for this section. 
1G. SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SACPA AND DRUG COURT PROGRAMS IN 
BOTH COUNTIES 
In spite of the diversity in how SACPA was implemented in each county, the differences found 
between SACPA and the Drug Court model at both study sites are remarkably similar. One 
major difference between SACPA and Drug Courts at our study sites and in the state as a whole 
is capacity. SACPA is designed to serve several times more participants than the Drug Court 
program in either site (and any site in California). A huge benefit of SACPA is its ability to serve 
every eligible participant. The treatment capacity in both counties increased dramatically in order 
to keep up with the demands of SACPA participants. (Although program staff at both sites 
described some difficulties in consistently being able to find open treatment slots appropriate for 
each client.) 
Another major difference is the level of supervision. Drug Court participants are much more 
heavily monitored than SACPA participants in multiple ways including more court supervision, 
more consistent treatment requirements, regular and more frequent drug testing and regular 
progress reviews by a team of representatives from multiple collaborating agencies that can 
assist participants with their legal problems as well as their treatment needs. 
For both study sites it is clear that the Drug Court model is more personalized. Just one example 
of this is the ceremony and celebration that goes with successful completion of the Drug Court 
programs that is completely lacking in the SACPA programs. This kind of personal and human 
activity leads to both staff and participants to feel good about the work they are doing. As one 
staff member, who works with both SACPA and Drug Court programs said, ―I love Drug Court. 
It‘s more intense. It humanizes the person and I get to know the client.‖ It is likely that the sheer 
size of the SACPA program makes the kind of personal interaction that occurs in the Drug Court 
program challenging to implement. To introduce this kind of personal attention into SACPA 
would require many more non-treatment staff (possibly several Drug Court teams serving 
smaller groups of clients would be necessary). 
The conviction has often been expressed that Drug Courts are ―creaming‖ the eligible population 
of offenders. The definition of creaming may vary depending upon the speaker but in general the 
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idea of creaming is that Drug Court staff screens participants and only accepts those they believe 
are likely to succeed. What kinds of participants are likely to succeed in any particular program? 
What characteristics might one look for in order to get the ―cream of the crop?‖ An obvious 
characteristic would be criminal history. It is commonly known that one of the best predictors of 
re-offending is prior offending. Because SACPA must take all eligible participants, it can be 
assumed that it is not possible for this program to perform any ―creaming.‖ Therefore, if Drug 
Courts are ―creaming‖ based on criminal history, an examination of the criminal history in the 
population at both sites should show that Drug Court participants have fewer arrests, fewer 
convictions, less time in jail and less time in prison. This is not the case. The Drug Court 
participants at both sites show either no significant difference in past criminal behavior than 
SACPA participants or a more extensive history. In fact, Drug Court participants at Time 2 (after 
the implementation of SACPA) consistently show a greater number of prior arrests, jail time and 
prison time than SACPA participants. This is to be expected considering that Drug Court 
participants at Time 2 consist to a large extent of former SACPA participants who spent time in 
SACPA and failed to complete SACPA treatment before entering the Drug Court program. If 
these Drug Courts were creaming, the more criminal offenders referred from SACPA would not 
be allowed in the program. Another characteristic that may be screened out in the ―creaming‖ 
process is drug of choice. The data does show some difference in drug of choice at both sites 
between Drug Courts and SAPCA. However, it is not clear that this difference (if it was due to 
creaming) would benefit the Drug Court program. The SACPA participants in one site appear to 
have slightly more methamphetamine users (in San Joaquin), while the Drug Courts tend to have 
greater numbers of cocaine and heroin users. Finally, another possible characteristic that may 
lead to ―creaming‖ is the possibility of allowing in only offenders who agree to participate. Since 
in both SACPA and Drug Court participation is voluntary, this should not be a factor. Overall, in 
relation to the above discussed factors and in these two sites, there is no evidence of ―creaming‖ 
in the Drug Court population. 
The large majority of Drug Court staff and at least half of the SACPA staff interviewed 
expressed the belief that the Drug Court model was more effective. They found keeping track of 
SACPA participants extremely challenging and believed that many of the SACPA eligible 
offenders referred to SACPA never made it to treatment. The validity of this belief is explored in 
policy questions # 3 through # 6, examining program participant outcomes and costs. 
Policy Question #2: How Have Drug Courts Adjusted (How Have 
Drug Court Process and Policies Changed) with the Implementation 
of State-Mandated Non-Drug Court Treatment Programs?  
The qualitative results for Policy Questions #2 were so similar across the two study sites that 
their data were combined in the presentation of their results. Quantitative analysis of participant 
characteristics between Drug Court at Time 1 and Time 2 (pre and post-SACPA) are presented in 
separate tables after the qualitative discussion of Drug Court changes.  
Drug Court staff were asked to assess changes that have occurred in the Drug Court program 
since the statewide implementation of the SACPA programs in 2001. Many members of the staff 
at both sites had been associated with the Drug Court program both before and after the 
implementation of SACPA. In El Monte the same commissioner ran Drug Court before SACPA 
implementation that still runs the Drug Court today, as well as overseeing the SACPA program. 
Responses in both sites were surprisingly similar and clustered in several main areas: Funding/ 
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treatment resources, enrollment numbers, the place of the Drug Court program in the judicial 
system and participant population characteristics. 
Quantitative data on participant characteristics (including demographics and criminal history) for 
the Drug Court before and after SACPA implementation was also examined and the results are 
presented later in this section. 
The results for this question are organized as into these topic areas: 
2A. San Joaquin and El Monte Staff Perceptions of Drug Court Program Change Due to 
SACPA 
2B. Drug Court Population Before and After SACPA Implementation 
2C. Summary of Changes in Drug Court in Before and After to SACPA 
2A. SAN JOAQUIN AND EL MONTE STAFF PERCEPTIONS OF DRUG COURT PROGRAM 
CHANGE DUE TO SACPA 
One of the main findings for this question about changes in the Drug Court program was that 
there was very little to no change in the basic Drug Court policies and procedures. 
  No significant procedural changes – Overall, staff did not perceive the Drug Court as 
having undergone any significant structural or procedural changes since the 
implementation of SACPA. Other than the inability to use jail as a sanction for Drug 
Court II participants in San Joaquin, most of the perceived changes were a result of 
external factors and not a result of adjustments that the Drug Court staff has undertaken 
in response to the implementation of SACPA. 
Other findings on Drug Court program changes were as follows: 
  Funding/Resources – Funding for the Drug Court program at both sites was perceived to 
have decreased with the passage of SACPA. Some staff perceived that the Drug Court 
program was now competing for scarce treatment resources with SACPA. 
―It has changed in terms of funding…. Lack of money effects programs.‖ 
―Funding has been curtailed- legislators think that they get more ―bang for the buck‖ 
with Prop 36. All Drug Courts were cut 30% when Prop 36 started, and in 2005, they 
were cut another 20%. We rely on federal grants for drug testing-which is an integral 
part of DC-and that‘s been cut, and the state won‘t fund it.‖ 
  Enrollment - Most Drug Court staff agreed that the enrollment statistics for Drug Court 
decreased after the implementation of SACPA. While there was no change in the 
eligibility screens for Drug Court during this time period, clients who were 
simultaneously eligible for both Drug Court and SACPA (which is the majority of 
eligible offenders) were opting for SACPA. Staff believed that dual-eligible clients would 
generally select the SACPA program because it was less strict and had fewer 
requirements than the Drug Court program. However, enrollment numbers have climbed 
back up nearly to their original numbers as SACPA participants fail to complete 
treatment and are referred to Drug Court. 
―There was a decline in number of people in Drug Court because many were eligible 
for SACPA.‖ 
―Some clients prefer Prop 36 to Drug Court because it is less strict.‖ 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.     Results 
 
45 
―Drug Court is the fall back for Prop 36.‖ 
―The population of Drug Court changed with the start of Prop 36. Were at 180 
capacity, then dropped to 60-80, but now back up again to around 120 due to Prop 36 
failures.‖ 
―Numbers have gone down; people are going to Prop 36 instead.‖ 
  Role of Drug Court in the criminal justice system – With the implementation of SACPA, 
the continuum of criminal justice diversion programs expanded. The role of the Drug 
Court program began to shift in response. After some confusion as to whether 
participants could go back and forth between programs, increasingly, the program is 
viewed as the next sequential step after a client has unsuccessfully participated in 
SACPA. The Drug Court now serves as a more intensive service option for those who are 
not succeeding under the less stringent criteria of the SACPA program. The Drug Court 
has also changed at what point in the case process they exist, changing from more pre-
plea to post-plea. 
―Now people who are in Drug Court cannot go back to Prop 36 (they could before).‖ 
―We are utilizing Drug Court as the last referral for SACPA treatment - after a person 
has failed twice in other programs but is still eligible.‖ 
―Once terminated from Prop 36 they are sentenced. He can‘t order someone into Drug 
Court, but gives them the option of going and averting the sentence (prison, etc.).‖ 
―Prior to Prop 36, the County‘s Drug Courts were pre-conviction. With Prop 36, most 
Drug Courts are no longer getting pre-conviction cases.‖ 
―No one chose Drug Court. They only went there if they failed out of Prop 36 and 
didn‘t want to go to prison. Drug Court became post-conviction after Prop 36 
started.‖ 
  Change in participant population. Staff perceptions are that participants coming in their 
third chance on SACPA or as SACPA failures were more criminal and more deeply 
addicted than Drug Court participants before SACPA was implemented.  
―We get more hard-core users. Drug Court is now getting more hard-core cases and more 
addicts and more criminalized people. I expect the retention rate for Drug Court has 
probably gone down.‖ 
―Today most courts are getting Prop 36 dropouts.‖ 
2B. DRUG COURT POPULATION BEFORE AND AFTER SACPA IMPLEMENTATION 
The staff perceptions at both study sites that the Drug Court participant population had changed 
after the implementation of SACPA is confirmed by the administrative data available on the 
participants at both time periods. Table 8 displays participant characteristics for San Joaquin‘s 
Drug Court before and after SACPA implementation including demographics and criminal history.  
Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were used to determine whether any differences between the 
programs at the two time points were statistically significant. 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.  Drug Courts and State Mandated Drug Treatment Programs: Outcomes, Costs, and Consequences   
46    March 2008 
Table 8. San Joaquin Drug Court Participant Characteristics Before and After 
SACPA Implementation 
  San Joaquin Drug 
Court Pre-SACPA 
(T1) (98-99) 
N = 202 
San Joaquin Drug 
Court Post SACPA 
(T2) (02-03) 
N = 128 
Significant 
Difference? 
P < .01 
Age  36  36  No 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
 
61% 
39% 
 
70% 
30% 
 
No 
Race/Ethnicity 
White 
Hispanic/Latino 
African American 
 
43% 
24% 
31% 
 
39% 
21% 
23% 
 
No 
Drug of Choice 
Meth 
Cocaine 
Heroin 
Marijuana 
Alcohol 
 
25% 
29% 
22% 
14% 
29% 
 
28% 
21% 
23% 
16% 
21% 
 
No 
Average # of arrests in 2 years prior to 
program entry  3.1  4.5  Yes 
Average # of arrests with drug charges 
in 2 years prior  2.3  3.0  Yes 
Average # of arrests with person 
charges in 2 years prior  .27  .48  Yes 
Average # of arrests with felony charges 
in 2 years prior  1.6  2.9  Yes 
Average # prior convictions in 2 years 
prior  2.0  2.0  No 
Average # of days in jail in 2 years prior  51  55  No 
 
For San Joaquin, the Drug Court participant population demographics, including age, gender, 
ethnicity and drug of choice remained consistent from one time period to the next. However, 
participant criminal history did change significantly from before to after SACPA 
implementation. Drug Court participants in 2002-2003 had significantly more drug and felony 
arrests, more arrests with person or violent charges and more arrests overall in the 2 years prior 
to starting the Drug Court program than participants in 1998-1999. 
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Table 9 displays the participant characteristics for the El Monte Drug Court before and after 
SACPA implementation. 
Table 9. El Monte Drug Court Participant Characteristics Before and After SACPA  
Implementation 
  El Monte 
Drug Court 
Pre-SACPA 
(T1) (98-99) 
N = 127 
El Monte  
Drug Court 
Post-SACPA 
(T2) (02-03) 
N = 147 
Significant 
Difference? 
P < .01 
Age  32  32  No 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
 
75% 
25% 
 
73% 
27% 
 
No 
Race/Ethnicity* 
White 
Hispanic/Latino 
African American 
 
28% 
68% 
2% 
 
19% 
75% 
1% 
 
Yes 
Drug of Choice 
Meth* 
Cocaine* 
Heroin 
Marijuana 
Alcohol* 
 
33% 
49% 
6% 
2% 
8% 
 
55% 
19% 
11% 
4% 
20% 
 
Yes 
(For 
methamphetamine, 
cocaine and 
alcohol) 
Average # of arrests in 2 years 
prior to program entry  2.2  3.1  Yes 
Average # of arrests with drug 
charges in 2 years prior  1.7  2.5  Yes 
Average # of arrests with person 
charges in 2 years prior  .02  .04  Yes 
Average # of arrests with felony 
charges in 2 years prior  1.4  2.0  Yes 
Average # convictions in 2 years 
prior  .79  .62  No 
Average # of days in jail in 2 years 
prior  33  69  Yes 
 
El Monte Drug Court participants stayed consistent for age, gender and ethnicity from before 
SACPA implementation to after. However, drug of choice did change dramatically from one 
time period to the next with significantly more methamphetamine users in 2002-2003 
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participants and significantly fewer cocaine users. This is most likely a reflection of the change 
in drugs available and in user in the population of drug users in the county in general. 
Participant criminal history also changed significantly from before to after SACPA implementation. 
Drug Court participants in 2002-2003 had significantly more drug and felony arrests, more arrests 
with person (or violent) charges and more arrests overall in the 2 years prior to starting the Drug 
Court program than participants in 1998-1999. Drug Court participants after SACPA 
implementation also had significantly more time in jail before entering the Drug Court program. 
2C. SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN DRUG COURT BEFORE AND AFTER SACPA 
Overall, the perception of Drug Court staff was that, for the most part, Drug Court policies and 
procedures had not changed from before and after SACPA participation and that most of the 
changes experienced by the Drug Court program were due to external factors and not a result of 
adjustments that the Drug Court staff has undertaken in response to the implementation of 
SACPA. 
The main perceived changes reported at both sites was a decrease in funding for Drug Courts and 
a competition with SACPA for scarce resources, a drop in enrollment numbers followed by an 
increase due to enrollment by ―SACPA failures,‖ a change in where Drug Court fell in the 
continuum of criminal justice diversion programs with the Drug Court program viewed 
increasingly as the next sequential step after a client has unsuccessfully participated in SACPA. 
With this shift in the continuum, Drug Courts that were mainly pre-plea became almost 
completely post-plea. And finally, a perceived change in the participant population with Drug 
Court participants becoming increasingly more addicted and more criminal by the time they 
enter the Drug Court program. 
Unfortunately, the data on the addiction level of the participants at each time period was not 
available for this study. However, the available data does show that the time from arrest to entry 
in the Drug Court is significantly longer after SACPA implementation and that a large portion of 
Drug Court participants formerly participated in and failed the SACPA program. It is likely that 
both these factors allowed time for participants who continued to use to become more addicted. 
Further, the criminal history data clearly shows a significant increase in the criminality of the 
Drug Court population after SACPA implementation. It is possible that part of this increase in 
criminality is due to changes in arrest rates in California in general and in these specific counties. 
An examination of statistics on arrest rates in the two counties show that rates have increased in 
both counties by about 10% (California Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2007). However, this 
rate increase is not enough to account for the significant differences in the Drug Court 
participants from before to after SACPA implementation. 
The above changes in funding and in the continuum of the criminal justice system as well as 
changes in the participant population are factors that could have a strong effect on Drug Court 
effectiveness. This is examined in the following sections using the administrative data gathered 
on program participants at both study sites. 
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Policy Question #3: What Is the Success Rate of Drug Court 
Programs Before the Implementation of State-Mandated Non-Drug 
Court Treatment Programs Compared to After?  
There are several measures of success that may be examined for the Drug Court programs before 
and after the implementation of SACPA including: 1. Program service elements such as program 
length of stay and amount of treatment received; 2. Program completion rates; and 3. Recidivism 
(i.e., re-arrests and time incarcerated). Differences between the Drug Court programs at the two 
time periods were assessed using the administrative data described in data sources portion of the 
methods section earlier in this report. 
The specific elements compared at the two study sites varied slightly based on the data available 
at each site. These elements are described in the section for each site. Univariate Analyses of 
Covariance (ANCOVA) were performed to determine any significant differences between time 
periods controlling for prior arrests, age, ethnicity, drug of choice, gender, and time incarcerated. 
In the case of graduation rates, a chi-square was performed to determine statistical significance 
between groups. 
The results for this question are organized into the following sections: 
3A.  San Joaquin Drug Court Success Rates Before and After SACPA Implementation 
  San Joaquin Drug Court Program Entry, Retention and Services Delivered 
  San Joaquin Drug Court Completion Rates 
  San Joaquin Drug Court Recidivism 
3B. El Monte Drug Court Success Rates Before and After SACPA Implementation 
  El Monte Drug Court Program Retention and Services Delivered 
  El Monte Drug Court Completion Rates 
  El Monte Drug Court Recidivism 
3C. Summary of Drug Court Success Rates at Both Sites Before and After the 
Implementation of SACPA 
3A.  SAN JOAQUIN DRUG COURT SUCCESS RATES BEFORE AND AFTER SACPA 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The San Joaquin Drug Court programs before and after SACPA were compared in three main 
areas: 1. program process related elements: including length of time from arrest to program 
entry, length of time in the program and extent of direct court supervision (Drug Court 
appearances); 2. graduation rate; and 3. 3-year recidivism from program entry including number 
of re-arrests with various charges, number of days in jail and number of days in prison. 
San Joaquin Drug Court Program Entry, Retention and Services Delivered 
Table 10 displays the program process related elements for the Drug Court programs before and 
after SACPA implementation. The San Joaquin Drug Court program after SACPA 
implementation includes both Drug Court II and Felony Drug Court participants. Because these 
two Drug Courts are run identically, except for the use of jail as a sanction, the participants of the 
two programs are combined for this analysis. However, because jail as a sanction is an important 
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component of Drug Court nationally, an analysis of these two Drug Court programs examined 
separately is provided in Appendix B. 
Table 10. San Joaquin Drug Court Program Process Before and After SACPA 
  San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
Pre-SACPA 
(T1) (98-99) 
N=202 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
Post-SACPA 
(T2) (02-03) 
N=128 
Significant 
Difference? 
P<.01 
Mean number of days between 
arrest and program entry 
126 
(median=54) 
349 
(median=262) 
Yes 
Mean number of days in program  208  163  No 
Mean number of drug court 
sessions attended 
17  14  No 
 
The length of time between the Drug Court eligible arrest and entry into the program has 
increased significantly and dramatically from the time before SACPA to the time after. It is 
highly likely that this is due directly to the change in process due to the implementation of 
SACPA. Because the eligibility criteria for SACPA were essentially the same as that for Drug 
Court, the population of the Drug Court decreased after SACPA implementation. Most 
offenders, when given a choice, preferred the less stringent supervision requirements of the non-
Drug Court SACPA model. However, the population of the Drug Court then increased again 
over time as some SACPA participants failed to complete the program and subsequently entered 
the Drug Court program. In addition, San Joaquin implemented a version of Drug Court program 
(Drug Court II) specifically for those on their third and final chance at SACPA funded treatment. 
This program‘s policies and procedures are identical to the regular Drug Court model except that 
jail is not used as a sanction. By definition, the current Drug Court program treatment occurs 
after participants spend time in other models of SACPA treatment. The Felony Drug Court is 
also available to those who fail the SACPA program who are facing possible prison sentences as 
well as offenders who were technically not eligible for SACPA due to minor sales charges. The 
results for the two versions of Drug Court are examined separately later in this section. 
Key component # 3 of the key components of Drug Courts (NADCP, 2007) is ―eligible 
participants are identified early and promptly placed in the Drug Court program.‖ This 
component is based on the idea that swift judicial action after an arrest can put offenders into 
treatment at a time of ―crisis‖ when they may be more open to change and responsive to 
treatment. Unfortunately, due to where the Drug Court program(s) currently fall in the San 
Joaquin system, it is not possible for the Drug Court to follow this key component. 
The average amount of time in the program for Drug Court participants before and after SACPA 
implementation was not significantly different. In the case of Drug Court, the amount of time in 
the program is nearly synonymous with time in treatment so it can be inferred from this that 
participants are spending close to the same amount of time in treatment before and after the 
implementation of SACPA. Further, the average number of Drug Court sessions attended was also 
not significantly different at the two time periods. This provides some confirmation of staff belief 
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that the main Drug Court procedures and policies had not changed after SACPA implementation 
and that the majority of changes that have occurred are a result of external factors.  
San Joaquin Drug Court Completion Rates 
Figure 1 displays the graduation rates for the San Joaquin Drug Court programs before and after 
SACPA implementation. The graduation rate decreased slightly but not significantly from 29% 
pre-SACPA to 23% post-SACPA. Although these graduation rates are very low compared to 
most Drug Court programs, (e.g., the average graduation rate from our past studies in California 
was 55% and the average graduation rate nationally is approximately 50%) (Carey et al., 2005; 
Cooper, 2004) the rates were consistent over the two time periods. 
Figure 1. San Joaquin Drug Court Graduation Rate Before and After 
SACPA Implementation 
 
 
San Joaquin Drug Court Recidivism 
Re-Arrests. Figure 2 presents average number of arrests per participant each year for 3 years 
after Drug Court entry. Drug Court participants before SACPA implementation had significantly 
fewer (p < .01) re-arrests than Drug Court participants after SACPA even after controlling for 
prior arrests, age, gender, ethnicity, drug of choice and time incarcerated. However, there are 
likely differences in the Drug Court population at the two time periods that cannot be controlled 
for. In particular, we did not have a measure of the level of addiction of the participants at either 
time period. It is probable that Drug Court participants who enter the Drug Court program after 
failing to complete SACPA have been continuing to use drugs, have committed additional crimes 
and are more deeply into their addiction than Drug Court participants that have not attended (and 
failed to complete) SACPA first. 
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Figure 2. San Joaquin Drug Court Participants Number of Re-Arrests Over 3 Years 
(Cumulative) Before and After SACPA Participation 
 
Note: The means reported in Figure 2 are adjusted by gender, ethnicity, age, drug of choice, prior drug arrests, 
prior arrests, and time incarcerated.  
 
Re-Arrests for Specific Charges and Incarceration. Table 11 displays the 3-year recidivism 
for San Joaquin Drug Court participants, including re-arrests for drug related charges, felony 
charges, person (or violent) charges, property charges, time served in jail, and time served in 
prison. The means for presented in this table are adjusted for differences between the two groups 
in age, gender, ethnicity, drug of choice, prior arrests and time incarcerated. 
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Table 11. San Joaquin Drug Court Recidivism Before and After SACPA 
  San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
Pre-SACPA 
(T1) (98-99) 
N=202 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
Post-SACPA 
(T2) (02-03) 
N=128 
Significant 
Difference? 
P<.01 
Mean number of re-arrests with 
drug charges in 3 years after 
program entry 
1.9  2.8  Yes 
Mean number of re-arrests with 
felony charges in 3 years after 
program entry 
1.7  2.7  Yes 
Mean number of re-arrests with 
person/violence charges in 3 
years after program entry 
.26  .26  No 
Mean number of re-arrests with 
property charges in 3 years after 
program entry 
.33  .95  Yes 
Mean number of days in jail in 3 
years after program entry  145  95  Yes 
Mean number of days in prison in 
3 years after program entry  86  57  No 
Note: The arrest numbers above are based on charges. As some arrests have multiple charges, the same 
arrests may be counted in more than one charge category. Therefore, these numbers should not add up to 
the total number of arrests. 
 
There was a significant increase in number of drug related re-arrests in the 3 years after program 
entry for San Joaquin Drug Court participants after SACPA implementation compared to before 
SACPA, even after controlling for prior arrests and time spent incarcerated. Felony arrests and 
arrests with property charges were also significantly higher for Drug Court participants after 
SACPA. As discussed previously, these increases in recidivism could be due to an increased 
addiction level in Drug Court participants at Time 2. In addition, the participants who 
experienced SACPA failure before enrolling in Drug Court may have a very different attitude 
and belief about the efficacy of treatment after these experiences that could also affect their 
ability to engage successfully in treatment. 
Conversely, there was a significant decrease in jail time for Drug Court participants after 
SACPA, which is likely to be at least partially due to Drug Court II participants who cannot be 
incarcerated while participating in the program.  
Felony Drug Court and Drug Court II. The key difference in Felony Drug Court and Drug 
Court II creates a unique opportunity to compare the efficacy of two programs with identical 
procedures (including the same judge, the same sanctions and rewards, etc.) except for the single 
difference in the use of jail as a sanction. An analysis of these two programs showed no 
significant difference in the program population on demographics or criminal history. However, 
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the analysis of outcomes revealed that Felony Drug Court participants (who may receive jail as a 
sanction) had significantly lower recidivism compared to Drug Court II (in spite of spending 
significantly less time in the program). A detailed comparison of the two programs is provided in 
Appendix B. 
3B. EL MONTE DRUG COURT SUCCESS RATES BEFORE AND AFTER SACPA 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The El Monte Drug Court program before and after SACPA was compared in three main areas: 
1. program process related elements including length of time in the program, amount of 
treatment received and the extent of direct court supervision (Drug Court appearances); 2. 
graduation rate; and 3. 3-year recidivism from program entry including number of re-arrests with 
various charges, time served in jail and time served in prison. Unfortunately, the data necessary 
to link arrest date for the program eligible case with program start date were not available in the 
datasets received from the various databases so it was not possible to determine any changes in 
the length of time between arrest and program start. However, since the Drug Court enrollment 
decreased from 180 per year to 60 and then began to climb again with offenders who had failed 
the SACPA program, it is likely that the length of time from arrest to Drug Court entry has 
increased after the advent of SACPA. 
El Monte Drug Court Program Retention and Services Delivered 
Table 12 displays the program process related elements for the El Monte Drug Court program 
before and after SACPA implementation. 
Table 12. El Monte Drug Court Program Process Before and After SACPA 
  El Monte 
Drug Court 
Pre-SACPA 
(T1) (98-99) 
N=127 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
Post-SACPA 
(T2) (02-03) 
N=147 
Significant 
Difference? 
P<.01 
Mean number of days in program  388  326  No 
Mean number of drug court sessions 
attended  10  13  No 
Mean number of individual 
treatment sessions attended  38  42  No 
Mean number of group treatment 
sessions attended  80  93  No 
 
There was no significant difference in treatment received or the number of Drug Court sessions 
attended for the El Monte Drug Court before SACPA implementation compared to after. Similar 
to San Joaquin, El Monte staff believed that the Drug Court process and policies had not changed 
since the implementation of SACPA (other than in external factors such as participant 
characteristics). The data in Table 12 provide confirmation for this belief. 
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El Monte Drug Court Completion Rates 
Figure 3 displays the graduation rate for the El Monte Drug Court program before and after 
SACPA implementation. Unlike San Joaquin, the El Monte graduation rate has dropped 
significantly since before SAPCA implementation (from 80% to 50%). The El Monte Drug 
Court judge (commissioner) has not changed since the court was implemented and the majority 
of the staff has also stayed with the program since before SACPA, so there are no changes in 
staff to explain differences over time. Drug Court staff believed that the population of the Drug 
Court program had changed (become more criminal—which was confirmed by the data shown in 
Table 9 in Policy Question # 2—and was more highly addicted). The staff predicted that this 
study would find that their graduation rate dropped after the implementation of SACPA. Figure 3 
shows that their prediction was accurate. 
Figure 3. El Monte Drug Court Graduation Rate Before and After 
SACPA Implementation 
 
 
El Monte Drug Court Recidivism 
Re-Arrests. Figure 4 presents average number of arrests per participant each year for three years 
after Drug Court entry. El Monte Drug Court participants before SACPA implementation had 
significantly fewer (p < .01) re-arrests than Drug Court participants after SACPA even after 
controlling for prior arrests, time incarcerated, age, gender, ethnicity and drug of choice. 
However, there are likely differences in the Drug Court population at the two time periods that 
cannot be controlled for. In particular, we did not have a measure of the level of addiction of the 
participants at either time period. As was expressed by Drug Court staff, it is probable that Drug 
Court participants who enter the Drug Court program after failing to complete SACPA have been 
continuing to use drugs, have committed additional crimes and are more deeply into their 
addiction than Drug Court participants that have not attended (and failed to complete) SACPA 
first. This difference could lead to higher recidivism. 
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Figure 4. El Monte Drug Court Participants Average Number of Re-Arrests Over 3 
Years (Cumulative) Before and After SACPA Participation 
 
Note: The means reported in Figure 4 are adjusted by gender, ethnicity, age, drug of choice, prior drug arrests, 
prior arrests, and time incarcerated.  
 
Re-Arrests for Specific Charges and Incarceration.  
 
Table 13Table 13 displays the 3-year recidivism for El Monte Drug Court participants including 
re-arrests for drug related charges, felony charges, person (or violent) charges, property charges, 
time served in jail, and time served in prison.  
 
Table 13. El Monte Drug Court Recidivism Before and After SACPA 
  El Monte 
Drug Court 
Pre-SACPA 
(T1) (98-99) 
N=127 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
Post-SACPA 
(T2) (02-03) 
N=147 
Significant 
Difference? 
P<.01 
Mean number of re-arrests with drug charges in 
3 years after program entry 
.82  1.9  Yes 
Mean number of re-arrests with felony charges 
in 3 years after program entry 
.77  1.6  Yes 
Mean number of re-arrests with person/violence 
charges in 3 years after program entry 
.08  .12  No 
Mean number of re-arrests with property 
charges in 3 years after program entry 
.31  .35  No 
Mean number of days in jail in 3 years after 
program entry 
55  56  No 
Mean number of days in prison in 3 years after 
program entry 
23  83  Yes 
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Note: The arrest numbers above are based on charges. As some arrests have multiple charges, the same arrests may 
be counted in more than one charge category. Therefore, these numbers should not add up to the total number of 
arrests. 
There was a significant increase in number of drug related re-arrests in the 3 years after program 
entry for El Monte Drug Court participants after SACPA implementation compared to before 
SACPA, even after controlling for prior arrests and time spent incarcerated. Felony arrests were 
also significantly higher for Drug Court participants after SACPA and there were a significantly 
greater number of days in prison as well. Jail time and arrests for violent and property charges 
were not significantly different before or after SACPA. 
Possible explanations for the increases in recidivism for the Drug Court participants after 
SACPA implementation are the same as those already discussed above. Because there was no 
change in Drug Court policies and procedures reported, or evident in the data, and little to no 
change in Drug Court staff, the most likely explanation for the decrease in graduation rate and 
increase in recidivism is the change in the Drug Court population with the Drug Court 
participants after SACPA entering the Drug Court most likely with an increased level of 
addiction than participants before SACPA. In addition, although prior arrests was controlled for 
in these analyses, there are attendant issues to a more extensive criminal record that cannot be 
controlled for including the stress and time involved when dealing with other legal issues. 
3C. SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT SUCCESS RATES AT BOTH SITES BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SACPA 
The findings in both San Joaquin and El Monte were remarkably similar. Drug Court participants 
at both sites received similar treatment services and court supervision before and after SACPA 
implementation, although San Joaquin showed a significantly longer time from arrest to Drug 
Court entry after SACPA and it is likely that, had the data been available, El Monte would also 
have shown a similar result. It is probable that the increased time is due to offenders entering the 
Drug Courts after first spending extended time in the SACPA program. This means that the Drug 
Courts can no longer reasonably follow the third key component of Drug Court, that eligible 
offenders are identified quickly and promptly placed in the Drug Court program. 
Recidivism increased significantly for Drug Court participants at both sites after SACPA 
implementation. The increased recidivism was significant even after taking into account any 
differences in demographics, criminal history, time incarcerated and drug of choice. Because the 
Drug Court programs at both sites showed little to no change in policies or procedures, the most 
likely explanation for this is the change in the Drug Court population after SACPA to a more 
deeply addicted and more criminal population at the time of entry. As suggested earlier, although 
prior arrests were controlled for in these analyses, there may be issues that go with a more 
extensive criminal record that cannot be controlled for including the stress and time involved 
when dealing with other legal problems. It is also likely that the extended time from arrest to 
entry into the Drug Court program, as well as participants‘ experience with SACPA treatment, 
had an effect on how the participants perceived the Drug Court program and Drug Court 
treatment. Perhaps these participants become more jaded after experiencing and failing at 
treatment more than once, rendering the next treatment experience less effective. 
San Joaquin provided the ability to compare the same Drug Court model (same polices and 
procedures, same staff) but with and without jail as a sanction (see Appendix B). Although the 
participants in both versions of Drug Court showed no significant differences in demographics or 
criminal history, the participants in Drug Court II (Drug Court without jail as a sanction) had 
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significantly higher recidivism in the 3 years after Drug Court entry. This provides clear 
evidence of the efficacy of the ability to use jail as a sanction. 
Overall, the evidence from these results points to the conclusion that the implementation of 
statewide mandated treatment reform (specifically, SACPA programs that do not follow the 
Drug Court model) may have led to a detrimental effect on Drug Court effectiveness. 
Policy Question #4: What Is the Relative Success Rate of The Drug 
Court Program Model Compared to Court Mandated Non-Drug Court 
Treatment Models? 
The same measures of success that were examined for the Drug Court programs before and after 
the implementation of SACPA were used to compare the Drug Court model at both time periods 
to the SACPA program models. These measures included: 1. Program experiences such as 
program length of stay and amount of treatment received; 2. Program completion rates; and 3. 
Recidivism (i.e., re-arrests and time incarcerated). Differences between the programs were 
assessed using administrative data (described in the methods section of this report). 
The specific elements compared at the two study sites varied slightly based on the data available 
at each site. Univariate Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVA) were performed to determine any 
significant differences between programs controlling for prior arrests, age, ethnicity, drug of 
choice, gender, and time incarcerated. In the case of graduation rates, a chi-square was 
performed to determine statistical significance between groups. 
The results for this question are organized into the following sections: 
4A.  San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA Program Success Rates 
  San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA Program Entry, Retention and Services 
Delivered 
  San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA Program Completion Rates 
  San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA Program Recidivism 
4B. El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Program Success Rates 
  El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Program Retention and Services Delivered 
  El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Program Completion Rates 
  El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Program Recidivism 
4C. Summary of Drug Court and SACPA Program Success Rates at Both Sites  
 
Note: The results presented for Policy Question #4 in this section repeat much of the same 
information as that presented in the previous section for the Drug Court programs. This 
information is included again in this section for the convenience of the reader in comparing Drug 
Court results directly to SACPA results. 
4A. SAN JOAQUIN DRUG COURTS AND SACPA PROGRAM SUCCESS RATES 
The San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA programs were compared in three main areas: 1. 
program process related elements, or services delivered: including length of time from arrest to 
program entry, length of time in the program and the amount of treatment completed; 2. program 
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graduation rate; and 3. 3-year recidivism from program entry including number of re-arrests with 
various charges, number of days in jail and number of days in prison. 
San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA Program Entry, Retention and Services Delivered  
Table 14 displays the program process related elements for the Drug Court programs before and 
after SACPA implementation and for SACPA. The Drug Court program after SACPA 
implementation includes both Drug Court II and Felony Drug Court participants.
7  
Table 14. San Joaquin Drug Court Program and SACPA Process Differences 
  San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T1 (98-99) 
N=202 
San Joaquin 
SACPA 
(02-03) 
N = 395 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T2 (02-03) 
N=128 
Significant 
Difference? 
P<.01 
Number of days between arrest 
and program entry 
Mean 
Median 
 
 
126 
54 
 
 
253 
101 
 
 
349 
262 
 
 
Yes 
(all three) 
Mean number of days in 
program 
208  552*  163  Yes 
(SACPA) 
% successfully completed 
treatment episodes 
29%  14%  23%  Yes 
(SACPA) 
*The number of days in the SACPA program is not the same as the number of days actually in treatment. In the San 
Joaquin SACPA program, the mean number of days in treatment is 319. 
All participants who enrolled in the Drug Court programs and in SACPA during a 1-year period 
from July through June (1998-1999 or 2002-2003) were included in these analyses. The number 
of participants listed in the table above is all new enrollees in each program. These numbers 
show that SACPA serves more than twice as many new participants each year as Drug Court at 
either time period. These numbers do not include participants who were already active during 
that period in either program, so the total number of clients served at any one time is generally 
higher. As mentioned earlier in this report, one of the benefits of SACPA is its ability to reach a 
large population of offenders, generally much larger than the numbers served by most traditional 
Drug Courts. 
As Table 14 shows, the length of time between arrest and program entry is significantly different 
for Drug Court at both time periods and for SACPA. The median time from arrest to entry in the 
SACPA program (101 days) is about twice as long as the time to entry for the Drug Court 
program pre-SACPA (54 days) but less than half as long as the Drug Court program post-
SACPA (262 days). Although the San Joaquin SACPA program is offered to eligible offenders 
very early in the judicial process, not all offenders agree to participate immediately, and even 
when offenders agree to participate, they may not actually show up for their assessment and 
intake appointment, both of which can lengthen time before program entry. As discussed in the 
                                                 
7 Because the population of the two versions of the Drug Court programs showed no significant differences in 
demographics or criminal history, and because they otherwise received the same Drug Court services (aside from 
jail sanctioning) it seemed appropriate to combine them for this comparison. 
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section for Policy Question # 3, a large number of the participants in the Drug Court program 
post SACPA first participated in SACPA program treatment before moving on to Drug Court. 
Table 14 also shows that SACPA participants spend a significantly longer time in the program 
(552 days) than Drug Court participants at either time period (208 days pre-SACPA and 163 
days post-SACPA). SACPA participants spend nearly three times as long in SACPA compared 
to Drug Court participants in the Drug Court program. For Drug Court, participants spend the 
full time that they are in the program participating in treatment. However, SACPA program 
participants may be in the program longer than the time actually spent in treatment because of 
other probation requirements and because there may be time between incomplete treatment 
episodes. That is, a SACPA participant may fail to show up for, or fail to complete the required 
treatment and then go back to the program to be re-assessed and referred back out to treatment, 
which may take some time. Taking the start and end dates of treatment episodes and adding them 
together resulted an average time in treatment for San Joaquin SACPA participants of 319 days. 
This is still significantly longer than the time in treatment for Drug Court participants. These data 
demonstrate that the SACPA program is successfully engaging eligible offenders in treatment 
and providing longer-term treatment.  
Finally, a comparison of the percentage of successfully completed treatment episodes shows that 
SACPA participants successfully complete 14% out of the total number of referrals to treatment. 
This is about half of the Drug Court completion rate
8 pre-SACPA (29%) and 9% less than the 
treatment episode completion rate for Drug Court after SACPA (23%). This indicates that while 
SACPA is associated with longer time in treatment, these treatment episodes result in fewer 
treatment completions than Drug Court. It should also be noted that in SACPA, treatment 
completion is a judgment more left up to the provider, while in the Drug Court model treatment 
completion is more standardized and monitored by the court and team of collaborating agencies, 
including treatment.  
San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA Program Completion Rates 
Figure 5, below, displays the program completion rate (the percentage of participants who 
successfully completed the program, not just a single treatment episode) for the San Joaquin 
SACPA and Drug Court programs. Although the completion rate for the Drug Court program 
post-SACPA is slightly lower, there is no significant difference (p > .05) in completion rate 
between SACPA and the Drug Court programs either before or after SACPA implementation. 
However, something to note is that many of the Drug Court participants after SACPA 
implementation were those who were unsuccessful in completing the SACPA program but then 
eventually able to successfully complete the Drug Court program. (A comparison of Drug Court 
II and Felony Drug Court showed identical graduation rates.) 
 
                                                 
8 Drug Court participants generally have a single treatment episode that starts at the time of Drug Court enrollment 
and is completed just before program exit. Therefore, the percentage of successful treatment episodes for Drug 
Court participants is the same as the percentage of participants who successfully complete the program. 
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Figure 5. San Joaquin SACPA and Drug Court Completion Rate 
 
 
San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA Program Recidivism 
Re-Arrests: SACPA and Drug Court T1. Figure 6 presents the average number of re-arrests 
over time for a 3-year period after program entry for SACPA and Drug Court participants from 
both time periods. Drug Court participants at Time 1 (before SACPA) have significantly fewer 
re-arrests than SACPA participants (p<.01) after controlling for differences in demographics, 
criminal history and time incarcerated. The San Joaquin Drug Court, before the changes in the 
criminal justice system continuum and the subsequent changes in the participant population, 
performed significantly better than the SACPA program. 
Re-Arrests: SACPA and Drug Court T2. SACPA participants and Drug Court participants at 
Time 2 (after SACPA) have nearly identical re-arrests over time. Although it might appear that 
the SACPA and Drug Court program at Time 2 are equally effective, as was noted previously, 
the Drug Court participants are largely made up of those who failed SACPA and likely have a 
more severe addiction as well as additional issues surrounding a more severe criminal history. 
This implies that the Drug Court program at Time 2 is doing equally well but with a more 
difficult population. 
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Figure 6. San Joaquin SACPA and Drug Courts Average Number of Re-Arrests per 
Participant Over 3 Years (Cumulative) From Program Entry 
 
Note: The means reported in Figure 6 are adjusted based on any difference between the three groups on gender, 
ethnicity, age, drug of choice, prior drug arrests, prior arrests, and time incarcerated.  
Re-Arrests for Specific Charges and Incarceration. Table 15 displays the 3-year recidivism 
for San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA participants including re-arrests for drug related 
charges, felony charges, person (or violent) charges and property charges, as well as time served 
in jail and time served in prison. 
Specific Charges and Incarceration: Drug Court Time 1 and SACPA. In the 3 years after 
program entry, the Drug Court program in Time 1 (before SACPA) had significantly fewer re-
arrests (even after controlling for time incarcerated) with drug charges, felony charges and 
property charges than SACPA participants and Drug Court participants in 2002-2003 (after 
SACPA). However, Drug Court participants pre-SACPA did have a significantly greater amount 
of jail time served than SACPA or Drug Court after SACPA. This is consistent with SACPA‘s 
mandate that program participants cannot be incarcerated. 
Specific Charges and Incarceration: Drug Court Time 2 and SACPA. SACPA participants 
and Drug Court participants at Time 2 (post-SACPA) had very similar recidivism numbers with 
the exception of SACPA participants spending less time in jail in the 3 years after program entry 
as would be expected with the SACPA mandate. Note that Drug Court participants at Time 2 had 
significantly less time in the program than SACPA participants, yet performed equally well, and 
with did so with participants who had failed the SACPA program. 
These results highlight the change in Drug Court outcomes after the implementation of SACPA, 
but also imply that Drug Court continues to be effective, even with a more difficult population.  
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Table 15. San Joaquin Program Process for SACPA and Drug Courts 
Pre- and Post-SACPA 
  San 
Joaquin 
Drug 
Court T1 
(98-99) 
N=202 
San 
Joaquin 
SACPA 
(02-03) 
N=395 
San 
Joaquin 
Drug 
Court T2 
(02-03) 
N=128 
Significant 
Difference 
between SACPA 
and DC? 
P<.01 
Mean number of re-arrests 
with drug charges in 3 years 
after program entry 
1.9  2.4  2.8 
Yes 
(Drug Court T1) 
Mean number of re-arrests 
with felony charges in 3 years 
after program entry 
1.7  2.1  2.7  Yes 
Mean number of re-arrests 
with person/violence charges 
in 3 years after program entry 
.26  .40  .26  No 
Mean number of re-arrests 
with property charges in 3 
years after program entry 
.33  .79  .95 
Yes 
(Drug Court T1) 
Mean number of days in jail 
in 3 years after program entry  145  62  95 
Yes 
(Drug Court T1) 
Mean number of days in 
prison in 3 years after 
program entry 
86  80  57  No 
Note: The arrest numbers above are based on charges. As some arrests have multiple charges, the same arrests 
may be counted in more than one charge category. Therefore, these numbers should not add up to the total number 
of arrests. 
4B. EL MONTE DRUG COURT AND SACPA PROGRAM SUCCESS RATES 
The El Monte SACPA program and the Drug Court program before and after SACPA were 
compared in three main areas: 1. program service delivered including length of time in the 
program, amount of treatment received and the extent of direct court supervision (Drug Court 
appearances); 2 graduation rate; and 3. 3-year recidivism from program entry including number 
of re-arrests with various charges, time served in jail and time served in prison.  
El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Program Retention and Services Delivered 
Table 16 displays the program process related elements for the El Monte SACPA program and 
Drug Court program before and after SACPA implementation. 
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Table 16. El Monte Program Process for SACPA and Drug Courts 
Pre- and Post-SACPA 
 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
T1 (98-99) 
N=127 
El Monte 
SACPA 
(02-03) 
N=313 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
T2 (02-03) 
N=147 
Significant 
Difference 
between SACPA 
and DC? 
P<.01 
Mean number of 
days in program  388  548  326  Yes 
Mean number of 
drug court sessions 
attended 
10  28  13  Yes 
Mean number of 
individual treatment 
sessions attended 
38  42  42  No 
Mean number of 
group treatment 
sessions attended 
80  197  93  Yes 
Mean number of 
drug tests  145  84  81 
Yes 
(For Drug Court T1) 
 
Table 16 shows that the program length of stay, treatment received and court sessions attended 
were significantly higher for SACPA participants than for Drug Court at either time period. The 
only exception is individual treatment sessions, which were not significantly different for 
SACPA or Drug Court. The greater number of all these types of sessions for SACPA participants 
is at least partially related to the longer length of stay in the program. (Note that the length of 
stay in the SACPA program is not the same as the length of time in treatment, as SACPA 
participants may complete treatment but still have other conditions of their probation to satisfy 
before successfully completing the program.) It appears that, because there are a larger number 
of court sessions for SACPA participants that they may be receiving more court supervision than 
Drug Court participants. Due to the longer stay in SACPA, the frequency of court sessions is 
approximately the same as that for Drug Court participants; however, the quality of that 
interaction is quite different. Observations of court sessions for each program showed that the 
judge interaction with SACPA participants was similar to that of a traditional court hearing. The 
judge spoke mostly to the attorneys and there was little discussion of SACPA participant 
behavior and, of course, no rewards or sanctions were dispensed. In contrast, in Drug Court 
hearings, the judge spoke directly to the participant, discussed events in the participants‘ lives 
and dispensed rewards and sanctions with a clear message about the behavior that was being 
rewarded or sanctioned. In addition, judges spent considerably more time interacting with Drug 
Court participants then he did with SACPA participants. 
Table 16 also shows that SACPA participants received significantly fewer drug tests during the 
course of the program than Drug Court at Time 1 but had very similar numbers of drug tests to 
Drug Court at Time 2. Because the SACPA program is longer, this number of drug tests over the 
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course of the program still demonstrates that SACPA participants are tested less frequently than 
Drug Court participants at either time period. Finally, Drug Court participants after SACPA had 
fewer drug tests than Drug Court before SACPA. The reason for the decrease in the number of 
drug tests for Drug Court before SACPA to Drug Court after SACPA may be related to funding. 
According to information gained from follow-up interviews, drug test funding was decreased for 
Drug Court along with other Drug Court funding when SACPA was implemented. Therefore, 
drug testing may have occurred less often (though this contradicts staff belief that no changes in 
process were made). Another possibility that may be related to some extent is that length of stay 
is shorter at Time 2 so the number of drug tests would necessarily be smaller. 
El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Program Completion Rates 
Figure 7, below, displays the completion rate for the El Monte SACPA program and Drug Court 
program before and after SACPA implementation. Unlike San Joaquin, the El Monte Drug Court 
graduation rate has dropped significantly since before SAPCA implementation (from 80% to 
50%). However, the completion rate for SACPA (33%) is significantly lower than that for Drug 
Court at either time period. The El Monte Drug Court judge (commissioner) is also the 
commissioner for SACPA. In spite of the higher number of court sessions reported for SACPA 
participants, they still happen infrequently except when a participant is not doing well. Therefore, 
the nature of these SACPA court sessions is more punitive as well as more formal and less 
personal. In addition, there is very little personal interaction for SACPA participants with program 
staff responsible for monitoring treatment attendance, since the majority of participant reporting on 
progress is done through the electronic kiosks. Although the kiosks are ―high-tech‖ and ―cutting-
edge‖ they are not very warm and provide little feedback for participants on their progress. 
Figure 7. El Monte Completion Rates for Drug Courts and SACPA 
 
 
El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Program Recidivism 
Re-Arrests for Drug Court Time 1 and SACPA. Figure 8 presents average number of arrests 
per participant each year for 3 years after Drug Court and SACPA entry. El Monte Drug Court 
participants at Time 1 (before SACPA implementation) had significantly fewer (p < .01) re-
arrests than SACPA participants, even after controlling for prior arrests, time incarcerated, age, 
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gender, ethnicity and drug of choice. Just as with San Joaquin, the El Monte Drug Court, before 
the change in the continuum for the criminal justice system and before the change in the Drug 
Court population characteristics, the El Monte Drug Court performed significantly better than the 
SACPA program. 
Re-Arrests for Drug Court Time 2 and SACPA. The number of re-arrests for Drug Court at 
Time 2 (post-SACPA) was not significantly different than for the SACPA program. However, 
there are likely differences in the Drug Court and SACPA population at the two time periods that 
cannot be controlled for. In particular, as described previously in this report, we did not have a 
measure of the level of addiction of the participants at either time period. As was expressed by 
Drug Court staff, it is probable that Drug Court participants who enter the Drug Court program 
after failing to complete SACPA have been continuing to use drugs, have committed additional 
crimes and are more deeply into their addiction than Drug Court participants that have not 
attended (and failed to complete) SACPA first. This difference could lead to higher recidivism.  
Figure 8. El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Average Number of Re-Arrests per 
Participant Over 3 Years (Cumulative) 
 
Note: The means reported in Figure 8 are adjusted based on any difference between the three groups on gender, 
ethnicity, age, drug of choice, prior drug arrests, prior arrests, and time incarcerated.  
 
Recidivism for Specific Charges and Incarceration: Drug Court at Time 1 and SACPA. 
Table 17 displays the 3-year recidivism for El Monte SACPA and Drug Court participants 
including re-arrests for drug related charges, felony charges, person (or violent) charges, 
property charges, time served in jail, and time served in prison. As with the total re-arrests 
described above, participants of the El Monte Drug Court at Time 1 had significantly fewer re-
arrests with drug charges and felony charges than SACPA participants. However, there was no 
significant difference in re-arrests for person or property charges. The number of arrests for these 
charges was very small in all three groups. Drug Court participants at Time 1 also had 
significantly fewer days in prison in the 3 years after Drug Court entry. 
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Recidivism for Specific Charges and Incarceration: Drug Court at Time 2 and SACPA. 
Table 17 shows that Drug Court participants at Time 2 (after SACPA) had slightly fewer re-
arrests with drug charges and slightly fewer felony re-arrests than SACPA participants, but these 
differences were not significantly different. Prison and jail time was also not significantly 
different between the two groups.  
Both SACPA participants and Drug Court participants at Time 2 (after SACPA implementation) 
had a greater number of re-arrests with drug charges and felony charges than Drug Court at Time 
1. These two later groups also spent significantly more time in prison in the 3 years after 
program entry than Drug Court participants before SACPA. Similar to the results found in San 
Joaquin, the Drug Court participants after SACPA and SACPA participants had higher 
recidivism than Drug Court before SACPA implementation. As stated earlier, it appears that the 
changes in the population and in the criminal justice continuum of programs have had an adverse 
effect on Drug Courts. However, in spite of the Drug Court participants being made up of 
SACPA failures, the Drug Court at Time 2 is doing as well as (or slightly better than) SACPA 
participants. 
Table 17. El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Recidivism Outcomes  
 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
T1 (98-99) 
N=127 
El Monte 
SACPA 
(02-03) 
N=313 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
T2 (02-03) 
N=147 
Significant 
Difference 
between 
SACPA and DC? 
P<.01 
Mean number of re-arrests 
with drug charges in 3 years 
after program entry 
.82  2.2  1.9 
Yes 
(Drug Court T1) 
Mean number of re-arrests 
with felony charges in 3 years 
after program entry 
.77  1.9  1.6 
Yes 
(Drug Court T1) 
Mean number of re-arrests 
with person/violence charges 
in 3 years after program entry 
.08  .18  .12  No 
Mean number of re-arrests 
with property charges in 3 
years after program entry 
.31  .39  .35  No 
Mean number of days in jail in 
3 years after program entry  55  72  56  No 
Mean number of days in 
prison in 3 years after 
program entry 
23  82  83 
Yes 
(Drug Court T1) 
Note: The arrest numbers above are based on charges. As some arrests have multiple charges, the same arrests may 
be counted in more than one charge category. Therefore, these numbers should not add up to the total number of 
arrests. 
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4C. SUMMARY OF SACPA AND DRUG COURT OUTCOMES AT BOTH SITES BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SACPA 
In spite of the differences in how the SACPA programs were implemented at both sites, the 
results for San Joaquin and El Monte were quite similar. SACPA participants spent significantly 
more time in the SACPA program than the Drug Court participants at either time period. Drug 
Court participants before SACPA implementation show significantly lower recidivism than 
SACPA program participants and Drug Court program participants after SACPA 
implementation. In contrast, the recidivism for Drug Court participants after SACPA 
implementation did not differ significantly from SACPA participants.  
These results imply that the Drug Court model, before the changes that have occurred since 
SACPA implementation (such as time between arrest and a more criminal, possibly more 
addicted participant population), is significantly more effective in getting drug offenders to 
complete treatment and in lowering criminal justice recidivism than state-mandated treatment 
models with less personalized supervision and no option for incarceration as a sanction. An 
additional implication, as suggested by Longshore et al., (2006), is that the Drug Court model is 
more effective than SACPA in working with a more criminal, more addicted population (as 
evidenced by Drug Court recidivism rates that are similar to SACPA recidivism rates with a 
population of offenders who have failed SACPA). 
Alternatively, the increase in recidivism rates from Drug Court pre-SACPA to Drug Court post-
SACPA suggests that the Drug Court model (or perhaps any treatment model) performs better 
with a less criminal, less addicted population than with a more criminal, more addicted 
population. The increase in Drug Court participant recidivism from pre- to post-SACPA also 
suggests that the Drug Court model may be negatively affected by the implementation of state-
mandated treatment programs that compete for the same population and for the same scarce 
resources. It may be that it is better to have these programs work together where each fits with 
the needs of a particular population. The recent work of Marlowe, et al. (2006) demonstrates that 
higher risk offenders do best under the drug court model, while lower-risk offenders do better 
with a less intensive treatment model. If the higher risk offenders were sent directly to Drug 
Court, rather than attempting and failing a less intensive model first, outcomes for the population 
as a whole may improve. 
Whatever the interpretation of these results, it is clear that the state-mandated treatment 
(SACPA) has succeeded in two important ways that were central to its initial logic. First, it has 
provided an enormous benefit in being able to reach nearly all eligible offenders and offer 
treatment for their substance use issues instead of incarceration. Second, it has allowed offenders 
to have more total treatment than the Drug Courts at these two study sites. In this sense, it has 
had a much greater impact on the total system of offenders than Drug Court which often serves 
only a small number of offenders. Yet, the Drug Court model has shown greater success at 
producing higher rates of treatment completion and lower recidivism. In short, from these data 
based on two court systems, it can be suggested that SACPA (as an example of a non-Drug Court 
model of treatment) succeeds in providing more treatment but the Drug Court model with its 
closer judicial supervision produces better outcomes. If the resources could be provided for the 
Drug Court model to be expanded to include all eligible drug offenders (or SACPA expanded to 
include Drug Court practices for the appropriate population), then this form of state-mandated 
treatment could be an extremely effective benefit for California. This might also be generalizable 
to the states that have implemented or are considering implementing statewide treatment reform 
for drug offenders.  
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This leads to the question of the kind of resources needed for this kind of endeavor. Because of 
the intense judicial supervision, it may be that Drug Courts are more expensive and that it is 
impractical to expand the model on this kind of scale. However, the results presented for Policy 
Question #6 show that this is not the case. First, however, Policy Question #5 presents the 
comparison of costs for Drug Courts before and after SACPA. 
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Policy Question #5: What Are the Investment and Outcome Costs of 
Drug Courts Before the Implementation of the State-Mandated Non-
Drug Court Treatment Programs Compared to After 
Implementation? 
As described in the methodology section, the Transactional and Institutional Cost Analysis (TICA) 
approach was used to calculate the costs of each of the transactions that occurred while participants 
were engaged in the Drug Court programs. Transactions are those points within a system where 
resources are consumed and/or change hands. In the case of Drug Courts, when a participant 
appears in court or has a drug test, resources such as judge time, defense attorney time, court 
facilities, and urine cups are used. Program transactions calculated in this analysis included Drug 
Court appearances, case management, drug tests, drug treatment (individual, group and residential 
treatment), and jail sanctions. All cost results provided in this report are based on fiscal year 2006-
2007 dollars. Costs tracked in this study were those incurred by taxpayers. 
The results for this question include the unit costs calculated for each transaction, for example, 
the cost of a single Drug Court appearance and the cost for a single drug test in the two study 
sites are interesting results in themselves. The cost results are separated into program investment 
costs and outcome costs. Program investments include all the transactions related to participation 
in the Drug Court program such as court sessions, treatment sessions, probation contacts and 
drug tests. Outcome costs for this report include all criminal justice activity that occurs after 
program entry that is not related to the program such as re-arrests, new court cases, jail bookings, 
and jail and prison time served. It is helpful to examine the costs from different perspectives. To 
assist with this, the costs are broken down in two ways, 1. By transaction (as described above) to 
allow us to determine the total costs for each kind of activity or event (such as the total cost for 
all court sessions engaged in during the course of the program) and 2. By agency, which allows 
the examination of the resources contributed by each agency involved in the program. Both these 
perspectives can assist agencies and policymakers in making informed decisions about the most 
appropriate allocation of funds. 
The answer to this question on Drug Court costs before and after SACPA is organized around the 
following topic areas: 
5A. Drug Court Program Investment Costs 
  Drug Court Transaction Unit Costs for San Joaquin and El Monte Drug Court 
Programs 
  San Joaquin Drug Court Program Investment Costs Before and After SACPA 
  El Monte Drug Court Program Investment Costs Before and After SACPA 
5B. Outcome Costs For Drug Court Before and After SACPA 
  Outcome Transaction Unit Costs for San Joaquin and El Monte  
  San Joaquin Drug Court Outcome Costs Pre and Post SACPA 
  El Monte Drug Court Outcome Costs Pre and Post SACPA 
5C. Summary of Drug Court Costs Pre and Post-SACPA 
  Program Investment Costs 
  Outcome Costs 
  Total Costs for Drug Courts Before and After SACPA Implementation 
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5A. INVESTMENT COSTS 
Investment costs for the Drug Court programs include the costs for Drug Court sessions, case 
management, treatment (outpatient and residential), drug tests and jail used as a sanction. All 
costs were calculated in (or have been adjusted to) 2006-2007 dollars. 
Drug Court Transaction Unit Costs for San Joaquin and El Monte Drug Court Programs 
A Drug Court session, for the majority of Drug Courts, is one of the most staff and resource 
intensive program transactions. In San Joaquin, these sessions include representatives from the 
Superior Court (judge, clerk, interpreter, bailiff, coordinator), the District Attorney (when 
required), the Public Defender (when required), the Office of Substance Abuse (case managers), 
the Human Services Agency and Mental Health Services. In El Monte, these sessions include 
representatives from the Superior Court (court commissioner, judicial assistant, court reporter, 
interpreter, bailiff), the District Attorney, the Public Defender and the treatment agency. The cost 
of a Drug Court appearance (the time during a session when a single participant is interacting 
with the judge) is calculated based on the average amount of court time (in minutes) each 
participant uses during the court session. This incorporates the direct costs of each Drug Court 
team member present during sessions, the time team members spent preparing for or contributing 
to the session, the agency support costs, and the overhead costs. The cost for a single Drug Court 
appearance in San Joaquin County is $105.26 per participant. The average cost for a single Drug 
Court appearance in El Monte is $80.26 per participant. The costs per appearance are on the 
lower end of per appearance costs of other adult Drug Courts studied by NPC Research. For 
example, other courts in California and Oregon have appearance costs ranging from $97 to $156 
(Carey & Finigan, 2003; Carey et al., 2005; Carey, Marchand, & Waller, 2005). 
Drug Court case management is based on the amount of staff time dedicated to case management 
activities during a regular workweek, staff salaries and benefits, and agency indirect support and 
overhead costs. This is translated into a total cost for case management per participant per day. The 
main agency involved in case management for San Joaquin County is the Office of Substance 
Abuse. The per day cost of Drug Court case management in San Joaquin County is $1.13 per 
participant. The main agency involved in case management for Drug Court in El Monte is the 
treatment provider. The per day cost of Drug Court case management in El Monte is $1.26 per 
participant. Both case management costs fall on the lower end of the range of costs found in other 
studies. For example, case management from other cost analyses in California (Carey et al., 2005) 
varied widely – from just over $1.00 per day to over $11.00 per day. 
Drug Court treatment sessions in San Joaquin County are provided by multiple treatment 
agencies (both county and private) including Drug Court outpatient and residential treatment 
although there is one treatment provider that is used most commonly. The most common 
treatment provider costs $6.33 per person per day, other Drug Court treatment (an average of 
all non-ADAP treatment agencies) is $18.14 per day and residential treatment is $55.08 per day. 
Costs include all salary, benefits, support and overhead costs associated with treatment. 
Treatment in El Monte is provided by one treatment provider whose treatment services include 
group and individual treatment. Specialized services, such as residential treatment, are contracted 
out to one of 300 treatment providers in Los Angeles County, with 10 agencies used most 
commonly. In El Monte, group treatment is $23.07 per person per session, individual treatment 
is $22.51 per session and residential treatment is $78.50 per day. Participants in El Monte and 
San Joaquin County pay fees to the treatment providers on a sliding scale, based on ability to 
pay, but the fees were not included in this analysis due to a lack of data on actual payments. It 
should be noted that any fees paid by participants reduce the cost to taxpayers for drug treatment.  
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Drug Court drug tests in San Joaquin County are administered by the Office of Substance 
Abuse. Each UA drug test is $7.61. In El Monte, Drug Court drug tests are administered by the 
treatment provider. Each UA drug test costs $3.39. These rates include the full cost of materials, 
salaries, benefits, support and overhead associated with the test. 
Drug Court jail days as a sanction in El Monte are provided by the Sheriff‘s Department. Jail 
bed days are $68.21 per person per day for males and $84.44 per person per day for females. 
Data on the amount of jail used as a sanction weren‘t available for the San Joaquin Drug Court, 
so the program costs for the San Joaquin County Drug Court pre-SACPA and the Drug Court 
post-SACPA may be slightly higher than those listed in the tables below (although half the 
participants are in Drug Court II, which does now use jail as a sanction and Felony Drug Court 
reports using jail rarely, so the difference in cost is probably minimal). Jail data available for 
outcomes included any jail that occurred while participants were in the Drug Court program, so 
any costs due to jail as a sanction are accounted for in outcome costs and in the total costs 
presented at the end of each section. Rates were calculated using the jail budget and the average 
daily population, and they include all staff time, food, medical, and support and overhead costs. 
San Joaquin Drug Court Program Costs Before and After SACPA 
Program Investment Costs by Transaction. Table 18 presents the average number of Drug 
Court transactions (Drug Court appearances, urinalyses, etc.) per participant and the total cost for 
each type of transaction (number of transactions times the cost per transaction) for the San 
Joaquin Drug Court pre-SACPA and post-SACPA. The sum of these transactions is the total per-
participant cost of the program for each time period. 
Table 18. Program Costs per Participant for San Joaquin Drug Court Before and After 
SACPA Implementation 
Transaction  Unit Cost 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
San Joaquin  
Drug Court  
T1
9 
N = 202 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court  
T2
10 
N = 128 
Mean 
Cost per 
Participant 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T1 
N = 202 
Mean 
Cost per 
Participant 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T2 
N = 128 
Drug Court 
Appearances 
$105.26  16.72  13.93  $1,760  $1,466 
Drug Court Case 
Management 
$1.13  208.21 days  163.15 days  $235  $184 
Treatment
11  NA  NA  NA  $1,436  $1,958 
Urinalyses (UAs)  $7.61  23.62  16.98  $180    $129 
Total        $3,611  $3,737 
 
                                                 
9 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
10 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
11 Treatment includes group and individual treatment sessions, as well as residential treatment. 
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Table 18 above illustrates the per-participant cost to the taxpayer for the Drug Court program 
before and after the implementation of SACPA. On average, in other Drug Court programs 
studied by NPC, the program cost per participant ranged from $4,000 to just over $12,000 
depending on the intensity of the program and the extent to which the programs used public 
funds for their services (Carey & Finigan, 2003; Carey et al., 2005). The San Joaquin Drug Court 
program costs were relatively low both before and after SACPA and there was no significant 
difference in cost between the two time periods. Interestingly, examination of the separate 
transactions show that costs decreased in every transaction category (mainly due to fewer Drug 
Court appearances, case management days, and UAs) from Time 1 to Time 2 except for 
treatment, which resulted in the overall small increase in total costs. None of these differences 
were statistically significant. 
Program Investment Costs by Agency. Another useful way to examine costs afforded by the 
TICA methodology is to quantify them by agency to determine whether or not the agency 
investments in Drug Court changed over time. Table 19 provides per-participant costs by agency 
for the Drug Court program pre and post-SACPA. 
 
Table 19. Program Agency Costs for San Joaquin Drug Court Before and After 
SACPA Implementation 
Agency 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T1
12 
N = 202 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T2
13 
N = 128 
Cost 
Difference 
Superior Court  $778  $648  (-$130) 
District Attorney  $60  $50  -$10 
Public Defender  $98  $82  -$16 
Office of Substance Abuse  $1,170  $1,380  $210 
Probation  $54  $45  (-$9) 
Treatment Agencies  $1,266  $1,381  $115 
Law Enforcement  $35  $29  (-$6) 
Mental Health Services  $46  $38  -$8 
Human Services Agency  $105  $85  -$20 
Total
14  $3,612  $3,738  $126 
 
 
Table 19 shows no significant difference in costs for any agency between Drug Court pre-
SACPA and Drug Court post-SACPA. There was a very slight (non-significant) decrease in costs 
from pre-SACPA Drug Court to post-SACPA Drug Court for every agency except the Office of 
                                                 
12 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
13 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
14 Total costs in this row may not equal those in the costs by transaction table due to rounding. 
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Substance Abuse and the agencies providing treatment services. The decreases for every other 
agency can be attributed to fewer Drug Court appearances, case management days, and UAs 
from Drug Court pre-SACPA to Drug Court post-SACPA. This further confirms the staff belief 
that the Drug Court program structure and procedures had changed very little after the 
implementation of SACPA. 
El Monte Drug Court Program Investment Costs Before and After SACPA 
Program Investment Costs by Transaction. Presents the average number of Drug Court 
transactions (Drug Court appearances, urinalyses, etc.) per participant and the total cost for each 
type of transaction (number of transactions times the cost per transaction) for the El Monte Drug 
Court pre-SACPA and post-SACPA. The sum of these transactions is the total per-participant 
cost of the program for each time period. 
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Table 20 illustrates that costs increased in every category except for case management and UAs 
(both of which had moderate decreases in the average number of transactions). The significant 
increase in costs stems almost entirely from increased use of jail as a sanction. It is probable that 
this increase is due to the change (increased level of addiction and increased criminality) in the 
Drug Court participant population after SACPA implementation. One explanation is that non-
compliant behavior has increased, resulting in increased use of jail sanctions. However, the El 
Monte Drug Court program uses an in-jail residential treatment program for most of its 
participants‘ residential needs and the data on in-jail treatment is combined in the database with 
jail sanction days because this intervention can be used as a sanction when participants are 
chronically non-compliant (particularly if they have multiple positive drug tests). Alternatively, 
in-jail treatment is also commonly used at the beginning of the program in order to prepare the 
participants that need it for outpatient treatment for the remainder of the program. It is most likely 
that the participants coming into Drug Court at Time 2 are more highly addicted and therefore 
more in need of residential treatment before engaging in treatment on an outpatient basis. 
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Table 20. Program Costs per Participant for El Monte Drug Court Before and After 
SACPA Implementation 
Transaction  Unit Cost 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
T1
15 
N = 127 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
T2
16 
N = 147 
Mean 
Cost per 
Participant 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
T1 
N = 127 
Mean 
Cost per 
Participant 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
T2 
N = 147 
Drug Court 
Appearances 
$80.26  9.98  13.16  $801  $1,056 
Drug Court 
Case 
Management 
$1.26  388.06 days  326.48 days  $489  $411 
Treatment
17  NA  NA  NA  $3,063  $3,517 
Urinalyses 
(UAs) 
$3.39  144.93  81.28  $491  $276 
Jail Sanction 
Days (Men) 
$68.21  5.79  33.50  $395  $2,285 
Jail Sanction 
Days (Women) 
$84.44  1.28  28.61  $108  $2,416 
Total        $5,347  $9,961 
Note: For El Monte, Drug Court program costs post-SACPA are almost twice as much as the program costs pre-
SACPA (this difference is statistically significant at p < .01).  
 
                                                 
15 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
16 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
17 Treatment includes group and individual treatment sessions, as well as residential treatment. 
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Program Investment Costs by Agency. The agency investments in the El Monte Drug Court 
pre and post-SACPA are shown in Table 21. 
Table 21. Program Costs per Participant for El Monte Drug Court Before and After 
SACPA Implementation by Agency 
Agency 
El Monte Drug 
Court T1
18 
N = 127 
El Monte Drug 
Court T2
19 
N = 147 
Cost 
Difference 
Superior Court  $283  $373  $90 
District Attorney  $213  $281  $68 
Public Defender  $157  $206  $49 
Treatment Agencies  $4,185  $4,393  $208 
Law Enforcement  $510  $4,710  $4,200 
Total
20  $5,348  $9,963  $4,615 
 
Table 21 shows that every agency involved in the Drug Court program had an increase in costs 
from Drug Court Time 1 to Drug Court Time 2, although only the costs for law enforcement 
were statistically significant. Law enforcement showed the largest increase, almost entirely due 
to the expanded use of in-jail treatment days for El Monte Drug Court participants post-SACPA. 
These results will be discussed further in the summary for this section. 
5B. OUTCOME COSTS FOR DRUG COURT BEFORE AND AFTER SACPA 
This section describes the criminal justice cost outcomes experienced by Drug Court participants 
pre and post-SACPA. The specific outcome transactions examined include re-arrests, subsequent 
court cases, jail bookings, jail time, prison, probation and victimizations.
21 Outcome costs were 
calculated for 3 years from the time of program entry for both groups. All costs are calculated (or 
adjusted from the statewide study to) 2006-2007 dollars. Costs are calculated based on means 
adjusted for any differences between the two groups on demographics, drug of choice, criminal 
history and time incarcerated. Following is a description of the transactions and the unit costs 
included in the outcome cost analysis. 
Outcome Transaction Unit Costs for San Joaquin and El Monte  
Arrests in El Monte and San Joaquin County are conducted by multiple law enforcement 
agencies. The predominant agency that arrests suspected offenders for the El Monte Drug Court 
is the El Monte Police Department. The predominant agency that arrests suspected offenders for 
the San Joaquin County Drug Court is the Stockton Police Department. Arrest models were 
constructed that reflect the arrest practice in each site. This model of arrest practice was 
combined with salary, benefit and indirect support and overhead cost information to calculate a 
                                                 
18 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
19 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
20 Total costs in this row may not equal those in the costs by transaction table due to rounding. 
21 Although the original intention of this study was to also include subsequent treatment and social service costs, we 
were unable to obtain that data within the time frame of this study. This will be discussed further in the limitations 
section of this report. 
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cost per arrest episode. The cost of a single arrest in El Monte is $457.18. The cost of a single 
arrest in San Joaquin County is $216.08. (Note: There is a large difference in the unit cost of an 
arrest between sites. Differences in unit cost at different sites for the same transactions can be 
due to an extremely large number of factors including the cost of living in the area, the 
availability of various resources and the specific practices involved in the transaction at each site, 
e.g., the number of people involved in the transaction, the amount of time taken by each person 
to perform the transaction, etc.) 
The cost of an average court case (taking into account the full range of case dispositions from 
dismissal to just short of trial) was determined based on local agency budget expenditures and 
interviews with local agency staff, in combination with information collected from several court 
case time studies in California and other states (National Center for State Courts, 2002; Carey & 
Finigan, 2003). To construct the cost model for court cases, court case time study information 
was paired with the budget expenditures and staff resources of the agencies typically involved in 
no-trial court cases. NPC researchers found the cost of a court case in San Joaquin County to be 
$2,265.93 and the cost of a court case in El Monte to be $2,030.56. 
In San Joaquin County and in Los Angeles County (for El Monte), jail booking episodes occur at 
Sheriff-operated county jail facilities. Booking cost models were created using budgetary 
information for the Sheriff and county jails along with the number of booking episodes. The cost 
of a single jail booking is $742.23 in El Monte and $152.12 in San Joaquin County. 
Jail days are provided by the Sheriff in San Joaquin County and in Los Angeles County (for El 
Monte). Jail bed days are $68.21 (for males) and $84.44 (for females) per person per day in El 
Monte and $103.64 per person per day in San Joaquin County. Rates were calculated using the 
Sheriff and county jail budgets and average daily jail populations. They include all staff time, 
food, medical, and support/overhead costs. 
Prison facilities in California are operated by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 
To represent the daily cost of prison time served the Department‘s per diem cost for its prison 
facilities was used as reported on its Web site. The average per diem prison cost in California is 
$93.56. 
Adult probation services in El Monte are provided by Los Angeles County‘s Probation 
Department. Through interviews with representatives of the department and analysis of the 
department‘s budget and caseload, NPC constructed a model of probation case supervision. The 
probation supervision cost per day in El Monte is $4.43. The Probation Department provides 
adult probation services in San Joaquin County. A probation case supervision model similar to 
the one in El Monte was constructed for San Joaquin County. The probation supervision cost per 
day in San Joaquin County is $0.83. 
Victimizations were calculated from the National Institute of Justice's Victim Costs and 
Consequences: A New Look (NIJ, 1996).
 The costs were updated to fiscal year 2006-2007 
dollars. Property crimes are $11,858 per event and person crimes are $38,414 per event. 
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San Joaquin Drug Court Outcome Costs Pre and Post SACPA 
Outcome Costs by Transaction. Table 22 presents the average number of outcome transactions 
(re-arrests, jail days, probation days, etc.) per participant and the total cost for each type of 
transaction (number of transactions times the cost per transaction) for the San Joaquin Drug 
Court pre-SACPA and post-SACPA. The sum of these transactions is the total per participant 
outcome cost for the Drug Court at each time period. 
Table 22. San Joaquin Outcome Costs per Drug Court 
Participant Pre- and Post-SACPA 
Transaction 
Unit 
Cost 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T1
22 
N = 202 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T2
23 
N = 128 
Mean Cost 
per 
Participant 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T1 
N = 202 
Mean Cost 
per 
Participant 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T2 
N = 128 
Re-arrests  $216.08  2.22  4.15  $480  $897 
Court Cases  $2,265.93  1.34  1.40  $3,036  $3,172 
Jail Bookings   $152.12  3.14  3.38  $478  $514 
Jail Days  $103.64  144.83  95.78  $15,010  $9,927 
Probation Days  $0.83  459.74  544.67  $382  $452 
Prison Days  $93.56  86.22  57.03  $8,067  $5,336 
Total        $27,453  $20,298 
Victimizations – 
Person Crimes 
$38,414.0
0 
0.25  0.27  $9,604  $10,372 
Victimizations – 
Property Crimes 
$11,858.0
0 
0.32  0.98  $3,795  $11,621 
Total w/ 
Victimizations 
      $40,852  $42,291 
 
The results in Table 22 are broken down with and without victimization costs because the cost of 
a single victimization is so high that the final costs can be heavily weighted by very small 
numbers of actual victimizations. This is the case in Table 22 where the outcome costs for Drug 
Court participants post-SACPA is significantly less than pre-SACPA Drug Court without 
victimization costs but is slightly more when victimizations are included.  
Table 22 shows that the average number of outcome transactions increased (even after 
controlling for demographics, criminal history and time incarcerated
24) from Drug Court pre-
                                                 
22 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
23 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
24 Time incarcerated was not used as a covariate in the analyses on time incarcerated. 
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SACPA to Drug Court post-SACPA for every outcome category except jail and prison days. The 
average number of re-arrests almost doubled and the average number of property crime 
victimizations almost tripled. Even though the average number of outcome transactions increased 
pre-SACPA to post-SACPA, the average cost per participant only rose slightly (from $40,852 to 
$42,291). This is because the reduction in the average number of jail and prison days almost 
made up for the increase in every other outcome transaction category.  
Excluding victimization costs, the average outcome cost per participant actually went down from 
Drug Court at Time 1 to Drug Court at Time 2 ($27,453 to $20,298). Again, this is due to the 
marked reduction in jail and prison days. It is likely that most of this decrease in jail (and prison) 
time is due to Drug Court II participants who cannot be jailed while actively participating in the 
program. Since these outcome costs include all 3 years after program entry this covers the time 
period (most of the first year) when participants are still in the program. 
This result provides evidence that the decrease in jail time may be directly related to the increase 
in crime, as evidenced by the significant increase in total arrests and in property crimes. 
Outcome Costs by Agency. Another useful way to examine outcome costs is to quantify them 
by agency to determine whether or not the agency resources that go into outcome costs have 
changed over time. Table 23 provides per participant outcome costs by agency for the San 
Joaquin Drug Court program pre and post-SACPA. 
Table 23. San Joaquin Agency Outcome Costs per Drug Court Participant Pre- and 
Post-SACPA 
Agency 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T1
25 
N = 202 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T2
26 
N = 128 
Cost 
Difference 
Superior Court  $1,571  $1,641  $70 
District Attorney  $680  $710  $30 
Public Defender  $786  $821  $35 
Probation  $382  $452  $70 
Law Enforcement  $15,968  $11,338  -$4,630 
Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation 
$8,067  $5,336  -$2,731 
Victimizations  $13,398  $21,993  $8,595 
Total
27  $40,852  $42,291  $1,439 
 
                                                 
25 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
26 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
27 Total costs in this row may not equal those in the costs by transaction table due to rounding. 
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Table 23 shows that Law Enforcement had the largest (and the only statistically significant) 
decrease in outcome costs per participant from Drug Court pre-SACPA to Drug Court post-
SACPA (due to decreased use of jail as described above), followed by the California Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Victimizations had the largest increase by far pre-SACPA to 
post-SACPA (due to the larger number of property crimes from T1 to T2). The Superior Court, 
District Attorney, Public Defender, and Probation showed small increases in costs. Again, the 
increase in victimization costs (and in costs for agencies not directly related to incarceration 
costs) is evidence for increased crime when participants spend less time in jail. 
El Monte Drug Court Outcome Costs Pre and Post SACPA 
Outcome Costs by Transaction. Table 24 presents the average number of outcome transactions 
(re-arrests, jail days, probation days, etc.) per participant and the total cost for each type of 
transaction (number of transactions times the cost per transaction) for the El Monte Drug Court 
pre-SACPA and post-SACPA. The sum of these transactions is the total per participant outcome 
cost for the Drug Court at each time period. 
Table 24. El Monte Outcome Costs per Drug Court Participant Pre- and Post-SACPA 
Transaction  Unit Cost 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
per 
Participant 
El Monte Drug 
Court T1
28 
N = 127 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
per 
Participant 
El Monte Drug 
Court T2
29 
N = 147 
Mean Cost 
per 
participant 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
T1 
N = 127 
Mean Cost 
per 
Participant 
El Monte 
Drug Court 
T2 
N = 147 
Re-arrests  $457.18  1.68  2.64  $768  $1,207 
Court Cases  $2,030.56  0.52  1.02  $1,056  $2,071 
Jail Bookings   $742.23  1.50  1.69  $1,113  $1,254 
Jail Days (Men)  $68.21  69.77  62.35  $4,759  $4,253 
Jail Days 
(Women) 
$84.44  49.51  32.59  $4,181  $2,752 
Probation Days  $4.43  262.92  516.31  $1,165  $2,287 
Prison Days  $93.56  22.59  82.65  $2,114  $7,733 
Total        $15,156  $21,557 
Victimizations – 
Person Crimes 
$38,414.00  0.08  0.12  $3,073  $4,610 
Victimizations – 
Property Crimes 
$11,858.00  0.30  0.33  $3,557  $3,913 
Total w/ 
Victimizations 
      $21,786  $30,080 
                                                 
28 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
29 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
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Similar to San Joaquin, after controlling for prior arrests, demographics and time incarcerated,
30 
the number of re-arrests is significantly higher for Drug Court participants post-SACPA while 
jail days decreased, but unlike San Joaquin, the decrease in jail days is not due to less use of jail 
as a sanction as those costs were included in the El Monte Drug Court program investment costs. 
The decrease in jail time may be due to the increase in days spent in prison for Drug Court 
participants post-SACPA, resulting in a higher cost for Drug Court at Time 2. The El Monte 
Drug Court showed a significant increase in outcome costs (of 38%) from T1 to T2 ($21,786 to 
$30,080). There were increases in every outcome transaction category except jail days, with 
court cases almost doubling and prison days more than tripling. When victimizations are 
excluded, the result is the same—outcome costs increased from pre-SACPA to post-SACPA 
Drug Court ($15,156 to $21,557, or a 42% increase). The increase in prison time may be 
explained by the change in the Drug Court population from Time 1 to Time 2. Because many of 
the participants at Time 2 are SACPA failures and therefore have used up their chances at 
treatment without incarceration, participants that fail Drug Court at Time 2 are far more likely to 
end up serving a prison sentence.  
Outcome Costs by Agency. Table 25 provides per participant outcome costs by agency for the 
El Monte Drug Court program pre and post-SACPA. 
Table 25. El Monte Agency Outcome Costs Drug Court Participant Pre- SACPA 
(T1) and Post-SACPA (T2) 
Agency 
El Monte Drug 
Court T1 
N = 127 
El Monte Drug 
Court T2 
N = 147 
Cost 
Difference 
Superior Court  $640  $1,255  $615 
District Attorney  $152  $298  $146 
Public Defender  $264  $518  $254 
Probation  $1,165  $2,287  $1,122 
Law Enforcement  $10,822  $9,466  -$1,356 
Department of 
Corrections and 
Rehabilitation 
$2,114  $7,733  $5,619 
Victimizations  $6,631  $8,523  $1,892 
Total
31  $21,788  $30,080  $8,292 
 
The El Monte Drug Court‘s outcome costs increased from pre-SACPA to post-SACPA for every 
agency except Law Enforcement. The decrease for Law Enforcement is due to the decrease in 
jail time. As discussed above, it is possible that the decrease in jail time may be a result of 
increased time in prison with Drug Court participants who have previously failed SACPA 
serving prison sentences. The CA Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation showed the 
largest increase, but costs for the Superior Court, District Attorney, Public Defender and 
                                                 
30 Time incarcerated was not used as a covariate on the analyses on time incarcerated. 
31 Total costs in this row may not equal those in the costs by transaction table due to rounding. 
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Probation almost doubled from pre-SACPA Drug Court to post-SACPA Drug Court. The 
differences for these agencies are statistically significant (p < .01). This is due to the almost 
doubling of re-arrests and court cases from pre-SACPA to post-SACPA. 
5C. SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT COSTS PRE AND POST-SACPA 
Program Investment Costs for San Joaquin and El Monte Before and After SACPA 
Drug Court program investment costs increased slightly in San Joaquin from pre-SACPA to 
post-SACPA and increased significantly for El Monte (see Figure 9 and Figure 10). 
Figure 9. San Joaquin Program Investment Costs: Cost per offender for Drug Court 
Pre-SACPA and Post-SACPA 
 
 
Figure 9 shows that program costs for the San Joaquin Drug Court rose very slightly ($126) from 
the pre-SACPA period to the post-SACPA period. This provided support for the Drug Court staff 
belief that the Drug Court services provided had not changed significantly from before to after 
SACPA implementation. However, the detailed cost per transaction in San Joaquin (see Table 
18) showed an increase in treatment costs (balanced by a decrease in costs in other areas), which 
may signify an increase in treatment for the more severely addicted participants at Time 2.  
Figure 10, below, shows a different situation for the El Monte Drug Court where the change in 
the Drug Court population (to a more criminal and addicted group) led to more jail sanctions. In 
addition, El Monte often uses an in-jail treatment program as a residential treatment source. If 
the Drug Court participants post-SACPA are more addicted, it is likely the program staff is 
responding to the participants‘ need for more residential treatment. 
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Figure 10. Program Costs: Cost per Participant for El Monte Drug Court Pre-SACPA 
and Drug Court Post-SACPA 
 
 
Consistent at both sites was the increase in treatment costs (including in-jail treatment for El 
Monte participants). The change in criminal justice treatment program continuum at both sites 
has led to a Drug Court population that has had more failed treatment attempts prior to Drug 
Court participation and a longer time to become more addicted and more resistant to treatment. 
This has a clear connection to the increase in treatment costs for Drug Court participants. 
Outcome Costs for San Joaquin and El Monte Drug Court Before and After SACPA 
Figure 11 provides a graph of the outcome costs over 3 years for San Joaquin Drug Court 
participants both pre and post-SACPA. 
Figure 11. San Joaquin Outcome Costs over 3 years (Cumulative): Cost per offender 
Drug Court Pre-and Post-SACPA 
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Figure 11 illustrates that for San Joaquin County in spite of the increased number of re-arrests, 
the decrease in days in jail led to no significant difference in costs for Drug Court before and 
after SACPA. It may be that the decrease in jail time is due to SACPA changes in the use of jail 
for drug crimes. Unfortunately, the lower use of jail time did not lead to less crime, as the data 
(presented above) showed a significant increase in re-arrests in the same time period. 
Figure 12, below, provides a graph of outcome costs over 3 years for El Monte Drug Court 
participants both pre and post-SACPA. 
Figure 12. El Monte Outcome Costs Over 3 Years (Cumulative): Costs per Participant 
for Drug Court Pre- and Post-SACPA 
 
 
Outcome costs over 3 years for El Monte Drug Court participants were higher for participants 
who entered Drug Court after SACPA than for participants who entered before SACPA 
implementation. The difference between the two grows over time, with post-SACPA participants 
showing increasingly higher costs. As the transaction data presented earlier in this section 
showed, the majority of this increase in costs is due to increased time in prison for Drug Court 
participants at Time 3. The increased time in prison is mostly likely a result of the change in 
Drug Court population to SACPA failures who, if they fail Drug Court, will serve prison time. 
Total Costs for Drug Courts Before and After SACPA Implementation 
The bottom line for costs is the total costs to the system (both program and outcome costs) over 
the time period of interest. Figure 13 provides the total costs for San Joaquin Drug Court 
participants before and after SACPA implementation. 
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Figure 13. San Joaquin Drug Court Total Costs: Combined Program and Outcome 
Cost per offender for Drug Court Pre- and Post-SACPA 
 
Figure 13, above, demonstrates that, in San Joaquin, there is no significant difference in costs for 
all participants from pre-SACPA to post-SACPA. As explained previous, the increase in re-
arrests post-SACPA is balanced out by the decrease in jail time, leading to the conclusion that 
less use of jail time as a sanction is related to increase in crime. 
Figure 14, below, provides the total costs for El Monte Drug Court participants before and after 
SACPA implementation. 
Figure 14. El Monte Drug Court Total Costs: Combined Program and Outcome Cost 
per offender for Drug Court Pre- and Post-SACPA 
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The total costs (program and outcome costs over 3 years) shown in Figure 14 reveal that total 
costs rose 48% for El Monte Drug Court participants after SACPA implementation. The increase 
in costs in El Monte is due largely to the increased use of jail (or in-jail treatment) for Drug 
Court participants while in the program post-SACPA and higher recidivism (particularly 
increased prison time) for Drug Court participants post-SACPA.  
The results for both programs indicate higher recidivism for Drug Court participants after 
SACPA implementation. In San Joaquin, the costs associated with this are nearly balanced out 
by less use of costly jail time so there is only a slight rise in total costs to the taxpayer. For El 
Monte, the increase in recidivism is clearly reflected in a significant rise in total costs to the 
taxpayer. It appears that the implementation of SACPA in both sites was detrimental to the Drug 
Court program in terms of increased crime and taxpayer costs. 
Policy Question #6: What are the Relative Investment and Outcome 
Costs of Drug Courts Compared to State-Mandated Non-Drug Court 
Treatment Programs? 
As described in the methodology section, and in the previous section, the Transactional and 
Institutional Cost Analysis (TICA) approach was used to calculate the costs of each of the 
transactions that occurred while participants were engaged in the Drug Court or SACPA 
program. Program transactions calculated in the analysis for SACPA
32 included SACPA 
appearances (in El Monte) or SACPA case processing (for San Joaquin County), case 
management, drug tests, and drug treatment (individual, group, day care rehabilitative, detox and 
residential treatment). All cost results provided in this report are based on fiscal year 2006-2007 
dollars. Costs tracked in this study were those incurred by taxpayers. 
The results for this question are presented similarly to Policy Question #5. They include the unit 
costs calculated for each SACPA transaction (for example, the cost of a single SACPA drug test 
or court session).
33 Other cost results are separated into program investment costs and outcome 
costs. Program investments include all transactions related to participation in the SACPA and 
Drug Court programs such as court sessions, treatment sessions, probation contacts and drug 
tests. Outcome costs for this report for all programs include all criminal justice activity that 
occurs after program entry that is not related to the program such as re-arrests, new court cases, 
jail bookings, and jail and prison time served. It is helpful to examine the costs from different 
perspectives. To assist with this, the costs are broken down in two ways, 1. By transaction, to 
allow us to determine the total costs for each kind of activity or event (such as the total cost for 
all court sessions engaged in during the course of the program) and 2. By agency, which allows 
the examination of the resources contributed by each agency involved in the program. Both these 
perspectives can assist agencies and policymakers in making informed decisions about the most 
appropriate allocation of funds. 
The answers to this question on the relative investment costs of SACPA and Drug Court are 
organized around the following topic areas: 
6A. SACPA and Drug Court Program Investment Costs 
  Transaction Unit Costs for San Joaquin and El Monte SACPA Programs 
  San Joaquin SACPA and Drug Court Program Investment Costs  
                                                 
32 Program transactions for Drug Court were listed previously in the results for Policy Question #5. 
33 Drug Court program unit costs were presented previously in the results for Policy Question #5 
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  El Monte SACPA and Drug Court Program Investment Costs 
6B. Outcome Costs For SACPA and Drug Court  
  San Joaquin SACPA and Drug Court Outcome Costs  
  El Monte SACPA and Drug Court Outcome Costs 
6C. Summary of SACPA and Drug Court Costs 
  Program Investment Costs 
  Outcome Costs 
  Total Costs for SACPA and Drug Courts 
Note: The results presented for Policy Question #6 in this section repeat much of the same 
information as that presented in the previous section for the Drug Court programs. This 
information is included again in this section for the convenience of the reader in comparing Drug 
Court results directly to SACPA results. 
6A. SACPA AND DRUG COURT PROGRAM INVESTMENT COSTS 
Investment costs for the SACPA programs include the costs for SACPA court sessions (for El 
Monte) or the court case (San Joaquin), case management, treatment (outpatient and 
residential), assessments and drug tests. All costs were calculated in (or have been adjusted to) 
2006-2007 dollars. 
SACPA Transaction Unit Costs 
A SACPA court session in El Monte includes representatives from the Superior Court (court 
commissioner, judicial assistant, court reporter, interpreter, bailiff), the District Attorney, the 
Public Defender and various treatment agencies (when required). The cost of a SACPA 
appearance (the time during a session when a single participant is interacting with the 
commissioner) is calculated based on the average amount of court time (in minutes) each 
participant uses during the court session. This incorporates the direct costs of each SACPA team 
member present during sessions, the time team members spent preparing for or contributing to 
the session, the agency support costs, and overhead costs. The average cost for a single SACPA 
appearance in El Monte is $41.96 per participant. San Joaquin County does not have SACPA 
court sessions. The San Joaquin Court processes SACPA cases (as far as court appearances) in 
the same way the Court processes general court cases. Participants only appear before a judge in 
the case of a probation violation. Therefore, for program costs, the cost of a general court case is 
included instead of court session costs. 
The cost of an average court case (taking into account the full range of case dispositions from 
dismissal to trial) was determined based on local agency budget expenditures and interviews 
with local agency staff, in combination with information collected from several court case time 
studies in California and other states (National Center for State Courts, 2002; Carey & Finigan, 
2003). To construct the cost model for court cases, the budget expenditures and staff resources of 
the agencies typically involved in no-trial court cases were considered along with information 
from the court case time studies. NPC researchers found the cost of a court case in San Joaquin 
County to be $2,265.93 and the cost of a court case in El Monte to be $2,030.56. (Note: SACPA 
cases in San Joaquin are treated by the Court in a similar fashion as non-SACPA cases since 
there is no court supervision. Participants only appear in court if they have a probation violation.) 
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SACPA case management is based on the amount of staff time dedicated to case management 
activities during a regular workweek, staff salaries and benefits, and agency support and overhead 
costs. This is translated into a total cost for case management per participant per day. The main 
agency involved in case management for SACPA in El Monte is Probation. The per day cost of 
SACPA case management in El Monte is $1.03 per participant. The main agencies involved in 
case management for SACPA in San Joaquin County are Probation and the Office of Substance 
Abuse. The per day cost of SACPA case management in San Joaquin County is $0.90 per 
participant. Both SACPA case management costs are similar to their respective Drug Court case 
management costs, but both are slightly lower than Drug Court case management costs per day. 
SACPA treatment sessions in El Monte are provided by over 100 different treatment providers 
located across Los Angeles County. In El Monte, group treatment is $31.75 per person per 
session, individual treatment is $66.03 per session, day care rehabilitative treatment is $69.97 
per day and residential treatment is $79.72 per day. In San Joaquin County, over a dozen 
treatment agencies provide SACPA outpatient and residential treatment. Level 1 treatment is 
$8.17 per person per day, level 2 treatment is $13.61 per person per day, level 3 treatment is 
$18.14 per person per day, level 4 treatment (residential) is $79.72 per day, and detox is $69.97 
per day. Costs include all salary, benefits, support and overhead costs associated with the 
session. Participants in El Monte and San Joaquin County pay fees directly to the treatment 
providers on a sliding scale, based on ability to pay, but the fees were not included in this 
analysis due to a lack of data on payments. It should be noted that any fees paid by participants 
reduce the cost to taxpayers for drug treatment. 
SACPA drug tests in El Monte are performed at least quarterly by Probation and once a week by 
the treatment providers. Each UA drug test costs $8.06, which is a proportional average of the 
Probation and treatment provider UA drug test costs. In San Joaquin County, the treatment 
providers perform all drug testing at a minimum of once per month per participant. Each UA 
drug test costs $8.00. These rates include the full cost of materials, salaries, benefits, support and 
overhead associated with the test. 
SACPA assessments in El Monte are administered by Community Assessment Service Centers 
(CASCs), which are private agencies contracted by the Alcohol and Drug Program 
Administration. NPC Research was unable to obtain any information on the cost of an 
assessment from the Alcohol & Drug Program Administration,
34 so the cost of assessments was 
not included in the analysis of El Monte SACPA program costs. Therefore, the SACPA program 
costs in El Monte are actually slightly higher than the numbers provided in this report. 
Assessments in San Joaquin County are provided by the Office of Substance Abuse, but all 
assessment costs are already included in the case management cost per day. 
San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA Program Costs 
This section of the results describes the program investment costs for SACPA and for Drug 
Courts at Time 1 and Time 2 in San Joaquin County. The main focus of this section is to 
compare the cost for Drug Court and SACPA, as Drug Court was already compared at the two 
time periods in the results for the previous question. 
Program Costs by Transaction. Table 26 presents the average number of transactions (Drug 
Court appearances, SACPA case processing, drug tests, etc.) per participant for the San Joaquin 
Drug Court pre-SACPA, the San Joaquin SACPA program and the San Joaquin Drug Court post-
SACPA.
                                                 
34 This is discussed further in the limitations section of this report. 
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Table 26. San Joaquin Program Transactions per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug Court, Post-
SACPA Drug Court and SACPA 
Transaction 
Mean # of 
Transactions per 
Participant  
San Joaquin Drug 
Court T1
35 
N=202 
Mean # of 
Transactions per 
Participant  
San Joaquin 
SACPA 
N=395 
Mean # of 
Transactions per 
Participant  
San Joaquin 
Drug Court T2
36 
N=128 
Drug Court 
Appearances 
16.72  NA  13.93 
SACPA Court Case 
Processing 
NA  1  NA 
Case Management  208.21 days  551.87 days   163.15 days 
Treatment
37  NA  NA  NA 
Urinalyses (UAs)  23.62  18.23  16.98 
 
As shown in Table 26, there are no SACPA court sessions in San Joaquin County, but the 
SACPA case is processed through the court system and participants return to court for probation 
violations and other issues similar to a typical court case, so one general no-trial court case was 
included in the program costs. The average number of case management days (days in the 
program) per SAPCA participant was over two times as many as Drug Court pre-SACPA and 
over three times as many days as Drug Court post-SACPA. SACPA participants spend much 
longer in the SACPA program than Drug Court participants do in Drug Court. The average 
number of drug tests for SACPA fell between the number for Drug Court participants pre-
SACPA and Drug Court participants post-SACPA. Given that participants in SACPA spend 
longer in the program, the average number of drug tests (18.23 UAs over 551.87 days) is 
somewhat misleading. Proportionately, SACPA participants have barely one-third of the average 
number of drug tests given in Drug Court at either time period. 
Table 27 below shows the total cost for each type of transaction (number of transactions times 
the cost per transaction) for the San Joaquin Drug Court pre-SACPA, the San Joaquin SACPA 
program and the San Joaquin Drug Court post-SACPA. The sum of these transactions for each 
program is the total per-participant cost of that program. 
                                                 
35 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
36 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
37 Treatment includes group and individual treatment sessions, as well as residential treatment. 
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Table 27. San Joaquin Program Costs per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug Court, 
SACPA and Post-SACPA Drug Court  
Transaction 
Drug Court 
Unit Cost 
SACPA 
Unit Cost 
Mean Cost 
per 
Participant 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T1
38 
N = 202 
Mean 
Cost per 
Participant 
San Joaquin 
SACPA 
N = 395 
Mean Cost 
per 
Participant 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T2
39 
N = 128 
Drug Court 
Appearances 
$105.26  NA  $1,760  NA  $1,466 
SACPA Case 
Processing 
NA  $2,265.93  NA  $2,266  NA 
Case 
Management 
$1.13  $0.90  $235  $497  $184 
Treatment
40  NA  NA  $1,436  $7,218  $1,958 
Urinalyses 
(UAs) 
$7.61  $8.00  $180  $146  $129 
Total      $3,611  $10,127  $3,737 
 
Table 27 shows that the cost for the SACPA program is nearly three times that of the Drug Court 
program (at either time period), mainly due to drug treatment costs for SACPA. SACPA funding 
is designated specifically for treatment, and the program is designed to provide it to eligible 
offenders. This results shows that SACPA is successfully providing treatment as intended to its 
participants.  
Case management and case processing costs are also higher for SACPA than for Drug Court. 
This is because SACPA participants spend a significantly longer amount of time in the SACPA 
program than Drug Court participants spend in the Drug Court program. Treatment and case 
processing (Drug Court appearances for the Drug Court participants) are the two most 
expensive transactions for both Drug Court and SACPA, followed by case management and 
then drug testing. 
Program Completers Investment Costs. The examination of these programs allows a unique 
opportunity to compare completers across programs. The program investment costs for 
completers were higher than for all participants for all programs, but showed the same 
proportional differences between Drug Court and SACPA programs with SACPA treatment 
costing nearly triple that of Drug Court at either time period. The detailed results of this analysis 
are presented in Appendix C. 
                                                 
38 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
39 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
40 Treatment includes group and individual treatment sessions, as well as residential treatment. 
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Program Investment Costs by Agency. Table 28 provides the Drug Court and SACPA costs by 
agency. 
Table 28. San Joaquin Agency Investment Costs per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug 
Court (T1), SACPA and Post-SACPA Drug Court (T2) 
Agency 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T1
41 
N = 202 
San Joaquin 
SACPA 
N = 395 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T2
42 
N = 128 
Superior Court  $778  $1,172  $648 
District Attorney  $60  $507  $50 
Public Defender  $98  $586  $82 
Probation  $54  $206  $45 
Office of Substance Abuse  $1,170  $5,004  $1,380 
Treatment Agencies  $1,266  $2,653  $1,381 
Law Enforcement  $35  $0  $29 
Mental Health Services  $46  $0  $38 
Human Services Agency  $105  $0  $85 
Total
43  $3,612  $10,128  $3,738 
 
A useful way to look at program costs is to break the per-participant costs down by agency. This 
allows the ability to see how funds are allocated by agency. Table 28 shows that, as expected 
with the high treatment costs, the Office of Substance Abuse and treatment agencies shoulder the 
largest portion of costs for both Drug Court and SACPA with the Office of Substance Abuse 
spending nearly four times as much on SACPA participants as Drug Court participants. The next 
highest portion of cost is contributed by the Superior Court. The higher Superior Court costs for 
SACPA are due to higher case processing costs from the greater length of time SACPA 
participants spend in the program. Law enforcement, Mental Health Services, and the Human 
Services Agency are not involved with the SACPA program, and SACPA doesn‘t incorporate 
jail sanctions like Drug Court, so these agencies show no cost for SACPA. Every other agency 
listed shows a higher per participant investment cost for SACPA than for Drug Court.  
El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Program Investment Costs 
Program Investment Costs by Transaction. Table 29 presents the average number of 
transactions (Drug Court/SACPA appearances, urinalyses, etc.) per participant for the El Monte 
Drug Court pre-SACPA, the El Monte Drug Court post-SACPA, and the El Monte SACPA 
program. 
                                                 
41 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
42 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
43 Total costs in this row may not equal those in the costs by transaction table due to rounding. 
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Table 29. El Monte (EM) Program Transactions per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug 
Court (T1), SACPA and Post-SACPA Drug Court (T2) 
Transaction 
Mean # of 
Transactions per 
Participant  
El Monte Drug 
Court T1
44 
N=127 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
per Participant 
El Monte 
SACPA 
N=313 
Mean # of 
Transactions per 
Participant  
El Monte Drug 
Court T2
45 
N=147 
Drug Court/SACPA 
Appearances 
9.98  28.16  13.16 
Case Management  388.06 days  548.25 days   326.48 days 
Treatment
46  NA  NA  NA 
Urinalyses (UAs)  144.93  84.33  81.28 
 
Table 29 shows that, although SACPA participants attend court sessions less frequently than 
Drug Court participants, SACPA had a significantly longer time in the program, leading to a 
total of more than twice as many court sessions than Drug Court participants at either time 
period. SACPA also has a similar total number of drug tests to Drug Court post-SACPA, but 
significantly less than the number of drug tests pre-SACPA. Since participants in SACPA spend 
longer in the program on average, the proportionate number of drug tests (84.33 UAs over 
548.25 days) was only one-half of the number of drug tests given in Drug Court pre-SACPA and 
60% of the number of drug tests given in Drug Court post-SACPA. The results in this table show 
that overall, SACPA participants in El Monte use significantly more program resources than 
Drug Court participants. 
Table 30 below shows the total cost for each type of transaction (number of transactions times 
the cost per transaction) for the El Monte Drug Court pre-SACPA, the El Monte SACPA 
program and the El Monte Drug Court post-SACPA. The sum of these transactions for each 
program is the total per-participant cost of that program. 
                                                 
44 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
45 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
46 Treatment includes group and individual treatment sessions, as well as residential treatment. 
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Table 30. El Monte Program Costs per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug Court, SACPA 
and Post-SACPA Drug Court  
Transaction 
Drug Court 
Unit Cost 
SACPA 
Unit Cost 
Mean 
Cost per 
Participant  
El Monte 
Drug Court T1
47 
N = 127 
Mean 
Cost per 
Participant 
El Monte 
SACPA 
N = 313 
Mean 
Cost per 
Participant  
El Monte 
Drug Court T2
48 
N = 147 
Drug Court/ 
SACPA 
Appearances 
$80.26  $41.96  $801  $1,182  $1,056 
Case 
Management  $1.26  $1.03  $489  $565  $411 
Treatment
49  NA  NA  $3,063  $13,048  $3,518 
Urinalyses 
(UAs)  $3.39  $8.06  $491  $680  $276 
Jail Sanctions 
(Men)  $68.21  NA  $395  $0  $2,285 
Jail Sanctions 
(Women)  $84.44  NA  $108  $0  $2,416 
Total      $5,347  $15,475  $9,962 
 
Comparing program investment costs in Table 30 reveals that the El Monte Drug Court program 
pre-SACPA was the least expensive ($5,347), followed by Drug Court post-SACPA ($9,962), 
with SACPA having the highest program investment costs of all at $15,475. These differences 
are statistically significant between each group (p < .01). Table 30 shows that even with no jail 
sanction costs, SACPA had the highest program costs due to treatment ($13,048 out of the total 
program cost of $15,475, or 84%). The treatment portion of total program costs for Drug Court 
varied from 57% for Drug Court Pre-SACPA to 35% for Drug Court post-SACPA. 
Even though SACPA had over twice the average number of court appearances as Drug Court, the 
cost of SACPA appearances remained only slightly higher than the cost of Drug Court 
appearances for both time periods because SACPA court sessions are about half as expensive as 
Drug Court sessions. SACPA sessions are less expensive because less time is spent per 
participant in court than in Drug Court sessions. 
Program Completers. The costs for completers were also compared on program investments. 
Like San Joaquin, completers total investment costs were higher in every program but results 
across program were proportionally the same with SACPA participants costing the most by far. 
The detailed results can be found in Appendix C. 
                                                 
47 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
48 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
49 Treatment includes group and individual treatment sessions, as well as residential treatment. 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.     Results 
 
95 
Program Investment Costs by Agency. Table 31 provides costs per agency (per participant) for 
Drug Court and SACPA. As described earlier, agency costs can be useful in determining how 
funds have been allocated and the best allocation of fund in the future. 
Table 31. El Monte Agency Investment Costs per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug 
Court, SACPA and Post-SACPA Drug Court  
Agency 
El Monte Drug 
Court T1
50 
N = 127 
El Monte 
SACPA 
N = 313 
El Monte Drug 
Court T2
51 
N = 147 
Superior Court  $283  $747  $373 
District Attorney  $213  $191  $281 
Public Defender  $157  $243  $206 
Probation  $0  $613  $0 
Treatment Agencies  $4,185  $13,679  $4,393 
Law Enforcement  $510  $0  $4,710 
Total
52  $5,348  $15,473  $9,963 
 
As was found in San Joaquin, the agency investment costs per participant in the table above 
shows that treatment agencies account for the vast majority of the costs for both Drug Court and 
SACPA programs (although law enforcement does have a slightly higher cost than treatment 
agencies for Drug Court T2). The cost to the treatment agencies for SACPA is more than three 
times the cost for Drug Court. It is interesting to note that the Superior Court costs are also 
higher for SACPA participants. This is due to the larger number of court sessions for SACPA 
participants. It would appear from this that SACPA participants actually have a higher level of 
court supervision. However, as described earlier, the quality of that supervision is very different, 
with SACPA participants being treated in a more formal, traditional, court fashion with no clear 
sanctions or rewards. In contrast, there is no cost to law enforcement for SACPA due to no law 
enforcement involvement in the program and no jail sanction use, as is currently required by law. 
However, costs for law enforcement in Drug Court are higher, particularly at T2 (mainly due to 
jail as a sanction). Another item that stands out in Table 31 is that there is no cost to Probation 
for Drug Court because before 2005 there was no Probation involvement in the Drug Court 
program. These results confirm that the intention of the SACPA law is being followed in El 
Monte in that eligible drug offenders are being given treatment instead of incarceration. 
6B. OUTCOME COSTS FOR DRUG COURTS AND SACPA 
Of particular interest to state and local policymakers and managers are the financial impacts on 
the agencies that support the criminal justice system as the result of the operation of Drug Court 
and SACPA. These outcome costs are shown below. Outcome transactions for this study include 
re-arrests, time on probation, jail and prison time served, jail bookings, new court cases, and 
                                                 
50 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
51 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
52 Total costs in this row may not equal those in the costs by transaction table due to rounding. 
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victimizations (person and property charges). These outcomes are measured for 3 years after 
program entry. All costs are calculated (or adjusted from the statewide study to) 2006-2007 
dollars. Costs are calculated based on means adjusted for any differences between the two groups 
on demographics, drug of choice, criminal history and time incarcerated. (The unit costs for 
these transactions were presented in the results for Policy Question #5, earlier in this document.) 
San Joaquin Drug Court and SACPA Outcome Costs 
Outcome Costs by Transaction. Table 32 presents the average number of outcome transactions 
(re-arrests, subsequent court cases, jail days, etc.) per participant for the San Joaquin Drug Court 
pre-SACPA, the San Joaquin SACPA program and the San Joaquin Drug Court post-SACPA. 
Table 32. San Joaquin Outcome Transactions per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug 
Court, SACPA and Post-SACPA Drug Court  
Transaction 
Mean # of 
Transactions per 
Participant San 
Joaquin Drug 
Court T1
53 
N = 202 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
per Participant 
San Joaquin 
SACPA 
N = 395 
Mean # of 
Transactions per 
Participant SJ 
Drug Court T2
54 
N = 128 
Re-arrests  2.22  4.20  4.15 
Court Cases  1.34  1.35  1.40 
Jail Bookings   3.14  2.99  3.38 
Jail Days  144.83  62.45  95.78 
Probation Days  459.74  225.92  544.67 
Prison Days  86.22  80.41  57.03 
Victimizations – 
Person Crimes  0.25  0.39  0.27 
Victimizations – 
Property Crimes  0.32  0.78  0.98 
 
Table 32 illustrates that, even after controlling for prior arrests and time incarcerated, re-arrests 
were almost twice as high for SACPA participants compared to Drug Court participants at Time 
1 (pre-SACPA). There is some evidence that arrest rates rose statewide in the time from Time 1 
to Time 2. However, the increase in arrest rates was just 10%, which does not account for the 
large differences in this data. SACPA participants had fewer jail bookings, jail days, and 
probation days compared to the Drug Court at Time 1. The lower probation days for SACPA 
participants are due to the SACPA participants being on probation while they are participating in 
the program, therefore that probation time was accounted for in investment costs and is not 
included in outcomes. SACPA participants had more person and property crimes than Drug 
Court participants at Time 1. 
                                                 
53 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
54 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
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Table 32, above, shows that there is very little difference in outcomes between participants of 
SACPA and Drug Court at Time 2. SACPA participants had less time in jail in the 3 years after 
program entry, but more time in prison. 
Overall, the results on the outcome resources used by SACPA participants compared to Drug 
Court participants are somewhat ambiguous with SACPA participants engaging in slightly more 
criminal activity but spending less time on probation and in jail outside the program.  
Table 33 below shows the total cost for each type of outcome transaction (number of transactions 
times the cost per transaction) for the San Joaquin Drug Court pre-SACPA, the San Joaquin 
SACPA program and the San Joaquin Drug Court post-SACPA. The sum of these outcome 
transactions for each program is the total per participant outcome cost. 
Table 33. San Joaquin Outcome Costs per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug Court 
(T1), Post-SACPA Drug Court (T2) and SACPA 
Transaction 
Unit 
Costs 
Mean Cost per 
Participant 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T1
55 
N = 202 
Mean Cost per 
Participant 
San Joaquin 
SACPA 
N = 395 
Mean Cost per 
Participant 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T2
56 
N = 128 
Re-arrests  $216.08  $480  $908  $897 
Court Cases  $2,265.93  $3,036  $3,059  $3,172 
Jail Bookings   $152.12  $478  $455  $514 
Jail Days  $103.64  $15,010  $6,472  $9,927 
Probation Days  $0.83  $382  $188  $452 
Prison Days  $93.56  $8,067  $7,523  $5,336 
Total    $27,453  $18,605  $20,298 
Victimizations – 
Person Crimes  $38,414.00  $9,604  $14,981  $10,372 
Victimizations – 
Property Crimes  $11,858.00  $3,795  $9,249  $11,621 
Total w/ 
Victimizations    $40,852  $42,835  $42,291 
 
As seen in Table 33, in spite of higher numbers of re-arrests for SACPA participants, there was 
no significant difference in outcome costs between Drug Court participants and SACPA 
participants. This is due to less time in jail for SACPA participants so, although arrest costs are 
higher, jail costs are lower. There wasn‘t much variation in total outcome costs per participant 
between the programs in San Joaquin County. SACPA did have the highest outcome costs per 
                                                 
55 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
56 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
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participant, but it was only 1% higher than that of Drug Court post-SACPA and 5% higher than 
that of Drug Court pre-SACPA. When victimization costs are excluded, SACPA actually had the 
lowest outcome costs of the 3 groups ($18,605 versus $27,453 for Drug Court T1 and $20,298 
for Drug Court T2), due to less jail time for SACPA participants, although this difference is not 
significant.  
Outcome Costs by Agency. Table 34 provides the San Joaquin outcome costs by agency for 
SACPA and Drug Courts. 
Table 34. San Joaquin Agency Outcome Costs per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug 
Court (T1), SACPA and Post-SACPA Drug Court (T2) 
Agency 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T1
57 
N = 202 
San Joaquin 
SACPA 
N = 395 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court 
T2
58 
N = 128 
Superior Court  $1,571  $1,582  $1,641 
District Attorney  $680  $685  $710 
Public Defender  $786  $792  $821 
Probation  $382  $188  $452 
Law Enforcement  $15,968  $7,835  $11,338 
Department of 
Corrections and 
Rehabilitation 
$8,067  $7,523  $5,336 
Victimizations  $13,398  $24,231  $21,993 
Total
59  $40,852  $42,836  $42,291 
 
Table 34 further illustrates the point that, aside from victimization costs, the CA Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation and Law Enforcement bear the largest portion of outcome costs 
for all 3 groups in San Joaquin County but with Law Enforcement spending much more on Drug 
Court participants due to more time in jail. Outcome costs for the Superior Court, District 
Attorney, Public Defender, and Probation were all much lower and showed less variation 
between groups. Costs for prison are higher for SACPA participants than Drug Courts post-
SACPA but lower for jail. Overall, the outcome costs for San Joaquin SACPA participants were 
not significantly different from those for Drug Court participants. This is true in spite of 
differences in the San Joaquin Drug Court participant population, such as a more extensive 
addiction history at Time 2. 
                                                 
57 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
58 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
59 Total costs in this row may not equal those in the costs by transaction table due to rounding. 
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El Monte Drug Court and SACPA Outcome Costs 
Outcome Costs by Transaction. Table 35 presents the average number of outcome transactions 
(re-arrests, subsequent court cases, jail days, etc.) per participant for the El Monte Drug Court 
pre-SACPA, the El Monte SACPA program and the El Monte Drug Court post-SACPA. 
Table 35. El Monte Outcome Transactions per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug Court 
(T1), Post-SACPA Drug Court (T2) and SACPA 
Transaction 
Mean # of 
Transactions per 
Participant  
El Monte 
Drug Court T1
60 
N = 127 
Mean # of 
Transactions per 
Participant  
El Monte SACPA 
N = 313 
Mean # of 
Transactions per 
Participant  
El Monte Drug 
Court T2
61 
N = 147 
Re-arrests  1.68  2.78  2.64 
Court Cases  0.52  1.05  1.02 
Jail Bookings   1.50  2.58  1.69 
Jail Days (Men)  69.77  75.18  62.35 
Jail Days (Women)  49.51  59.19  32.59 
Probation Days  262.92  135.12  516.31 
Prison Days  22.59  80.69  82.65 
Victimizations – 
Person Crimes  0.08  0.17  0.12 
Victimizations – 
Property Crimes  0.30  0.38  0.33 
Note: The means presented in this table are adjusted based on gender, ethnicity, age, prior number of arrests, 
time incarcerated, and drug of choice. It was not possible to control for addiction level as that data was not 
available in the treatment databases for both Drug Court and SACPA programs. 
 
Table 35 illustrates that re-arrests and the number of subsequent court cases were higher (and 
significantly different) for SACPA than for Drug Court at Time 1 (before SACPA). Jail 
bookings, jail days, and victimizations were all higher while probation was lower for SACPA 
than Drug Court at Time 1. One of the reasons the amount of probation is lower for SACPA 
participants in this table is that probation is a part of the SACPA program and therefore is not 
included in outcomes until participants have left the program.  
Drug Court at Time 2 (post-SACPA) had more time on probation after Drug Court entry than 
SACPA but less time in jail. Other types of transactions were not significantly different between 
SACPA and Drug Court Time 2. 
Table 36 below shows the total cost for each type of outcome transaction (number of transactions 
times the cost per transaction) for the El Monte Drug Court pre-SACPA, the El Monte SACPA 
                                                 
60 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
61 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
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program and the El Monte Drug Court post-SACPA. The sum of these outcome transactions for 
each program is the total per participant outcome cost of that program. 
Table 36. El Monte Outcome Costs per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug Court (T1), 
Post-SACPA Drug Court (T2) and SACPA 
Transaction  Unit Costs 
Mean Cost per 
Participant  
El Monte Drug 
Court T1
62 
N = 127 
Mean Cost per 
Participant  
El Monte 
SACPA 
N = 313 
Mean Cost per 
Participant  
El Monte Drug 
Court T2
63 
N = 147 
Re-arrests  $457.18       $768       $1,271       $1,207 
Court Cases  $2,030.56       $1,056       $2,132       $2,071 
Jail Bookings   $742.23       $1,113       $1,915       $1,254 
Jail Days (Men)  $68.21       $4,759       $5,128       $4,253 
Jail Days (Women)  $84.44       $4,181       $4,998       $2,752 
Probation Days  $4.43       $1,165       $599       $2,287 
Prison Days  $93.56       $2,114       $7,549       $7,733 
Total         $15,156       $23,592       $21,557 
Victimizations – 
Person Crimes  $38,414.00  $3,073  $6,530  $4,610 
Victimizations – 
Property Crimes  $11,858.00  $3,557  $4,506  $3,913 
Total w/ 
Victimizations    $21,786  $34,628  $30,080 
 
As seen in Table 36, total outcome costs over 3 years in El Monte were significantly higher for 
SACPA ($34,628) than for Drug Court at Time 1 ($21,786), while costs for Drug Court at Time 
2 ($30,080) were not significantly different than SACPA outcome costs. Excluding victimization 
costs does not change the relative proportion of costs. After controlling for differences in 
demographics, prior arrests and time incarcerated, the Drug Court program before SACPA was 
implemented performed significantly better than SACPA or the Drug Court program after 
SACPA implementation. 
                                                 
62 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
63 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
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Outcome Costs by Agency. Table 37 provides the per participant outcome costs by agency. 
Table 37. El Monte Agency Outcome Costs per Participant for pre-SACPA Drug 
Court (T1), SACPA and Post-SACPA Drug Court (T2) 
Agency 
El Monte Drug 
Court T1
64 
N = 127 
El Monte SACPA 
N = 313 
El Monte Drug 
Court T2
65 
N = 147 
Superior Court  $640  $1,292  $1,255 
District Attorney  $152  $307  $298 
Public Defender  $264  $534  $518 
Probation  $1,165  $599  $2,287 
Law Enforcement  $10,822  $13,312  $9,466 
Department of 
Corrections and 
Rehabilitation 
$2,114  $7,549  $7,733 
Victimizations  $6,631  $11,036  $8,523 
Total
66  $21,788  $34,629  $30,080 
 
When looking at El Monte outcome costs over 3 years by agency, law enforcement‘s portion of 
costs clearly stands out as the highest for all three programs, followed by victimizations and then 
the CA Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. However, law enforcement spends 
significantly more on outcome costs for SACPA participants than Drug Court at either time 
period. Otherwise, all agencies aside from Probation spend less on Drug Court participants 
before SACPA implementation.  
6C. SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT AND SACPA COSTS 
Program Investment Costs 
Figure 15 presents the cost per participant for the Drug Court and SACPA programs in San 
Joaquin while Figure 16 presents the cost per participant for the Drug Court and SACPA 
programs in El Monte. 
                                                 
64 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
65 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
66 Total costs in this row may not equal those in the costs by transaction table due to rounding. 
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Figure 15. Program Costs: Cost per offender for San Joaquin SACPA, Drug Court Pre-
SACPA (T1) and Drug Court Post-SACPA (T2) 
 
 
Figure 15 illustrates that San Joaquin program investment costs for SACPA are almost 3 times 
that of Drug Court pre-SACPA or post-SACPA. It also shows that program investment costs 
from both Drug Court time periods didn‘t vary much after the implementation of SACPA. Figure 
16, below, provides a similar finding for El Monte with the investment cost in the SACPA 
program 3 times the cost of Drug Court pre-SACPA and nearly twice the investment of Drug 
Court post-SACPA. The majority of the high investment costs for the SACPA program are due 
to treatment costs. These treatment costs are based on program treatment data showing actual 
time spent in treatment (not time in the program) for both Drug Court and SACPA participants. 
Figure 16 also shows that program investment costs in the El Monte Drug Court jumped 
considerably from T1 to T2. 
Figure 16. Program Costs: Investment Cost per Participant for El Monte SACPA, Drug 
Court Pre-SACPA (T1) and Drug Court Post-SACPA (T2) 
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In sum, program investment costs for SACPA are significantly higher than Drug Court program 
costs due almost entirely to the amount of resources spent on treatment for SACPA participants. 
Outcome Costs 
Figure 17 provides the outcome (recidivism related) costs over time for the Drug Court and 
SACPA participants in San Joaquin. 
Figure 17. Outcome Costs Over 3 years (Cumulative): Costs per Offender for San 
Joaquin SACPA, Drug Court Pre-SACPA (T1) and Drug Court Post-SACPA (T2) 
 
 
As seen in Figure 17, San Joaquin outcome costs over 3 years amongst the 3 groups were 
virtually indistinguishable. While there was some variation from year to year, the total outcome 
costs were highest for SACPA, followed closely by Drug Court post-SACPA and then Drug 
Court pre-SACPA. 
Figure 18, below, presents the outcome costs per participant over time for El Monte Drug Court 
and SACPA programs.  
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Figure 18. Outcome Costs Over 3 Years: Cost per Offender for El Monte SACPA, Drug 
Court Pre-SACPA (T1) and Drug Court Post-SACPA (T2) 
 
Figure 18 shows that outcome costs over 3 years in El Monte were very different for the 3 
groups. SACPA participants had the highest outcome costs, then Drug Court post-SACPA and 
finally Drug Court pre-SACPA. Outcome costs for Drug Court at Time 1 appear to taper off, 
while outcome costs for SACPA appear to continue to rise over time. 
In both counties, Drug Court participant outcomes cost less than SACPA participants‘ outcomes 
(though not significantly in the case of San Joaquin.) The conclusion here is that Drug Courts 
perform as well as or better than SACPA programs with a more difficult population. 
Total Costs per Drug Court and SACPA Participant 
As stated earlier in this report, the bottom line for costs is really the total cost (program 
investment plus outcome costs) per participant. Overall, the key cost question is which program 
participants cost the taxpayers the least? 
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Figure 19. Total Costs: Program Investment plus Outcome Cost per Offender for San 
Joaquin Drug Court Pre-SACPA (T1), the SACPA Program and Drug Court Post-
SACPA (T2) 
 
 
When program investment and outcome costs over 3 years are combined (as in Figure 19), the 
full picture of the cost to taxpayers becomes clear. In San Joaquin County, the total cost per 
participant for SACPA ($52,962) stands out well over the cost Drug Court pre-SACPA 
($44,461) and Drug Court post-SACPA ($46,027). This is a difference of 19% between Drug 
Court pre-SACPA and SACPA, and a difference of 15% between Drug Court post-SACPA and 
SACPA. Figure 19 also shows that an increase in total costs did occur for the Drug Court 
program from pre- to post-SACPA, possibly due to the implementation of SACPA.  
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Figure 20. Total Costs. Program Investment Plus Outcome Cost per Offender for El 
Monte SACPA, Drug Court Pre-SACPA (T1) and Drug Court Post-SACPA (T2) 
 
 
Figure 20 illustrates the total cost to taxpayers for SACPA, Drug Court pre-SACPA and Drug 
Court post-SACPA in El Monte. Total program investment and outcome costs over 3 years are 
clearly highest for SACPA ($50,102), followed by Drug Court T2 ($40,042) and then Drug 
Court T1 ($27,134). There is a difference of 85% between Drug Court pre-SACPA and SACPA, 
and a difference of 25% between Drug Court post-SACPA and SACPA.  
Overall, the costs for SACPA in both sites are higher. For a significantly lower investment cost, 
the Drug Court model produced outcomes as good as or better than SACPA outcomes, resulting 
in lower costs for Drug Courts over all. From these total costs, it is clear that the Drug Court 
model outperforms the non-Drug Court treatment models. However, the SACPA programs can 
provide treatment to substantially more offenders than the current Drug Court programs in these 
counties.  
The next step after this conclusion is then to determine how the Drug Court program model can 
be brought to a much larger number of participants. There are Drug Courts in other states that 
serve high number of participants (e.g., the Multnomah County Drug Court in Portland, Oregon 
has enrolled and served up to 1,200 participants per year). Lessons from the larger (successful) 
Drug Courts may be of use to bring Drug Court ―to scale.‖ In addition, thought must be taken in 
how to provide the personal team approach of the Drug Court model to large numbers of 
participants. It may be necessary to increase the number of Drug Courts and Drug Court teams 
per county, perhaps focusing the Drug Court models on different types of offenders based on 
drug of choice, level of addiction or criminal history. This is discussed further in the final 
summary and conclusions for this paper. 
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LIMITATIONS  
There are several limitations to this study. This section of the report describes these limitations 
and what was done during the course of the study to compensate for them. 
One limitation is related to the use of the historical sample of Drug Court participants. Although 
the existence of the data on the Drug Court sample pre-SACPA is one of the strengths of this 
study, there are changes over time, besides changes due to the implementation of the SACPA 
program, which could account for differences between the Drug Court programs at the different 
time periods. For example, there was an increase in re-arrest rates statewide and in the specific 
counties between 1999 and 2003 of approximately 10%. This could explain the higher number of 
prior arrests for the SACPA and Drug Court cohorts in 2002-2003 (after SACPA) compared to 
the Drug Court cohorts in 1998-1999. This could also explain some of the increase in recidivism 
from one time to the next. However, this 10% increase is not large enough to change the 
direction or the significance of differences found. Although there could be changes over time 
outside of those influenced by these programs, one of the strengths of these study sites is that the 
majority of the staff for the Drug Court programs at the two time periods remained the same and, 
those interviewed provided information on the program policies and procedures that matched 
what we had learned about the programs in interviews performed in the earlier time period. 
In addition, this study was not able to measure differences in participant addiction levels or measure 
the amount of treatment experienced by participants prior to starting the Drug Court or SACPA 
programs or after exiting the programs. These data on treatment exist statewide at the California 
Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs. In spite of having successfully obtained this data for 
past studies and having followed all IRB procedures (including a HIPAA waiver) as requested by 
ADP and although the data were requested multiple times, starting over 12 months before the end 
of the study, the data were never provided to NPC. Therefore, although it is likely that Drug Court 
participants in 2002-2003 were more highly addicted than SACPA participants and had more prior 
treatment than SACPA participants, it was not possible to control for this in analyzing recidivism 
outcomes. However, in using the statewide data in previous studies, we have found that much of the 
data are incomplete and therefore the amount of treatment is under-reported. (For example, when a 
sample of drug court graduates, known to have experienced extensive treatment, was searched for 
in the statewide treatment data, over 30% could not be found.)  
The lack of statewide treatment data was less of a concern in terms of cost as a large amount of 
detailed data was available locally for all program participants on treatment received while they 
participated in the programs, which covered the majority of the time period that participants were 
followed during the course of this study. Further, although there may have been additional costs 
for treatment after Drug Court or SACPA program exit which could not be accounted for in this 
study due to lack of this statewide treatment data, subsequent treatment was not a focus of 
outcomes for this study. The interpretation of a result in which additional treatment is obtained 
by participants of one program or another is somewhat ambiguous. Although additional 
treatment may result in a higher cost, it is also often considered a positive result when 
individuals continue to engage in treatment services. For this reason, the focus of this study on 
criminal justice recidivism outcomes may have added more clarity to the final conclusions. 
Finally, there is a limitation in our ability to generalize to other sites in California from this 
study. Although the detailed information and data available from the Drug Courts and SACPA in 
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this study was a strength of this research, the research was only performed in two counties. 
Given the differences found in the programs at these two sites, and given that each county in the 
state was given the ability to develop their own SACPA program model, it is likely that this 
model differs in every county. In addition, the research performed by Longshore et al. (2006), 
showed treatment and cost averages that differed from those found in this study. This is most 
likely due, in part, to the lack of detailed information available in Longshore‘s study that was 
available in this study as well as differences in sample selection between studies. However, this 
also provides further evidence that SACPA and Drug Court programs in other counties that 
participated in Longshore‘s research operate differently and therefore had different results. To 
increase the generalizability of this study, it is recommended that future research repeat this 
detailed methodology in a greater number of counties.  
Although it may not be possible to generalize to every county in the state of California, there are 
clear lessons to be learned from these results in terms of the relative effectiveness of the Drug 
Court model (with practices that have been shown to be effective in other settings such as court 
supervision, rewards and sanctions and participant accountability) compared to other program 
models such as those demonstrated at these two study sites. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
ver the past decade in the United States there has been a trend toward changing 
criminal justice policy to provide treatment as an alternative to incarceration for 
nonviolent drug offenders. Two main models have emerged that are aimed at effecting 
this change. One model is Drug Court; the other is statewide policy reformation, mandating 
treatment for all nonviolent drug offenders. 
The overall purpose of this study was twofold: 
  To examine the varying effectiveness of the two models for treating substance abusing 
offenders measured in terms of participant completion rates, criminal recidivism and 
cost/benefit; 
  To determine the impact of statewide mandated treatment policy reform on the operation 
of Drug Courts. 
The results for this study were organized around six policy questions and are summarized in the 
following text. 
Policy Question #1: How have the Drug Court and statewide mandated treatment models been 
implemented locally and how do they differ? 
There are several key differences between the Drug Court model and the SACPA model. One 
obvious difference is capacity. SACPA is designed to treat all eligible offenders well beyond the 
current capacity of Drug Court programs. The ability to provide treatment to a large number of 
offenders is a large benefit of SACPA. In addition, SACPA uses a larger number of treatment 
providers than the Drug Court programs. The benefit of this is the ability to provide participants 
with the treatment specific for the needs. The drawback is that it is more difficult to coordinate 
and determine the quality of the treatment with a larger number of providers and it can be 
difficult for supervision to consistently receive communications on participant progress.  
The length of stay for participants in SACPA is longer, and longer time in treatment is known to 
be associated with better outcomes. However, the treatment received in SACPA during that time 
may not be consistent, depending on whether the participant follows through on their treatment 
plan. This is in contrast to the Drug Court model where the high level of court supervision 
enforces participant attendance at treatment. 
The Drug Court model performs several activities that result in a high level of participant 
monitoring including court sessions, treatment sessions, and drug tests. In addition to learning 
to deal with their substance abuse issues in treatment, participants learn to modify their 
inappropriate behaviors from feedback provided by the Drug Court team. Appropriate behavior 
is rewarded and inappropriate behavior is sanctioned so that participants are accountable for 
their behavior either way. 
The successful completion of Drug Court, for each participant, is decided by a team who follow 
a clear list of requirements. The completion of SACPA is not standardized and is decided mainly 
from reports on treatment completion by individual treatment providers who may use very 
different criteria. Finally, the successful completion of Drug Court is called ―graduation‖ and is 
O 
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marked by a ceremony and celebration. There is no special marking of SACPA completion aside 
from a certificate of completion. 
In summary, the Drug Court model is more personal, including a much higher level of 
supervision and participant accountability while the SACPA program reaches and provides 
treatment to a much larger number of individuals making a more personal model more 
challenging. 
Policy Question #2: How have Drug Courts adjusted (how have Drug Court process and policies 
changed) with the implementation of state-mandated non-Drug Court treatment programs?  
One of the main findings for this question was that overall there was very little to no change in 
the basic Drug Court policies and procedures. However, there were some external changes that 
may have impacted Drug Court operations and effectiveness. 
Funding for the Drug Court programs was perceived to have decreased with the passage of 
SACPA. Some staff perceived that the Drug Court program was now competing for scarce 
treatment resources with SACPA.  
With the implementation of SACPA, the continuum of criminal justice diversion programs 
expanded. The role of the Drug Court program began to shift in response. After some confusion 
as to whether participants could go back and forth between programs, increasingly, the Drug 
Court programs are viewed as the next sequential step after a client has unsuccessfully 
participated in SACPA. The Drug Court now serves as a more intensive service option for those 
who are not succeeding under the less stringent criteria of the SACPA program. The Drug Court 
has also changed at what point in the case process they exist, changing from more pre-plea to 
post-plea. 
And finally, there was a perceived change in the participant population with Drug Court 
participants becoming increasingly more addicted and more criminal by the time they enter the 
Drug Court program. This perception was confirmed by the available data on the Drug Court 
participants before and after SACPA implementation. 
Policy Question #3: What is the success rate of Drug Court programs before the implementation of 
state-mandated non-Drug Court treatment programs compared to the success rate of Drug Court 
programs after? 
Drug Court participants received similar treatment services and court supervision before and 
after SACPA implementation, although data available at one site showed a significantly longer 
time from arrest to Drug Court entry after SACPA. It is probable that the increased time is due to 
offenders entering the Drug Courts after first spending extended time in the SACPA program. 
This means that the Drug Courts can no longer reasonably follow the third key component of 
Drug Court, that eligible offenders are identified quickly and promptly placed in the Drug Court 
program. 
Recidivism increased significantly for Drug Court participants after SACPA implementation. 
The increased recidivism was significant even after taking into account any differences in 
demographics, criminal history, time incarcerated and drug of choice. Because the Drug Court 
programs showed little to no change in policies or procedures, the most likely explanation for 
this is the change in the Drug Court population after SACPA to more addicted population at the 
time of entry. It is also likely that the extended time from arrest to entry into the Drug Court 
program, as well as participants‘ experience with SACPA treatment, had an effect on how the 
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participants perceived the Drug Court program and Drug Court treatment. Perhaps these 
participants become more jaded after experiencing and failing at treatment more than once, 
rendering the next treatment experience less effective. 
Policy Question #4: What is the relative success rate (measured by program completion rate and 
recidivism) of the Drug Court program model compared to court mandated non-Drug Court 
treatment models? 
SACPA participants spent significantly more time in the SACPA program than the Drug Court 
participants at either time period. Drug Court participants before SACPA show significantly 
lower recidivism compared to SACPA program participants and Drug Court program 
participants after SACPA implementation. While the recidivism for Drug Court participants after 
SACPA implementation was lower, it did not differ significantly from SACPA participants.  
These results imply that the Drug Court model, before the changes that have occurred since 
SACPA implementation, was significantly more effective in getting drug offenders to complete 
treatment and in lowering criminal justice recidivism than state-mandated treatment models with 
less personalized supervision and no option for incarceration as a sanction. 
These results also imply that the Drug Court model may (understandably) be less effective with a 
more criminal, more heavily addicted population than it was with a less criminal, less addicted 
population. However, even with a more criminal population than SACPA, Drug Court performed 
at least as well, or better, than the SACPA programs in terms of criminal justice related outcomes 
in these two counties. 
Policy Question #5: What are the investment and outcome costs of Drug Courts before the 
implementation of the state-mandated non-Drug Court treatment programs compared to after 
implementation? 
Drug Court program investment costs increased in both programs from pre-SACPA to post-
SACPA, though this was significant only in one site. Outcome costs over 3 years for El Monte 
Drug Court participants were higher for participants who entered Drug Court after SACPA 
implementation than for participants who entered before SACPA. The difference between the 
two grows over time, with post-SACPA participants showing increasingly higher costs. For San 
Joaquin, in spite of the increased number of re-arrests, the decrease in days in jail led to no 
significant difference in outcome costs for Drug Court before and after SACPA. It may be that 
the decrease in jail time is due to SACPA changes in the use of jail for drug crimes. 
Unfortunately, the lower use of jail time did not lead to less crime, as the data showed a 
significant increase in re-arrests in the same time period. 
Putting both the investment costs and the outcome cost together, we find that in San Joaquin 
there is no significant difference in costs for all participants from pre-SACPA to post-SACPA. 
The increase in re-arrests post-SACPA is balanced out by the decrease in jail time. 
However, in El Monte total costs rose by 48% after SACPA implementation. The increase in 
costs in El Monte is due largely to the increased use of jail (or in-jail treatment) for Drug Court 
participants post-SACPA and higher recidivism (including re-arrests and prison time) for Drug 
Court participants post-SACPA. For El Monte, it appears that the implementation of SACPA 
caused Drug Court costs to the taxpayer to rise significantly, probably due to the increase in 
addiction and criminality of the participants.   
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Policy Question #6: What are the relative investment and outcome costs of Drug Courts compared 
to state-mandated non-Drug Court treatment programs? 
SACPA produced much higher per person program investment costs than Drug Courts. This is 
largely a function of the greater amount of treatment experienced by SACPA participants. Drug 
Courts had less treatment but were more likely to lead to treatment completion. While SACPA 
participants had a higher number of re-arrests than Drug Court participants, their overall outcome 
costs were similar due to less jail time for SACPA participants. Unfortunately, this provides 
evidence that decreased jail time for SACPA participants was related to more crime. 
Overall, the total per person costs were substantially higher for SACPA participants than for 
Drug Court participants at either time period. For a significantly lower investment cost, the Drug 
Court model produced outcomes as good as or better than SACPA outcomes, resulting in lower 
costs over all. Although the data showed that Drug Court participants spent less time in 
treatment, the results of this study suggest that the Drug Court model is more efficient in 
treatment delivery and produces better outcomes. 
Overall Conclusions  
SACPA represents a broad based policy initiative aimed at reducing rates of incarceration and 
increasing recovery rates for low level, non-violent drug involved offenders. SACPA devotes 
considerable resources to treatment of those offenders. The policy initiative was developed 
without the use of interventions deemed effective in other researched and evaluated initiatives 
such as the Drug Court model. For example, SACPA did not use criminal justice leverage or 
sanctions found to be effective Drug Courts. Consequently, retention in the SACPA and in 
treatment was lower than might have been anticipated. Nevertheless, on a large scale, California 
diverted many more people to treatment than the Drug Courts alone. In other words, treatment 
access was significantly increased. Further, it is likely that the total number of participants who 
entered recovery and did not recidivate exceeds the total number of Drug Court participants in 
recovery, even though the rates for Drug Court were higher. 
Therefore, the state-mandated treatment in California (SACPA) has succeeded in two important 
ways that were central to its initial logic. First, it has provided an enormous benefit in being able 
to reach nearly all eligible offenders and offer treatment for their substance use issues instead of 
incarceration. Second, it has allowed offenders to have more total treatment than Drug Court. In 
this sense, it has had a much greater impact on the total system of offenders than Drug Court that 
often serves only a small number of offenders.  
Yet, the Drug Court model has shown significantly greater success at producing higher rates of 
treatment completion and lower recidivism. And it accomplishes this with a significantly lower 
per person taxpayer investment. In short, from these data it can be suggested that SACPA 
succeeds in providing more treatment but the Drug Court model, with its closer judicial 
supervision, as well as the behavioral change model of rewards and sanctions, produces better 
outcomes for less money. This provides support for the idea that treatment alone, at least for 
some drug offenders, is insufficient to sustain changes in drug use and criminal behaviors. 
Overall, it appears that the Drug Court model is a more efficient use of resources. 
It is clear that the Drug Court model is much more personalized and focused on behavior change. 
Observations during the course of this study of staff interaction with participants in both Drug 
Court and SACPA programs, particularly in court sessions, showed a much more interactive and 
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individualized approach. As one staff member, who works on both SACPA and Drug Court 
programs said, ―I love Drug Court. It‘s more intense. It humanizes the person and I get to know 
the client.‖ It is likely that the sheer size of the SACPA program makes the kind of personal 
interaction that occurs in the Drug Court program difficult to implement. To introduce this kind 
of personal attention into SACPA would require many more non-treatment staff (possibly several 
Drug Court teams serving smaller groups of clients would be necessary). Given that the Drug 
Court programs before SACPA implementation outperformed both SACPA and Drug Court 
post-SACPA and given that SACPA treatment was vastly more expensive than Drug Court 
treatment, this provides support for a plan of ―taking Drug Courts to scale.‖ The personal 
attention given to Drug Court participants from multiple collaborating agencies as well as the use 
of rewards and sanctions to produce behavior change, are key components that make this model 
effective. Shifting some of the funding from treatment (by having participants spend less time in 
treatment) to provide staff from other agencies the ability to form multiple Drug Court teams and 
be trained in the Drug Court model may be a valid option. 
In addition, recent work by Marlowe, et al. (2006) indicates that drug offenders at lower risk 
levels perform better with lower supervision (and perhaps no judge supervision at all) while 
higher risk offenders perform better with more intense supervision. In addition, as discussed 
earlier, Longshore et al. (2006) suggested that Drug Court may be more effective for more 
criminal, more highly addicted offenders than the SACPA programs that do not follow the Drug 
Court model. One option for SACPA may be to include a range of supervision levels based on 
offender risk level so that higher risk offenders can receive the level of supervision most 
effective for behavior change (the Drug Court model). It would be important to place offenders 
at high risk directly into the Drug Court model, rather than attempting lower supervision first and 
setting them up to fail, which appears to be commonly occurring in SACPA programs. 
As discussed in the introduction to this report, there are many supporters for the idea of 
modifying SACPA programs to add the accountability provided by the Drug Court model. One 
step that has been taken recently by the Governor is to modify the state budget so that 2007-08 
SACPA funding is reduced by $60 million and is utilized to provide an increase to the Offender 
Treatment Program (OTP). As the OTP contains some of the Proposition 36 reforms (including 
more supervision and jail sanctions) sought by the Administration, increasing funding for the 
OTP will allow the state to implement these and other reforms that they believe will lead to 
improved program performance and client outcomes.  
As described in the cost methodology, NPC‘s cost approach looks at publicly funded costs as 
―opportunity resources.‖ The concept of opportunity cost from the economic literature suggests 
that system resources are available to be used in other contexts if they are not spent on a 
particular transaction. The term opportunity resource describes these resources that are now 
available for different use. Since the results from this study show that significantly more 
resources are committed to SACPA treatment than Drug Court treatment without any added 
benefit in participant outcomes, some of the resources committed to SACPA treatment may be 
better spent in funding additional staff from collaborating criminal justice and other agencies to 
increase supervision and to adjust SACPA programs to something closer to the Drug Court 
model, including consequences for offenders who do not attend treatment (such as jail sanctions) 
and rewards for those who are doing well. (Both sanctions and rewards are important for 
behavior change. While sanctions provide information for what not to do, rewards provide 
information on the correct thing to do.) This is currently exactly what is occurring with SACPA 
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funding moving to OTP. If the reforms to Proposition 36 agreed to by the Legislature are not 
implemented, the Administration will revise its budget proposal to move all remaining 
Proposition 36 funding to the OTP. 
If the resources could be provided for the SACPA to be expanded to include Drug Court 
practices that have been shown to be effective in reducing substance abuse and reducing 
recidivism, (or Drug Court could be expanded to include a larger number of drug offenders), 
then this form of state-mandated treatment could be an effective benefit resulting in cost savings 
for the state of California. Other states considering statewide treatment reform should take into 
account the clear benefits demonstrated by the Drug Court model in this study, as well as the 
myriad of Drug Court studies showing positive outcomes for Drug Court participants. 
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Typology Interview Guide: Prop 36/Drug Court Combined Version w/ 
TICA questions (Time period of sample – 2002-2003) 
 
 
Respondent Information [Contacts Database: please check accuracy and spelling] 
1.  Interview Date: _________________________ 
2.  Prop 36 Site: ___________________________ Drug Court Site: 
________________________ 
3.  Respondent‘s Name: ____________________________________NPC ID 
#_______________ 
4.  Respondent‘s Title: _____________________________________ 
5.  Respondent‘s Organization: _______________________________ 
 (Get the precise designation- including categories such as: division, bureau, unit, etc.) 
6.  Respondent‘s email: _____________________________________ 
7.  Respondent‘s direct telephone number_______________________ 
 
CONTACT LOG 
Date                  Result 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Background 
 
8.  Are you involved in Prop 36 and/or Drug Court? When did you become involved with 
the Prop 36/Drug Court program? [Contacts Database] 
 
9. Can you describe the implementation process of Prop 36/Drug Court in your county? Who 
was responsible for implementing the plan in your county? Who approves changes made to 
the program? [1] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Role (Activities and Time Spent) 
 
One of the main purposes of this study is to determine more accurate costs for both Prop 36- 
related and Drug Court-related activities. To determine these costs we need to learn about any 
activities you pursue for the Prop 36 and Drug Court programs and your estimate of how much 
time you spend performing those activities. 
 
10. What is your role (or what do you do) in the Prop 36/Drug Court program (or at your 
agency)? Can you briefly describe your activities? (Probe: attending sessions, team 
meetings, writing progress reports, case management, counseling, phone calls, prep time, 
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coordinating services, supervising employees, etc.) [Contacts Database, 22-30, Cost 
Table] 
 
11. (If this person has been there since the time of our sample) Were those activities different 
at the time of our sample (2002-2003)? If so, how were they different? [Cost Table, 1, 
43] 
 
12. How many hours in an average week do you spend on Prop 36? How many hours in an 
average week do you spend on Drug Court? How many hours per week are spent on other 
NON-Prop 36/Drug Court activities? (The hours should total up to 40 hours for the 
average week, unless the person works part-time) [Cost Table, 22-30] 
 
13. If you had to divide up the time you spend on Drug Court/Prop 36 activities into the 
following categories, how many hours in an average week do you think you would put 
into each category? (Your best estimates are fine.) (Make sure ALL categories are divided 
up according by Drug Court/Prop 36; if the person is involved in both, make sure to ask 
the questions first for Drug Court, then ask the questions again for Prop 36) 
  
-DRUG COURT/PROP 36 (attending court sessions, attending team meetings & planning 
meetings, preparing for court, and doing progress reports on participants) 
 
-CASE MANAGEMENT (meeting with clients and making referrals, phone calls, answering 
questions, determining appropriate treatment, home visits, monitoring progress, contacting 
treatment providers, screenings and evaluations, assessments) 
 
-TREATMENT SESSIONS (preparing for and conducting individual or group treatment 
sessions) 
 
-DRUG TESTS (administering UAs and other drug tests) 
 
-COORDINATION AND/OR SUPERVISION (writing grants, data management, doing 
reports for the state, supervising employees, program development, doing the budget, billings 
and invoices, coordinating the courts, trainings) 
 
14. Who else does Prop 36/Drug Court activities in your organization? What do they do? 
(Some of these people will be interviewed separately to determine their time spent. Would 
you recommend I speak to them directly about their Prop 36/Drug Court activities, or 
can you tell me about what they do?) Can you estimate how much time they spend on it? 
[Cost Table, 22-30] 
 
15. What services does your agency provide to Prop 36/Drug Court clients and/or to the 
general public? [11, Cost Table] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court Goals 
 
16. What are the main goals of your prop 36/Drug Court program? [15] 
17. How does what you do in the process relate to these goals? [15] 
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18. What do you think would be good measures for whether you have reached the goals?  
[15] 
 
Prop 36: Eligibility  
 
19. Describe the case referral process. (How are eligible participants identified?) Who does 
the initial screening? (DA, PD, Probation Pre-trial Services?) [4, 6, 8] 
 
20. Who is responsible for final determination about program entry? (DA, PD, Judge?) [6] 
 
21. Which charges are targeted for entry? (Misdemeanors, felonies, or both? Possession, 
trafficking, under the influence, property offenses, etc.? Are non-drug offenses allowed?) 
[4, 6] 
 
22. What are the eligibility criteria? (Only nonviolent offenses? Limit on number of prior 
convictions?)     [6, 8] 
 
23. Can you describe the step-by-step process for determining eligibility? [4,6] 
 
24. What assessments are performed in determining eligibility? Is there a clinical substance 
abuse assessment conducted before entry? What screening instrument is used? Is there a 
mental health assessment conducted in the process of determining eligibility? Is mental 
health treatment a component of Prop 36 or are mental health cases excluded? (What is 
the assessment tool called? Who completes this assessment? How, if at all, is participant 
eligibility affected by the results?) [6,8] 
 
25. Are there ever exceptions to the eligibility restrictions? (Are some people allowed in that 
don’t exactly fit the requirements or that have one or more disqualifying factors?) [6] 
 
26. How is Prop 36 offered to each potential participant? (Is there an official letter from the 
District Attorney, are the offenders just asked in open court, etc.) How often do people 
refuse and what reasons do people give for refusing? [6,7] 
 
27. Has the eligibility process changed over time? [1, 6, 43] 
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Drug Court: Eligibility  
 
28. Is your drug program pre-plea or post-plea? (Note: post-plea includes post-conviction.  
Also include any further explanation from respondent) [3]   
 
29. Describe the Drug Court case referral process. (How are eligible participants identified?) 
Who does the initial screening? (DA, PD, Probation Pre-trial Services?) [4, 6, 8] 
 
30. Who is responsible for final determination about program entry? (DA, PD, Judge?) [6] 
 
31. Which charges are targeted for entry? (Misdemeanors, felonies, or both? Possession, 
trafficking, under the influence, property offenses, etc.? Are non-drug offenses allowed?) 
[4,6] 
 
32. Can you describe the eligibility criteria? (Only nonviolent offenses? Limit on number of 
prior convictions?). [6,8] 
 
33. Can you describe the step-by-step process for determining eligibility? [4, 6] 
 
34. What assessments are performed in determining eligibility? Is there a clinical substance 
abuse assessment conducted before entry? What screening instrument is used? Is there a 
mental health assessment conducted in the process of determining eligibility? Is mental 
health treatment a component of Drug Court or are mental health cases excluded? (What 
is the assessment tool called? Who completes this assessment? How, if at all, is 
participant eligibility affected by the results?) [6,8] 
 
35. Do you think that everyone who is eligible (based on their criminal history) is always 
referred to Drug Court? Other than people eligible for Prop 36, what are the 
circumstances under which an offender would not be referred to Drug Court who is 
technically eligible? [6, 42, 44] 
 
36. Are there ever exceptions to the eligibility restrictions? (Are some people allowed in that 
don’t exactly fit the requirements or that have one or more disqualifying factors?) [6] 
 
37. How is Drug Court offered to each potential participant? (Is there an official letter from 
the District Attorney, are the offenders just asked in open court, etc.) How often do 
people refuse and what reasons do people give for refusing? [6, 7] 
 
38. Has the eligibility determination process for Drug Court changed since the 
implementation of Prop 36? [1, 6, 43] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Participants 
 
39. Can you describe your Prop 36/Drug Court participants? (What are the most commonly 
used drugs by your Drug Court/Prop 36 participants? Are your participants mostly 
recreational users or hard-core addicts, or a mix?) [5] 
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40. Do you have any statistics or reports on your participants? [5, 40] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Bench Officer 
 
41. How is the bench officer (how were you) assigned to Prop 36/Drug Court? (Voluntary? 
Rotating assignment?) Is the length of time presiding over the monitoring court limited? 
What is the limit? If rotating assignment, how does the rotation work? [22, 23] 
 
42. Is there only one bench officer for Prop 36/Drug Court? If only one bench officer, does 
he/she (do you) hear other cases in addition to Prop 36/Drug Court? If there is more than 
one officer, how many are there and what are their roles and responsibilities? [22, 23] 
 
43. What are the bench officer‘s other roles and responsibilities for Prop 36/Drug Court? [22, 
23] 
 
44. Have there been other bench officers before (“you” or “the current bench officer”)? If 
so, who was the monitoring court bench officer (at the time of our sample)? [22, 23] 
 
45. Does the bench officer spend time on Prop 36/Drug Court activities beyond the time 
officially allocated for it? If yes, how much time and for what activities? [22, 23]  
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Coordinator 
 
46. What kind of paperwork or surveys on statistics or costs do you need to report for your 
Prop 36/Drug Court program? [40] 
 
47. What kind of information have you needed for grant proposals/paperwork/surveys? [40, 
44] 
 
48. What kind of cost information on Prop 36/Drug Court would be useful for you to have? 
[44, Cost Table] 
 
49. How has the Prop 36/Drug Court program been funded in the past and how is it funded 
now? [41] 
 
50. Do you have an evaluation and monitoring aspect to the Prop 36/Drug Court program? 
(Have you had process or outcome evaluations performed on your Prop 36/Drug Court 
program?) [40] 
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Prop 36 Team  
 
(Note: Most of these questions will be asked either in the initial phone calls or directly 
to the person who belongs to each role) 
 
51. Is there a Prop 36 coordinator? How many Prop 36 programs is the coordinator 
responsible for? By what agency is the coordinator employed? Who supervises the 
coordinator? [24] 
 
52. Is there a Prop 36 team? Who is part of it? (Prompt: Are there others who you feel are 
key to the Prop 36 process who are not on the team?) [19, 20] 
 
53. Are there regular court sessions for Prop 36 participants? Who attends Prop 36 sessions? 
(Prompt: Please include everybody in the courtroom, and whether they attend regularly 
or as needed. Specify their agency and position) [21, Cost Table] 
 
(Note: If there are no regular court sessions/hearings for Prop 36 participants and/or if 
there is no Prop 36 team the following questions do not apply) 
 
54. If there are regular court hearings, does the team meet outside of Prop 36 hearings? 
(Prompt: How often and for what purpose? Who attends regularly and who attends as 
needed? Do they talk mainly about policy issues or participant progress?) [21, Cost 
Table] 
 
55. When are Prop 36 sessions held and how long are they? How many clients typically 
attend one session? About how much time do you think is spent per participant in a 
typical Prop 36 session? [21, Cost Table] 
 
56. Are the bailiff/court security positions paid for by the court or by the Sheriff‘s 
Department? [21, Cost Table] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court Roles 
 
57. What is the role of the bench officer/judge? (Duties?) [22] 
 
58. What is the role of the coordinator? (Duties?) [24] 
 
59. What is the role of law enforcement? (Duties, level of involvement?) What do they do 
differently with Prop 36 vs. Drug Court cases? Do they do home visits? If so, how often 
and how long do they take? Are home visits required as part of the program? [29] 
 
60. Are home visits done for all Prop 36/Drug Court participants? What percentage of 
participants get home visits? How many home visits does the average Prop 36/Drug 
Court participant receive during his or her time in the program? [26, 29] 
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61. Do you have active warrants (in which law enforcement goes out to pick someone up) or 
do you have open bench warrants (in which a participant is picked up when stopped for 
something else)? [26,29] 
 
62. What is the role of the Probation Department? (Duties, level of involvement?) What do 
they do differently with Prop 36 vs. Drug Court cases? Do they do home visits? If so, 
how often, how long do they take, and who is involved? [26] 
 
63. What is the role of the Public Defender? (Level of involvement, etc.) [27] 
 
64. What is the role of the District Attorney? (Level of involvement, etc.) [28] 
 
65. Do the Public Defender and District Attorney use a non-adversarial approach in Prop 
36/Drug Court? Are their roles in Prop 36 different than what they would be in a regular 
court case/Drug Court? [27,28] 
 
66. Who provides primary management and coordination of treatment and rehabilitation 
services? (Probation, treatment services, Prop 36 staff?) [8, 9,25] 
 
67. Does the Prop 36/Drug Court team receive any training or continuing education? [31] 
 
68. How well do you feel the agencies involved in Prop 36/Drug Court work together?  (Give 
examples. Do the agencies integrate any services? Have partnerships developed between 
key agencies and with local community organizations? Is there cooperation and 
communication among team members?) [20, 42] 
 
Drug Court Team  
 
(Note: Most of these questions will be asked either in the initial phone calls or directly 
to the person who belongs to each role) 
 
69. Is there a Drug Court coordinator for this Drug Court? How many Drug Courts is the 
coordinator responsible for? By what agency is the coordinator employed? Who 
supervises the coordinator? [24] 
 
70. Is there a Drug Court team? Who is part of it? (Prompt: Are there others who you feel are 
key to the Drug Court process who are not on the team?) [19, 20] 
 
71. Does the team meet outside of Drug Court hearings? (Prompt: How often and for what 
purpose? Who attends regularly and who attends as needed? Do they talk mainly about 
policy issues or participant progress?) [20, 21, Cost Table] 
 
72. Who attends Drug Court sessions? (Prompt: Please include everybody in the courtroom, 
and whether they attend regularly or as needed. Specify their agency and position) [21, 
Cost Table] 
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73. When are Drug Court sessions held and how long are they? How many clients typically 
attend one session? About how much time do you think is spent per participant in a 
typical Drug Court session? [21, Cost Table] 
 
74. Are the bailiff/court security positions paid for by the court or by the Sheriff‘s 
Department? [21, Cost Table] 
 
75. Is the Drug Court team working together differently since the implementation of Prop 
36? [20,43] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Process/Phases 
 
76. What is the length of time between the participant‘s referral and entry into the Prop 
36/Drug Court program? [4] 
 
77. What is the length of time between the participant‘s arrest and entry into the Prop 
36/Drug Court program? [4] 
 
78. Does your Prop 36/Drug Court program have phases? If so, how many and how long do 
they last? [16] 
 
79. What are the requirements for each phase? (Include number of number of court 
appearances, UA’s, group and individual sessions, and the number of hours in each 
group and individual session) [17] 
 
80. Are there any specific requirements to move from one phase to the next phase? [17] 
 
81. Have the phases or the process changed over time? [16,17,43] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Treatment 
 
82. Does your agency provide treatment directly to Prop 36/Drug Court clients? [8,9] 
 
83. How many treatment providers are involved with Prop 36/Drug Court? Do you have the 
names and contact information for these providers? [9, Cost Table, Contacts Database] 
 
84. Is there a central intake? [8] 
 
85. What specific treatment services does each one offer to Prop 36/Drug Court participants? 
(Individual and group counseling, residential treatment, case management, acupuncture, 
mental health services) How long does each session typically last and how many 
participants attend each session?  [10,11, Cost Table] 
 
86. What other (non-D&A treatment) services are offered to Prop 36/Drug Court 
participants? (Parenting classes, GED, anger management, life skills training, job 
training, physical health services, AIDS education, etc.) [11, 12, Cost Table] 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.  Drug Courts and State Mandated Drug Treatment Programs: Outcomes, Costs, and Consequences   
130    March 2008 
 
87. What assessments are performed on Prop 36/Drug Court clients? (Please describe these 
tools. What are they called? Can we get a copy of the tool? Who completes this 
assessment? Who reviews it? How, if at all, is the treatment plan affected by the results?) 
[8] 
 
88. How many counselors at each provider are directly involved with Prop 36/Drug Court 
participants? [8,9, Cost Table] 
 
89. Who else at the treatment agencies is involved in Prop 36/Drug Court? [9] 
 
90. (If more than one treatment provider) How is it decided which Prop 36/Drug Court 
clients go to which treatment provider? [8] 
 
91. How many Prop 36/Drug Court clients does the treatment provider (do the treatment 
providers) serve [8, 9, Cost Table]? Who performs case management for Prop 36/Drug 
Court clients? [12,14, Cost Table] Who is required to report to court staff on treatment 
progress/compliance? [25] 
 
92. What funds are used to pay treatment providers for services for Prop 36/Drug Court 
clients? (Specific agency, Prop 36/Drug Court funds, private insurance, Medicaid, or 
other state/county/federal funds) How much is covered by each funding source? Which 
agency is the keeper of these funds? (In which agency’s budget are such funds 
allocated?) [Cost Table] 
 
93. Are the providers paid per client or service, or are they paid with a blanket, fixed-cost 
contract? [Cost Table] 
 
94. Have the treatment providers and/or the services they provide changed over time (for 
Drug Court: ―since Prop 36 was implemented‖)? (We need to find out which providers 
were operating at the time of our sample and find out information for them. Who was 
providing treatment during (the time of our sample)? [9, 43] 
 
95. What type of information does the treatment provider share with Prop 36/Drug Court and 
how is it shared? (Prompts: progress reports, reports of missed treatment sessions, UAs) 
Is this information useful? [14] 
 
96. Are participants encouraged to attend other treatment support groups? (12-step programs) 
[13] 
 
97. Do the treatment providers serve non-Prop 36/non-Drug Court offenders? How often? 
How is this coordinated with probation? [11, 26] 
 
98. What is the primary philosophy or treatment model used? (At each agency. Prompt: strict 
boot camp, strengths based social work?) [10] 
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99. Are you involved in drug testing? (UAs?) [33, Cost Table] 
 
100.  Which agency/agencies are responsible for UAs for Prop 36/Drug Court? [33, Cost 
Tab1e]   
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: UAs 
 
101.  What is the drug testing process for Prop 36/ Drug Court? (Frequency per participant, 
what types of tests are given, who is responsible, who coordinates them, who administers 
them, and how are they conducted?) [33] 
 
102.  Are drug tests assigned randomly? If not, how are they assigned? [33] 
 
103.  Who performs the analysis? (For UAs and any other tests they use.) If contracted with a 
tech. company, what is the billable cost per UA? [33, Cost Table]  
 
104.  (If not contracted out) How much do you pay for each type of drug test? (What are the 
materials involved, how much of each are used per drug test, and what is the cost per 
unit?) [33, Cost Table] 
 
105.  Do clients pay for their drug tests? [33, Cost Table] 
 
106.  Has the drug testing process changed over time? [33, 43] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Fee Structure 
 
107.  Is there a fee required of Prop 36/Drug Court participants? If yes, how much is the fee? 
Is it on a sliding scale? What percentage of participants would you estimate pay the entire 
fee? [39, Cost Table] 
 
108.  Is full payment required for graduation? Is payment reduced if the participant 
successfully completes the Prop 36/Drug Court program? [39, Cost Table] 
 
109.  Who collects the fees? Where does the money go? Do you know what is the money 
used for? [39, Cost Table] 
 
110. Has the fee structure changed over time? If yes, when and how? (Was it the same at the 
time of our sample?) [39, 43, Cost Table] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Rewards/Sanctions 
 
111. For Prop 36/Drug Court participants, what behaviors are considered non-compliant? 
(Failure to appear at court or treatment sessions, positive UAs, subsequent arrests) [17, 
35] 
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112. What kinds of sanctions are imposed as a result? (Bench warrants, writing papers, site 
sanctions, community service, residential treatment, more frequent UAs or court 
appearances, incarceration, etc.) [35] 
 
113. Are sanctions graduated? How frequently are sanctions given? (Rare or quite common?) 
[35] 
 
114. How consistently are sanctions imposed for similar non-compliance behaviors? How 
swiftly is the sanction imposed after non-compliant behavior? How are the sanctions 
administered? [35] 
 
115. What is considered good behavior? [17, 34] 
 
116. What kinds of rewards are given for good behavior? (Applause, physical rewards such 
as key chains or movie tickets, less frequent court appearances) [34] 
 
117. Does the treatment team work together to determine sanctions and rewards? Does the 
Probation officer have any new or creative/different sanctions or rewards? [20, 34, 35] 
 
118. Has the reward/sanction process changed over time? [34, 35, 43] 
 
Prop 36: Failure 
 
119. What would prompt a termination from Prop 36? (Prompts: New arrest for drug 
possession or trafficking? Arrest for violent offense? Arrest for other nonviolent 
offenses? Nonparticipation or noncompliance with treatment or court orders? Failure to 
appear? Dirty UAs? Other?) [38] 
 
120.  If a participant is terminated, does he or she enter the Drug Court system? Would 
he/she be referred to the traditional court system? (Standard court process, stipulated 
facts trial, or sentencing because they have already pled guilty?) [38] 
 
121. Has the termination process changed over time? If yes, when and how? [38] 
 
Drug Court: Failure 
 
122. What would prompt a Drug Court termination? (Prompts: New arrest for drug 
possession or trafficking? Arrest for violent offense? Arrest for other nonviolent 
offenses? Nonparticipation or noncompliance with treatment or court orders? Failure to 
appear? Dirty UAs? Other?) [38] 
 
123.  If a participant is terminated, where does he or she enter the traditional court system? 
(Standard court process, stipulated facts trial, or sentencing because they have already 
pled guilty?) [38] 
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124.  Has the termination process changed since Prop 36 was implemented? If yes, when and 
how? [38] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Completion/Graduation 
 
125. Please describe the Prop 36/Drug Court completion process. Are there graduation 
activities?  [36]  
 
126.  How often is a completion/graduation ceremony held for Prop 36/Drug Court 
participants? (Note: Drug Court usually has a graduation while Prop 36 participants just 
“complete the program”) [36] 
 
127.  What are the requirements for Prop 36/Drug Court completion/graduation? 
(Number of days clean, payment of fines and Drug Court fees, employment, suitable 
housing, GED, other requirements) [17, 36] 
 
128.  Does completion of the Prop 36 program/graduation from Drug Court mean an 
end of probation? [7, 36]  
 
129.  What are the incentives to complete the Prop 36/Drug Court program? (Charges 
dismissed, guilty pleas stricken, probation in lieu of incarceration, probation shortened, 
felony reduced to misdemeanor, other incentives?) [7] 
 
130.  In your experience, do you think certain types of Prop 36/Drug Court clients have 
different completion/graduation rates? (For example, first timers versus repeat felons, 
type of addiction, a particular age group, etc.) [36, 42] 
 
131.  Have the completion requirements changed over time? If yes, when and how? 
(What was it like at the time of our sample?)  [36, 43] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Aftercare 
 
132. Is there an aftercare program for Prop 36/Drug Court clients? Is it mandated? [37] 
 
133. What are the requirements of the aftercare program and what services are offered? [37] 
 
134. What agency administers aftercare for Prop 36/Drug Court? Is it an in-house or 
contractual activity? If it is a contractual program, how is the contractor compensated? 
(E.g. per client per period of time, lump sum per period of time, per service consumed, 
etc.) [37, Cost Table] 
 
135. Who is involved with aftercare activities? What are those activities? How much time do 
they spend on each of those activities? (Time per client?) [37, Cost Table] 
 
136. How long does it last? [37]  
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137. What happens upon completion? (Incentives to complete?) [37] 
 
138. Has the Prop 36/Drug Court aftercare program changed over time? (What was it like at 
the time of our sample?) [37, 43] 
 
 
Prop 36 Program: Capacity and Enrollment   
(If the Coordinator does not know these numbers off hand ask for copies of recent reports or 
statistics that could be mailed to you that would give us this information.)  
139. Are you having difficulty meeting the demand for the Prop 36 program? (What steps are 
you taking to manage the number of participants?) [2] 
 
140. Total number enrolled to date? As of what date? [2] 
 
141. Number of completers/graduates to date? As of what date? [2] 
 
142. Number of active participants? [2] 
 
143. Number of unsuccessful terminations to date? As of what date? [2] 
 
144.  Do you keep statistics on those who have participated in Prop 36 more than once? (Can 
you give them to us? Can we have a copy?) [2, 40] 
 
145. How has enrollment changed since the implementation of the program? [2, 43] 
 
146. What is the primary drug used most frequently by Prop 36 participants? (Percentages of: 
Marijuana, Crack or Cocaine, Heroin, Methamphetamine, Poly Drug, Alcohol, Other) 
[5] 
 
Drug Court Program: Capacity and Enrollment   
(If the Coordinator does not know these numbers off hand ask for copies of recent reports or 
statistics that could be mailed to you that would give us this information.)  
147. What is the annual program capacity? How many are in the program at one time? How 
long do people stay in the program, on average? How many new participants each year? 
[2] 
 
148. What is the total number enrolled (ever) to date? As of what date? [2] 
 
149. What is the number of graduates to date? As of what date? [2] 
 
150. What is the number of active participants? How do you define active? [2] 
 
151. What is the number of unsuccessful terminations to date? As of what date? [2] 
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152. What is the primary drug of choice for Drug Court participants? (Percentages of: 
Marijuana, Crack or Cocaine, Heroin, Methamphetamine, Poly Drug, Alcohol, Other) 
[5] 
 
153. How has Drug Court enrollment changed since the implementation of Prop 36? [2, 43] 
 
154. Do you have statistics on how many of your Drug Court participants are former Prop 36 
participants? (Can you give them to us? Can we get a copy?) [2, 40] 
 
 
Regular (non Prop 36/Drug Court) Court Process   
(Ask DA, PD, Judge, Probation): 
155. In order to understand if and how the traditional Court process has changed to adjust to 
the addition of Prop 36/Drug Court, please describe the current court process and options 
for a person who is arrested on a Prop 36/Drug Court eligible charge, but does not enter 
either program. In particular, explore the flow and who is involved. What types of 
hearings and sentences do they receive? What about this system changed when Prop 36 
was implemented? (Probe: Are people sentenced to probation and do they usually serve 
the whole sentence, or can people be released from probation early? If so, how often 
does this happen, and what is the procedure? If this does happen with some regularity, 
typically how much of a person’s sentence are they likely to serve?) [Regular Court 
Table]  
 
156. Is treatment a condition of the offender‘s sentence? (E.g., as a condition of probation) 
How often? What is the probation process in these instances? What is the treatment 
process in these instances? [Regular Court Table] 
 
157. Who appears at a typical regular court (non-Prop 36/Drug Court) hearing? (Name the 
position of everyone in the courtroom who would appear for an average, typical case, as 
well as their corresponding agency. Probe: Public Defender, District Attorney, Court 
Clerks, Court Reporter, Judge, Bailiff, etc.) [Regular Court Table, Cost Table] 
 
158.  Are you (or your agency) involved with non-Prop 36/Drug Court activities? [Regular 
Court Table] 
 
159. Do you attend court for non-Prop 36/Drug Court cases? What kinds of cases? How often? 
[Regular Court Table] 
 
160. What is your role in these kinds of cases? (What activities are you involved in?) [Regular 
Court Table] 
 
Prop 36/Drug Court: Other 
 
161. What do you feel are some notable or unique characteristics of your Prop 36/Drug Court 
program? (Character of court, reputation) [44] 
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162. What do you think are the most promising practices of this Prop 36/Drug Court program? 
[44] 
 
163. What changes do you think could be made that would improve the Drug Court/Prop 36 
program? [42]  
 
Ending the Interview 
Is there anything else that you’d like to add about all the questions I’ve asked you? Is there 
anything that you think I’ve missed? 
 
Thank the respondent for their time and ask if they have any questions for you. Ask if they would be 
willing to be contacted should you have any follow-up or clarifying questions for them. If they agree, ask if 
they prefer to be called or emailed. 
 
 
San Joaquin Interview Products 
 
A.  Contacts Database 
B.  Prop 36 Description Table (FY 2002 – 2003) 
C.  Drug Court Description Table (FY 2002-2003) 
D.  Regular Court Description Table (FY 2002 - 2003) 
E.  Drug Court Description Table (FY 1998 – 1999) 
F. Regular Court Description Table (FY 1998 - 1999) 
G.  Drug Court Cost Table (FY 2002-2003) 
H.  Prop 36 Cost Table (FY 2002-2003) 
 
 
El Monte Interview Products 
A. Contacts Database 
B. Prop 36 Description Table (FY 2002 – 2003) 
C. Drug Court Description Table (FY 2002-2003) 
D. Regular Court Description Table (FY 2002 - 2003) 
E.  Drug Court Description Table (FY 1998 – 1999) 
F. Regular Court Description Table (FY 1998 - 1999) 
G. Drug Court Cost Table (FY 2002-2003) 
H. Prop 36 Cost Table (FY 2002-2003) 
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San Joaquin Felony Drug Court Compared to Drug Court II 
San Joaquin created a track of their Drug Court program specifically for SACPA participants 
called Drug Court II. This program is identical to their regular Drug Court (same staff, same 
treatment, same judge, same court sessions) except for the use of jail as a sanction. Jail cannot be 
used as a sanction for SACPA participants. This provided the unique opportunity to examine the 
Drug Court model without the use of incarceration as a sanction (Drug Court II), to the Drug 
Court model with incarceration (Felony Drug Court). Most of the participants in Drug Court II 
are individuals who were unable to successfully complete the less intensive versions of the 
SACPA program, although some participants do occasionally enter Drug Court II as their first 
SACPA experience. Charges eligible for Drug Court II include both felony and misdemeanors. 
In addition, some participants in Felony Drug Court are those who were unable to complete the 
SACPA program and are no longer eligible for SACPA funds. Other Felony Drug Court 
participants are offenders who were technically not legally eligible for SACPA (because of 
minor sales charges or because of other pending cases) and therefore did not experience SACPA 
first. As the name implies, Felony Drug Court is for felony charges only. Although this seems on 
the surface to be two very different populations, in reality, many Drug Court staff believe that it 
is just the timing of the arrest that is different between the two groups and therefore just a matter 
of chance depending on what the participants were caught with at the time of the arrests (whether 
sales could be proved) and where their other cases happened to be in the system at the time that 
would affect their eligibility. A comparison of demographics and other information available on 
participants in both programs also show no difference between the two groups. 
Table 38 below shows that, at least on the data elements available for this study, there is no 
significant difference between participants of Drug Court II and Felony Drug Court. Because 
many Felony Drug Court participants have the possibility of prison sentences in their future, it 
might be expected that they have a more extensive criminal history. The data in Table 38 
provides evidence that this is not the case. 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.   Appendix B: A Comparison of Drug Court II and Felony Drug Court in San Joaquin County 
141 
Table 38. Participant Characteristics for San Joaquin Drug Court II and Felony 
Drug Court  
 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court II 
N = 60 
San Joaquin 
Felony  
Drug Court 
N = 68 
Significant 
Difference? 
P < .01 
Age  35  37  No 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
 
72% 
28% 
 
68% 
32% 
 
No 
Race/Ethnicity 
White 
Hispanic/Latino 
African American 
 
39% 
23% 
25% 
 
39% 
19% 
21% 
 
No 
Drug of Choice 
Meth* 
Cocaine* 
Heroin 
Marijuana 
Alcohol 
 
32% 
20% 
19% 
20% 
6% 
 
24% 
21% 
27% 
11% 
13% 
 
No 
 
Mean # of Arrests in 2 years 
prior to program entry  4.5  4.5  No 
Mean # of arrests with drug 
charges in 2 years prior  2.9  3.2  No 
Mean # of arrests with felony 
charges in 2 years prior*  2.9  2.9  No 
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Table 39, below, presents the program process related data for Drug Court II and Felony Drug 
Court. The main difference between these process related elements is the length of time between 
the arrests and entry into the program. Because Drug Court II is primarily for SACPA 
participants who have attempted other SACPA program options first, there is a significantly 
longer time between the arrest and Drug Court entry while because Felony Drug Court includes 
offenders who do not go through SACPA first, the time from arrests to Drug Court entry is 
shorter (and closer to the length of time it took for offenders to enter the program before 
SACPA). There were no significant differences in the amount of time in treatment or the amount 
of time spent receiving judicial oversight (the number Drug Court sessions). 
Table 39. San Joaquin Program Process Drug Court II vs. Felony Drug Court  
 
San Joaquin 
Drug Court II 
San Joaquin 
Felony 
Drug Court 
Significant 
Difference? 
Mean Number of Days 
Between Arrest and Program 
Entry 
546 
median=485 
164 
median=84 
Yes 
Mean Number of Days in 
Treatment/Program  157  150  No 
Mean Number of Drug 
Court Sessions Attended  13  13  No 
 
Figure 21 provides the average number of re-arrests over time for 3 years after program entry for 
Drug Court II participants compared to Felony Drug Court participants. Felony Drug Court 
participants had significantly fewer re-arrests (p < .01) after 2 and 3 years than Drug Court II 
participants. Felony Drug Court participants also had significantly fewer re-arrests with drug 
related charges after 3 years from program entry than Drug Court II participants (average drug 
re-arrests for Felony Drug Court =2.4 versus Drug Court II = 3.8). Interestingly, there was no 
significant difference in graduation rate, felony re-arrests, time served in jail or even time served 
in prison in the 3 years after program entry between Felony Drug Court and Drug Court II (even 
though Felony Drug Court participants should be made up to a large extent of offenders that 
were facing prison time). 
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Figure 21. Average Number of Re-Arrests per Participant for Drug Court II and 
Felony Drug Court 
 
Note: The means reported in Figure 21 are adjusted based on any differences between these two groups on 
gender, ethnicity, age, prior arrests, prior drug arrests, time incarcerated and drug of choice. For this reason, 
these means may not average to the means reported for Drug Court at T2 earlier in this document which were 
adjusted for differences between Drug Court participants and SACPA participants. 
 
There are a few possible explanations related to SACPA and Drug Court practices that might 
explain the higher recidivism for Drug Court II. One is the extended length of time between 
arrest and entry into the Drug Court II program. As described earlier, a key component of the 
Drug Court model is that eligible offenders should be identified quickly and promptly placed in 
the Drug Court program. The prompt placement in treatment that is strongly enforced by the 
judicial component of Drug Court may be a strong factor in positive outcomes for Drug Court 
participants. A second explanation is also one that was described earlier, that offenders who 
participate in other versions of SACPA first and have failed have a strong likelihood of being re-
arrested (which could be a reason for why they did not successfully complete SACPA treatment) 
and of continuing drug use and therefore being more highly addicted by the time they enter the 
Drug Court II program.  
Finally, Drug Court II and Felony Drug Court have identical policies and procedures (including 
the same judge and the same treatment providers, the same number of drug tests and attendance 
at the same Drug Court sessions) except for the use of jail as a sanction. There are many 
proponents of the use of jail as a sanction. The belief being that threat of incarceration is an 
extremely effective deterrent to drug use and other behaviors that are non-compliant to program 
requirements.  
As described in the introduction to this report, of those states that have implemented state-
mandated treatment for drug offenders only California and Arizona specifically prohibit the court 
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from using incarceration as a penalty for continued drug possession or use (VanderWaal et al., 
2006) and in an attempt to remedy what is perceived as the faulty accountability mechanisms in 
SACPA, the California legislature passed a law in 2006 (SB 803/1137) to allow the use of 
―shock incarceration‖ for offenders who are not complying with SACPA program requirements. 
This has been hotly contested by SACPA proponents and an injunction has been granted to stop 
the new law. However, this data from San Joaquin provides some support for the belief that the 
use of jail as a sanction in the Felony Drug Court was indeed an effective deterrent to 
participants‘ inappropriate behaviors and a good teaching tool for participants to take 
responsibility for their future behavior, resulting in lower recidivism. 
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Results for Drug Court and SACPA Program Completers 
SAN JOAQUIN DRUG COURT GRADUATES AT TIME 1 AND TIME 2 
Outcome Transaction Costs for Drug Court Graduates. The study of Drug Court programs at 
two time periods allows the opportunity to perform a direct comparison of Drug Court graduates. 
Table 40 provides outcome costs for San Joaquin Drug Court graduates only. Note that the 
sample sizes in this case are very small and the results should be taken with caution. 
Table 40. San Joaquin Outcome Costs per Drug Court Graduate Pre- and Post-SACPA 
Transaction  Unit Cost 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
per 
Graduate SJ 
Drug Court 
T1
67 
N=59 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
per 
Graduate SJ 
Drug Court  
T2
68 
N=29 
Mean 
Cost per 
Graduate SJ 
Drug Court 
T1 
N = 59 
Mean 
Cost per 
Graduate SJ 
Drug Court 
T2 
N = 29 
Re-arrests  $216.08  .94  1.77  $203  $382 
Court Cases  $2,265.93  .60  1.08  $1,360  $2,447 
Jail Bookings   $152.12  2.45  1.69  $373  $257 
Jail Days  $103.64  82.77  44.17  $8,578  $4,578 
Probation Days  $0.83  407.41  370.76  $338  $308 
Prison Days  $93.56  34.08  52.83  $3,189  $4,943 
Total        $14,041  $12,915 
Victimizations – 
Person Crimes 
$38,414.00  .16  .01  $6,146  $384 
Victimizations – 
Property Crimes 
$11,858.00  .14  .54  $1,660  $6,403 
Total w/ 
Victimizations 
      $21,847  $19,702 
 
Outcome costs per graduate went down, although not significantly, from Drug Court pre-SACPA 
to Drug Court post-SACPA ($21,847 to $19,702), even though the average number of re-arrests, 
subsequent court cases, and prison days increased. This is due in large part to the number of 
outcome jail days dropping by almost half (82.77 to 44.17 days). This reduction in outcome jail 
day costs offsets the increases in every other category. Victimization costs do not alter the 
difference for graduates pre and post-SACPA ($14,041 to $12,915).  
                                                 
67 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
68 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
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EL MONTE DRUG COURT GRADUATES AT TIME 1 AND TIME 2 
Again, the comparison of Drug Court programs at two time periods allows the comparison of 
program graduates. Table 41 provides the outcome costs for El Monte graduates pre and post-
SACPA. 
Table 41. Outcome Costs per El Monte Drug Court Graduate Pre- and Post-SACPA 
Transaction  Unit Cost 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
per Graduate 
EM 
Drug Court 
T1
69 
N=102 
Mean # of 
Transactions 
per Graduate 
EM 
Drug Court 
T2
70 
N=73 
Mean 
Cost per 
Graduate 
EM 
Drug Court 
T1 
N = 102 
Mean 
Cost per 
Graduate 
EM 
Drug Court 
T2 
N = 73 
Re-arrests  $457.18  0.81  1.69  $370  $773 
Court Cases  $2,030.56  0.36  0.75  $731  $1,523 
Jail Bookings   $742.23  1.10  1.02  $816  $757 
Jail Days (Men)  $68.21  53.51  25.07  $3,650  $1,710 
Jail Days 
(Women)  $84.44  15.32  0.31  $1,294  $26 
Probation Days  $4.43  241.85  216.50  $1,071  $959 
Prison Days  $93.56  9.08  37.10  $850  $3,471 
Total        $8,782  $9,219 
Victimizations – 
Person Crimes  $38,414.00  0.05  0.04  $1,921  $1,537 
Victimizations – 
Property Crimes  $11,858.00  0.18  0.21  $2,134  $2,490 
Total w/ 
Victimizations        $12,837  $13,246 
 
Table 41 shows that outcome costs for graduates of the El Monte Drug Court increased slightly 
from pre-SACPA to post-SACPA, but not significantly. Prison days, court cases, and re-arrests 
showed large increases, while jail days had large decreases. The change in Drug Court outcome 
costs from pre-SACPA to the post-SACPA period was an increase of only $409, or 3%. Without 
victimizations, the difference was $437, or 5%. These results provide evidence that Drug Court 
graduates continue to do reasonably well both pre and post-SACPA. 
                                                 
69 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
70 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
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SAN JOAQUIN COMPARISON OF DRUG COURT AND SACPA COMPLETERS 
Program Completers Investment Costs. The examination of these programs allows a unique 
opportunity to compare completers across program. The program investment costs for 
completers were higher than for all participants for all programs, but showed the same 
proportional differences between Drug Court and SACPA programs with SACPA treatment 
costing nearly triple that of Drug Court at either time period. Table 42, below, presents the 
program costs for San Joaquin Drug Court participants pre-SACPA, SACPA participants, and 
Drug Court participant post-SACPA. 
Table 42. San Joaquin Program Costs per Successful Completers for pre-SACPA Drug 
Court, SACPA and Post-SACPA Drug Court 
Transaction 
Drug Court 
Unit Cost 
SACPA 
Unit Cost 
Mean. 
Cost per 
Graduate SJ 
Drug Court 
T1
71 
N=59 
Mean. 
Cost per 
Completer 
SJ SACPA 
N=122 
Mean. 
Cost per 
Graduate SJ 
Drug Court 
T2
72 
N=29 
Drug Court 
Appearances 
$105.26  NA  $3,558  NA  $2,968 
SACPA Case 
Processing 
NA  $2,265.93  NA  $2,266  NA 
Case 
Management 
$1.13  $0.90  $477  $476  $406 
Treatment
73   NA  NA  $1,600  $14,121  $3,732 
Urinalyses (UAs)  $7.61  $8.00  $370  $139  $199 
Total      $6,005  $17,002  $7,305 
 
Graduates of the Drug Court program in San Joaquin County at both time periods had lower 
program investment costs ($6,005 for T1 and $7,305 for T2) than completers of the SACPA 
program ($17,002). Costs for graduates/completers of both programs are higher than for those of 
all participants because graduates spend more time in the programs on average and have gone 
through the full treatment and case management process, while all participants includes those 
that dropped out or terminated early on in the program (and subsequently didn‘t receive as many 
services or attend as many treatment sessions). As with all participants, treatment costs for 
SACPA graduates ($14,121) is significantly higher than treatment costs for graduates of Drug 
Court T1 ($1,600) or Drug Court T2 ($3,732). 
Table 43 provides outcome costs for completers of Drug Courts and SACPA. 
                                                 
71 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
72 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
73 Treatment includes group and individual treatment sessions, as well as residential treatment. 
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Table 43. San Joaquin Outcome Costs per Completer for pre-SACPA Drug Court, 
SACPA and Post-SACPA Drug Court  
Transaction 
Unit 
Costs 
Mean Cost per 
Graduate SJ 
Drug Court 
T1
74 
N = 59 
Mean 
Cost per 
Completer SJ 
SACPA 
N = 122 
Mean Cost per  
Graduate SJ 
Drug Court 
T2
75 
N = 29 
Re-arrests  $216.08  $203  $538  $382 
Court Cases  $2,265.93  $1,360  $1,858  $2,447 
Jail Bookings   $152.12  $342  $277  $257 
Jail Days  $103.64  $8,578  $3,133  $4,578 
Probation Days  $0.83  $338  $179  $308 
Prison Days  $93.56  $3,189  $1,547  $4,943 
Total    $14,010  $7,532  $12,915 
Victimizations – 
Person Crimes 
$38,414.00  $6,146  $11,524  $384 
Victimizations – 
Property Crimes 
$11,858.00  $1,660  $5,218  $6,403 
Total w/ 
Victimizations 
  $21,816  $24,274  $19,702 
 
Outcome costs for completers of the SACPA program in San Joaquin County were higher 
($24,274) than outcome costs for graduates of Drug Court pre-SACPA ($21,816) or post-
SACPA ($19,702). Again, when excluding victimization costs, the reverse was true—SACPA 
had the lowest outcome costs ($7,532) when compared to either Drug Court T1 ($14,010) or 
Drug Court T2 ($12,915). This is because SACPA completers had a large cost for person/violent 
victimization costs (47% of the total outcome costs for SACPA). The jail, prison, and 
victimizations outcome transactions resulted in the highest portion of outcome costs for all 3 
groups, similar to the situation for all participants of each group. 
                                                 
74 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
75 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
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EL MONTE COMPARISON OF DRUG COURT AND SACPA COMPLETERS 
Program Completers Investment Costs. The costs for completers were also compared on 
program investments. Like San Joaquin, completers total investment costs were higher in every 
program but results across program were proportionally the same with SACPA participants 
costing the most by far. Table 44, below, provides the costs for El Monte Drug Court and 
SACPA completers. 
Table 44. El Monte Program Costs per Completer for pre-SACPA Drug Court, SACPA 
and Post-SACPA Drug Court 
Transaction 
Drug Court 
Unit Cost 
SACPA 
Unit Cost 
Mean 
Cost per 
Graduate EM 
Drug Court 
T1
76 
N=102 
Mean 
Cost per 
Completer 
EM SACPA 
N=102 
Mean 
Cost per 
Graduate EM 
Drug Court 
T2
77 
N=73 
Drug Court/ 
SACPA 
Appearances 
$80.26  $41.96  $783  $1,001  $1,397 
Case 
Management  $1.26  $1.03  $530  $716  $570 
Treatment
78  NA  NA  $3,194  $17,740  $4,278 
Urinalyses (UAs)  $3.39  $8.06  $514  $862  $355 
Jail Sanctions 
(Men)  $68.21  NA  $237  $0  $1,548 
Jail Sanctions 
(Women)  $84.44  NA  $199  $0  $2,376 
Total      $5,457  $20,319  $10,524 
 
Table 44 shows that program investment costs in El Monte were even higher for completers in 
both programs than for all participants in. Graduates of Drug Court pre-SACPA had an average 
program investment cost of $5,457. Graduates of Drug Court Post-SACPA had nearly twice the 
average program investment cost ($10,524) of Drug Court pre-SACPA, while completers of the 
SACPA program had program investment costs almost 4 times that of Drug Court pre-SACPA 
($20,319). These differences are all significantly different (p < .01). Similar to the case for all 
participants, the difference between SACPA and Drug Court is mainly due to much higher 
treatment costs for SACPA. 
Table 45 provides outcome costs for completers of Drug Courts and SACPA. 
                                                 
76 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
77 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
78 Treatment includes group and individual treatment sessions, as well as residential treatment. 
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Table 45. El Monte Outcome Costs per Completer for pre-SACPA Drug Court, SACPA 
and Post-SACPA Drug Court  
Transaction  Unit Costs 
Mean 
Cost per 
Graduate EM 
Drug Court T1
79 
N = 102 
Mean 
Cost per 
Completer 
EM SACPA 
N = 102 
Mean 
Cost per  
Graduate EM 
Drug Court T2
80 
N = 73 
Re-arrests  $457.18  $370  $544  $773 
Court Cases  $2,030.56  $731  $914  $1,523 
Jail Bookings   $742.23  $816  $675  $757 
Jail Days (Men)  $68.21  $3,650  $1,538  $1,710 
Jail Days (Women)  $84.44  $1,294  $971  $26 
Probation Days  $4.43  $1,071  $299  $959 
Prison Days  $93.56  $850  $304  $3,471 
Total    $8,782  $5,245  $9,219 
Victimizations – 
Person Crimes  $38,414.00  $1,921  $4,226  $1,537 
Victimizations – 
Property Crimes  $11,858.00  $2,134  $474  $2,490 
Total w/ 
Victimizations    $12,837  $9,945  $13,246 
 
El Monte outcome costs for SACPA completers over 3 years ($9,945) were lower (though not 
significantly) than those of graduates of Drug Court T1 ($12,837) or Drug Court T2 ($13,246). 
The costs for completers only is a reversal of the situation when compared to the costs for all 
participants of Drug Court and SACPA. It may be that completers of SACPA are less hardened 
users or they may have had a shorter drug use ―career‖ than graduates of Drug Court. When 
victimization costs are excluded, SACPA completers still had the lowest outcome costs over 3 
years compared to Drug Court, with Drug Court post-SACPA the highest. As with all 
participants of each group, jail days and victimizations were the outcome transactions with the 
highest costs, although prison costs were only high for the Drug Court T2 group. 
                                                 
79 Drug Court T1= Drug Court in 1998-1999, before SACPA implementation. 
80 Drug Court T2= Drug Court in 2002-2003, 1 year after SACPA implementation. 
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